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Chapter 1
General Introduction
The aims of this chapter are to describe the motivation, the goals and the ndings pur-
suing this thesis. Two key components of the democracy have been analyzed: political
parties with ambiguous features and voting behavior when agents have preferences af-
fected by the inuence of other agents when voting. Section 1.1 provides the motivation,
some background information regarding the topic, and the main contributions for each
topic. Section 1.2 presents each of the goals that are developed individually in Chapters
2 to 6. Finally, Section 1.3 presents a brief summary of the methodology used in each of
the chapters.
1.1 Research Scope
This section introduces the scope of this thesis, which develops di¤erent scenarios indi-
vidually regarding political parties and votersbehavior.
1.1.1 Political Parties
One of the main goals of this thesis is to demonstrate the strategies of two political parties
that compete in order to win the elections, given that one party is viewed as traditional
7
whilst the other party is perceived by the voters as being ambiguous. The traditional
party is characterized by o¤ering a unique platform and only being interested in winning
the elections. Therefore, the strategy of this party is to nd the location in which the
party maximizes its probability of winning the elections. The ambiguous party also wants
to win the elections, however, its political platform consists of several di¤erent policies.
The motivation behind this study consists of the recent incorporation of new political
parties within the political arena, that try to be perceived by voters as non-ideological
and non-traditional, in order to attract the highest number of voters possible.
The existing literature already demonstrates what are the consequences of a two-party
political competition when two traditional parties compete with the same intention of
winning the elections. In this case, the Downsian equilibrium illustrates both parties
locate at the median voter position (Downs, 1957), that is to say, the position at the
middle of the policy space. On this basis, this thesis studies the case in which a traditional
party and an ambiguous party compete to win the elections and studies the consequences
in terms of political strategies taken from both parties. A political party is perceived as
being ambiguous if voters cannot relate a specic policy to that party. This implies that
the political party is evaluated by voters as a lottery, in which a positive probability is
given to each policy announced by the ambiguous party.
In 1957, Anthony Downs states in his book "An Economic Theory of Democracy",
that a political party can be interested in being ambiguous in order to win the elections.
According to Downs (1957), "Ambiguity thus increases the number of voters to whom a
party may appeal. This fact encourages parties in a two party system to be as equivocal
as possible about their stands on each controversial issue. And since both parties nd it
rational to be ambiguous, neither is forced by the others clarity to take a more precise
stand."
This thesis analyzes two particular scenarios individually, in which one of the political
parties represents an ambiguous party and the other party acts as a traditional one. The
rst scenario studies the case of an assembly party. An assembly party takes decisions
8
according to what the a¢ liate members vote in an assembly prior to an election, and
they can be represented by means of a lottery. This scenario is developed in Chapter 2.
The second scenario considers a political party composed of various internal factions:
an ideological and an opportunist. This model follows the arguments of Roemer (1999)
which characterizes political parties by obtaining several internal factions that take part
in the design of the nal policy implemented by the political party. The ideological
faction is in charge of keeping the ideological principles of the founders of the party. This
faction can also be interpreted as the "party label" or "party brand", or as the mean
policy of the di¤erent political platforms that the party has implemented throughout
its history. The opportunistic faction is in charge of maximizing the number of votes
achieved by the party, that is to say, it proposes a platform that allows the party to
win the elections. Given that both factions have the same weight within the party, the
nal political platform is estimated by voters as a lottery. This scenario is developed in
Chapter 3.
The nal issue is why political parties decide to be ambiguous, not as a political strat-
egy, but due to their motivation to represent the highest number of voters possible. In
this way, the theoretical setting is characterized by two parties with a two-fold objective:
representing the electorate and winning the elections. This scenario is fully developed in
Chapter 4.
1.1.2 Voters
The second goal of this thesis is to study a particular voting scenario in which agents not
only consider their favorite option when voting, they also consider the favorite option of
the other agents. In real life situations, it is common to nd agents that, once they have
to vote for an alternative, they misrepresent their opinions and vote for the alternative
preferred by the group. The tendency of agents to adapt their votes to those of other
agents is known in social psychology as conformity.
Conformity has been studied in social psychology since the 1950s. In 1951, social
9
scientist Solomon Asch found the rst evidence of this social attitude in a laboratory
experiment. Later, the study of Deutsch and Gerard (1955) identied two types of social
inuences: informational and normative. Informational inuence refers to updating an
opinion taking into account the previous opinions of others, whereas normative inuence
describes the behavior of stating an opinion that ts with the group choice.
In a voting procedure, this behavior can determine that the chosen decision is not
the one that represents the real preferences of the agents. Besides, the fact that they
impose themselves the need to vote for the same option as some other group members,
makes them vote for a option di¤erent from the preferred one. This can represent a serious
problem in scenarios such as trials, boards of directors, quality committees, courts, among
other committees in charge of taking decisions.
This thesis presents a model in which the discussion stage is not necessary since agents
have their preferences well dened regarding two possible options: to remain with the
current option or to change it. First, agents want their opinions to succeed. If their
votes have no e¤ect on the decision, conformity arises and they want their messages to
coincide with the messages of other agents. In Dutta and Sen (2012), agentspreferences
are also lexicographic, but in the sense that agents have a preference for honesty when
announcing the true state does not change their welfare. Dutta and Sen (2012) call these
agents partially honest. However, agents a¤ected by conformity are not necessarily
partially honest. A conformist agent strictly prefers to conform to the opinion of certain
reference group when her message does not have any inuence on the decision, regardless
of whether her message corresponds with her true opinion.
Thus, this thesis highlights the consequences of having agents with such preferences
over the adopted decision, in an environment in which all agents vote simultaneously.
Then, it proposes a mechanism that guarantees the outcome obtained when all agents
vote truthfully. This case is studied in general, for any number of agents, for any threshold
considered to accept the proposal and considering that agents want to coincide with any
number of agents within the group. Finally, the same scenario is analyzed under a
10
sequential setting. This model is fully developed in Chapter 5.
The fact that this procedure is binary there are only two options, and there is com-
plete information all agents know the options preferred by the other agents, facilitates
the use of a laboratory experiment to check whether theoretical results can be replicated
empirically. The nal contribution of this thesis is to induce conformity in the labora-
tory for groups of 5 agents for a particular preference prole in which, 3 agents prefer
one option and the other 2 agents prefer the other. A theoretical and an experimental
analysis is conducted in Chapter 6 showing these ndings.
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1.2 Research goals
The main objective of this thesis is the use of game theoretic tools in order to analyze the
strategic behavior of two fundamental parts of democracy: political parties and voters.
There are ve specic goals which corresponds to each of the studies developed in this
thesis:
1. Model of political competition where an assembly political party and a traditional
party compete to win the elections. First, we present the political strategies that
each of the parties consider in order to win the elections. We also demonstrate
how the existence of an assembly party determines the political strategy that the
traditional party can take.
2. Model of political competition between a traditional party and a party with two
internal factions: an ideological and an opportunistic faction. We study the political
strategies taken by both parties when there is uncertainty about the party which has
valence advantage, and about the degree of such advantage when the two-factions
party has a rst mover advantage.
3. Model of political competition between two non-ideological political parties which
are characterized by proposing ambiguous strategies. We study the political strate-
gies that each party carries out in order to achieve the parties two main goals:
representing the electorate and winning the elections.
4. Binary-voting game in which agents not only consider the nal decision when voting,
they also consider the vote of the other agents. First, we identify the consequences
of the conformity phenomenon over the voting behavior of the agents. Next, we
propose a mechanism that guarantees that the decision obtained always coincides
with the one obtained when all agents vote truthfully.
12
5. Finding empirical support for the theoretical predictions obtained in Objective 4
by means of a laboratory experiment applied to a particular situation with 5 group
members and a particular preference prole.
Each of the goals previously mentioned are studied individually in chapters 2 to 6.
13
1.3 Methodology
In this section, the main characteristics of the methodology used in Chapters 2 to 6 are
presented. They are divided into two parts: one part is dedicated to the methodology
used in the three chapters that analyze political competition cases. The other presents
the methodology used in the two chapters that analyze conformity in voting. Further
details regarding the methodology are described throughout each chapter.
1.3.1 Political Parties
Two parties are considered. The strategies of each party are determined by the parties
utility function and by the benets received in each of the strategies, meaning by strate-
gies the locations each political party o¤ers to the electorate within a unidimensional
political space. Votersutility depends on a valence characteristic , associated to each
of the parties, and the euclidean distance between the ideal policy of the voter and the
nal location of the political party. Therefore, voters support that party that derives a
greater utility. In the case that voters are indi¤erent between both parties, they will ab-
stain from voting. Each of the scenarios analyzed are characterized by a di¤erent timing
that establishes which of the parties moves rst in the case of a sequential competition
game (Chapter 3) or, whether there are stages prior to the elections are held (Chapters
2 and 4). The equilibrium concept used in the abovementioned scenarios are those of
game theory. In particular, we take the equilibrium concept of Nash equilibrium under
weakly undominated strategies.
1.3.2 Voters
This part of the thesis concentrates on observing the consequences of voters who are
a¤ected by the conformity phenomenon upon voting. A group of n agents are considered
(Chapter 5). They have to vote between accepting or rejecting a proposal taking their
opinions of each option into consideration. Various thresholds are used to accept the
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proposal. Again, the equilibrium concept and the reasoning chosen to solve this game are
those developed in game theory. In order to obtain the votersstrategies in equilibrium,
the equilibrium concept used is of Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies.
The agents best responses are studied for each of the thresholds used to accept the
proposal, from where the results will determine whether the outcome is inuenced by
conformity or not. For the experimental scenario (Chapter 6), only groups of 5 agents are
considered. First, the theoretical model is studied and then the experiment is conducted
inducing conformity in the behavior of the agents. In the experiment, three scenarios are
analyzed: when agentspayo¤s only depend on the outcome, when agentspayo¤s are
induced by conformity, and when there is information about the vote of two agents prior
to agents vote. Marginal e¤ects are estimated using logit regressions.
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Chapter 2
Downsian Competition with
Assembly Democracy
Coauthored with Socorro Puy. Published in The Political Economy of Gover-
nance: Institutions, Political Performance and Elections. Editors: Schoeld,
N. y G. Caballero. Springer (2015). ISBN: 978-3-319-15550-0. DOI 10.1007/978-
3-319-15551-7.
2.1 Introduction
In the last decade, small groups of citizens all over Europe and in the U.S. have spread
their protests in demand for more civil participation in the process of policy decision
making. In Spain, the so-called 15-M inspired in the Arab Spring and in the U.S. the
Occupy Wall Street (OWS), are examples of social movements that are protesting against
the current democratic systems. On the one hand, internet networks have facilitated the
coordination in the action of these groups that have become stronger. On the other hand,
the size of these groups does not seem to threaten, up to now, the stability of the current
political systems neither in the U.S. nor in the European continent. While the media has
widely covered the protests of these groups, politicians and the members of traditional
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political parties do not have attended these demands so far.
The social movements mentioned above do not agree with the power that political
parties have acquired in representative democratic systems. They defend either indepen-
dent candidates which are not tied by party discipline, or more direct participation of
the citizens in the process of policy decision making.
In addition, there is a recent phenomenon in current western democracies by which
the autonomy of states has reduced due to the development of supranational political
institutions such as United Nations, European Union, IMF, NATO, among others (Held,
1991; Dahl 1994). Many countries in Europe and in the American continent have reduced
their decision-making power whereas supranational institutions have increased their com-
petencies. As a consequence, citizens nd that the process of policy decision-making is
increasingly moving out of their scope. This has generated an extra discontent over the
traditional parties which have shown no clear opposition against the process of delegating
state power. The pressure of the civil society to recover the state autonomy has become
more intense (this is the case of many protests in European countries such as Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Spain and others across the Atlantic, Canada and U.S.).1
As a response to these protests, there is a number of new political parties in many
European countries which incorporate, in their policy platforms, the proposals of these
social movements. A key aspect of these partiesmanifesto is the promotion of new
forms of participatory democracy. The impact of these new parties will have to be
tested in the ballot boxes. So far, however, they have shown to be quite successful.
This was evidenced in the last 2014 European Elections in which political parties such as
"Movimento 5 Stelle" obtained 17 seats out of 73 in Italy, and "Podemos", a three-month-
old party in Spain, gained ve seats in the European Parliament, being the fourth-largest
representation for Spain.2
1See http://www.cbsnews.com/2718-201_162-1290/occupy-wall-street-protests/
for a media coverage of these protests.
2http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/world/europe/spanish-upstart-party-said-it-could-and-did-
now-the-hard-part-begins.html?_r=0
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In this paper, we propose a stylized model which tries to deduce the e¤ects derived
from the political competition between traditional parties and new parties which promote
participatory democracy. Whereas Matsusaka (2005) suggests that assembly democracies
has dwindled in importance, we nd that, in the last decade, the media has taken the
protests of social movements to the front page and voters are showing an increasing
and non-negligible interest for alternative forms of democracy among which assembly
democracy is one of them.
According to representative democracy, citizens vote to elect their representatives on
whom they delegate political decisions. Representative democracy is the most widespread
form of democracy. The essence of representative democracy is the competition among
candidates which, in most cases, are a¢ liated to di¤erent political parties. Either a plu-
rality system or a proportional system can lead to one or more representatives holding
the ultimate power of policy decision making. In every legislature, citizens elect their
representatives with their ballot and political accountability is guaranteed by the repre-
sentativesincentives to be reelected. Representative democracy is viewed as one of the
most e¤ective mechanisms to achieve political stability. This political stability, however,
can be threatened when citizens perceive that the interests of the representatives are
moving in opposite directions to their own interests (Kalt and Zupan 1984; Peltzman,
1984). As claimed by Budge (2001a, 2001b): "Representative democracies are decient
in many respects, all of which fundamentally stem from the limited role they allow citizens
in government. Most decisions are imposed on those a¤ected without consulting them".3
Assembly democracy is a form of direct democracy in which citizens in an assembly
directly vote on initiatives. This type of democracy, that can be traced back to the
Greek city of Athens, has scarcely been put into practice in our days. The most well-
known experience is in Switzerland, in which popular assemblies in each of the cantons
approve citizens initiatives by popular vote. Assembly democracy is not exclusive of
Switzerland, but also the towns of the states of New England in the U.S., are governed
3See also Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
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by periodic meetings that discuss and vote their main issues (the term town corresponds
to municipalities in other places).4 There is no "pure" form of direct democracy as
in both, Switzerland and New England, popular assemblies coexist with representative
democracy at higher levels of government. Opponents to direct democracy claim that this
procedure generates delays, conicts, and even tyranny of the majority among others.
In this paper, we propose a theoretical exercise which combines elements from both,
direct and representative democracy. Our simplied model tries to resemble as much as
possible the well-known Downsian model of political competition (Downs, 1957; Hotelling,
1929). We consider a unidimensional policy space in which voters endowed with single-
peaked preferences are identied with an ideal policy. A political party defends the
principles of representative democracy (Party A) and another, defends assembly democ-
racy (Party B). The degree of social protest against the traditional political party is
introduced in the form of a valence characteristic. The two parties face each other at a
general election that is solved by majority voting rule. Party A is a pure o¢ ce seeking
political party that selects a platform as to defeat its counterpart. Party B cannot com-
mit to certain platforms given that the party manifesto contains those proposals decided
in a pre-electoral assembly. In the case of winning the elections, Party B will implement
the platform decided in a post-electoral assembly. Both assemblies, the pre-electoral and
the post-electoral, we consider, are open to all who wish to take part.
At the pre-electoral assembly of Party B, citizens can launch and defend proposals. We
follow the citizen-candidate approach as a rationale to deduce the endogenous location
of the proposals at the pre-electoral assembly (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and
Slivinsky, 1996). According to this approach, every conguration of proposals at the
pre-electoral assembly should be sustained as a Nash equilibrium outcome in which none
of the citizens who have launched a proposal at the assembly can benet from dropping
it out, and no other citizen who has not launched a proposal can benet from presenting
one. For the sake of simplicity, we just consider pre-electoral assemblies in which just
4There are other experiencies of direct democracy in Italy (see Putnam et al., 1993).
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two proposals are launched. Party A selects a platform as to maximize its chances of
winning the elections given the common believe on the assembly outcome.
We consider that voters, when casting their ballots at the general election, do evaluate
Party B in terms of the proposals launched at the pre-electoral assembly. As a result,
voters evaluate Party B in terms of a lottery that assigns probabilities to the assembly-
equilibrium proposals. That is, from the point of view of voters, Party B gathers certain
degree of ambiguity (in line with Shepsle, 1972; Alesina and Cukierman, 1990), whereas
Party A is characterized by a single policy.
Our results suggest that the assembly proposals (of Party B) should be su¢ ciently
moderated as to defeat a traditional party (Party A). Interestingly, competition does
not always result in a policy at the median voters ideal point (similar result to Romer
and Rosenthal, 1979). We nd that extremist assembly parties induce the traditional
party to locate at the median policy position, whereas centrist assembly parties move the
traditional party away from the median just in the opposite direction of the assemblys
median.
Ours is not the rst contribution analyzing the impact of direct democracy. Mat-
susaka (2005) describes the practice and theory of direct democracy through referenda
in some of the states of U.S., and shows that allowing the general public to participate in
lawmaking seems to improve the performance of government. In the same line, Gerber
(1996) compares states where referenda are available with those in which direct democ-
racy is not available. She shows that the threat of a ballot proposition can cause the
elected o¢ cial to choose policies that more closely reects the medians voter ideal policy.
Maskin and Tirole (2004) highlights some of the negative side e¤ects of direct democracy.
They show that this may lead to a worse outcome due to the citizenslack of access to
the expert opinion that is just available to legislators.
Our proposal can also be related to the literature on endogenous selection of electoral
rules. Barberà and Jackson (2004) explore this issue from a self-stable type of criteria and
more closely related, Aghion et al. (2002) analyze how much society chooses to delegate
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power to its leaders. According to their approach, di¤erent constitutions establish the
share of votes needed to block a leader, and this determines the level of "insulation"
of a leader. In our simplied framework, voters face two options: delegation of power
to a leader, or total insulation of the leader (i.e., assembly democracy). We show that
leaders in our framework are constrained in their decision by the expected proposals at
the assembly, that is, the assembly also has a relevant role in controlling political leaders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the formal
model. Section 3 provides the results for the case of full attendance at the assembly.
Section 4 analyzes the case in which not all the citizens are expected to attend the
assembly. Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2.2 Model
A general election is going to be held, in which voters will elect one out of two political
parties. The two competing political parties are denoted by Party A and Party B. These
parties di¤er in the constitutional structure they support. Party A defends representative
democracy and Party B defends assembly democracy.
Let [0; 1] be the unidimensional policy space.5 The continuum of voters have sym-
metric single-peaked preferences over the policy space. The ideal policies of voters are
distributed over [0; 1] according to a strictly increasing distribution function F . Let
xi 2 [0; 1] be the ideal policy of voter i and let xM 2 [0; 1] be the ideal policy of the
median voter in the population. Preferences of voters over policies are represented by
the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
ui (x) =   jx  xij
where the absolute distance between the ideal point and the policy x measures the disu-
5All the results also hold if instead of taking [0; 1], we take the real line as the policy space.
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tility for the agent.
The two political parties competing to win the elections are denoted by j 2 fA;Bg :
Party A is a traditional party that o¤ers a single policy xA 2 [0; 1]. Party B, on the
contrary, represents a party which decisions are taken in an assembly. Each party is
associated to a characteristic A; B > 0; where A represents the social preference for
a traditional structured political party and B represents the social preference for a new
party which defends the participation of the civil society. Let  = B   A be the
di¤erence in advantage between the two parties, which we interpret as a measure of the
degree of social protest against the traditional parties. We assume that both parties are
uncertain about the di¤erence in the advantage  and they both consider that the value
of  is distributed according to a strictly positive density function.
Party B defends a new form of democracy in which their primary decision making
body is an assembly open to all who wish to take part. This is, in fact, in the spirit
of the global Occupy Movements. We consider that this party runs two assemblies, one
before the general elections in which all those who wish to, can launch policy proposals,
and another just after the elections in which all those who want to participate, vote over
the pre-assembly proposals. The pre-electoral assembly aims at collecting information
about those policy proposals with options to defeat any other proposal in a plurality
vote election. The fact that the assembly party organizes two assemblies is inspired by
the anecdotal evidence of the Spanish new left-wing party called "Podemos". For the
rst time participating in an election (European Parliament Elections), the party has
organized its program around many assemblies, from which we outline the pre-electoral
and the post-electoral assemblies. Besides, the Italian party "Movimento 5 Stelle" also
organizes online referendums to take both pre-electoral and post-electoral decisions.
The timing of the proposed electoral game unfold as follows:
Stage 1 : Party B organizes the pre-electoral assembly where all who wish to take part,
can launch a proposal. Let XB be the set of proposals made at the assembly.
Stage 2 : Party A decides its political platform xA 2 [0; 1] :
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Stage 3 : General elections are held.
Stage 4 : If Party A wins, platform xA is implemented. If Party B wins, there is a
post-electoral assembly in which all who wish to take part vote over XB and the policy
obtaining more votes is implemented.
Observe that the proposals of Party B come from an assembly whereas the platform
of Party A comes from the strategic decision of the members of Party A. In this way,
there is an important di¤erence between the two parties given that Party B limits its
power to organizing the assembly and executing its decision. We next describe in more
detail the stages of the electoral game.
Stage 1: The pre-electoral assembly
In Stage 1, citizens have the option of launching a proposal at the pre-electoral as-
sembly. These proposals are defended by Party B during the electoral campaign and in
the case of Party B winning the general election, the post-electoral assembly will select
one of them.
Let ei 2 f0; 1g be citizen i0s strategy where ei = 0 means that agent i is not launching
a proposal and ei = 1 means that the citizen is launching a proposal. A prole of
strategies e describes the strategy for each of the citizens. If a citizen makes a proposal,
we consider that she cannot misrepresent her preferences so that the proposed policy is
her ideal policy. Let XB = fx1B; :::; xmBg be the set of proposals such that each proposal
xiB is the ideal policy of the citizen i who has launched it at the assembly. We assume
that launching a proposal has a small cost c > 0. In this way, a citizen has only incentives
to launch a proposal when either this has some chances of being selected at the post-
electoral assembly, or when this can a¤ect the policy that will be nally implemented if
Party B wins the elections.
For each prole of entry strategies e, the expected voting outcome at the post-electoral
assembly is represented by a lottery L(e) = fXB; pg where XB is the set of proposals and
p = (p1; :::; pm) with pi > 0 is the expected probability of each proposal being selected
at the post-electoral assembly. For example, if there are two proposals fx1B; x2Bg and
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L(e) = ffx1B; x2Bg ; (1; 0)g ; then x1B is expected to win. However, if there are two proposals
and L(e) =
fx1B; x2Bg ; (12 ; 12)	, the two proposals are expected to tie. Thus, L(e) is a
lottery that represents the expected voting outcome at the post-electoral assembly. The
expected voting outcome is common knowledge.
Let e i be the entry strategies for all citizens except for i. We say that a prole of
entry strategies e is a pre-assembly equilibrium if in expected utility terms,
Eui(L(e
))  cei  Eui(L(e0i; e i))  ce0i for all i and all e
0
i 2 f0; 1g:
Hence, a pre-assembly equilibrium requires that, on the one hand, no citizen strictly
improves launching a new proposal and, on the other hand, no candidate strictly benets
from dropping her proposal. Note that the pre-assembly equilibrium is a Nash equilib-
rium. For the sake of simplicity, we just consider pre-assembly equilibria in which just
two proposals are launched.
Stage 2: Party As election of platform
Party A is a pure o¢ ce-seeking political party. This party selects a platform xA as
to win the general elections. Given the proposals of the pre-electoral assembly and its
expected voting outcome, preferences of Party A are represented by:
v(xA; L(e)) =
8<: 1 if a strict majority of voters prefers xA over L(e)0 otherwise (2.1)
The members of Party A are uncertain about the degree of social protest of the electorate.
Therefore, they do not know whether they gather some advantage with respect to Party
B. Their optimal decision, that we denote by xA; maximizes their expected probability
of winning:
xA 2 argmaxEv(xA; L(e)):
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Stage 3: General election
Given A and B, the platform of Party A and the expected voting outcome at the
assembly L(e), the optimal decision of a voter is the following:
vote for Party A when A   ui(xA) > B   Eui(L(e))
vote for Party B when A   ui(xA) < B   Eui(L(e))
abstain from voting when A   ui(xA) = B   Eui(L(e)):
(2.2)
Stage 4: Electoral outcome
If Party A wins, then the implemented policy is xA: If Party B wins, then the post-
electoral assembly takes place and, by plurality rule, one of the proposals inXB is selected.
Ties are broken at random.
Next, we introduce the equilibrium concept that accounts for the strategic behavior
of Party A to select its platform, and for the strategic decision of the citizens to launch
proposals at the pre-electoral assembly.
Denition: A political equilibrium is a policy for Party A, xA, and a lottery representing
the expected voting outcome at the assembly, L(e) = fXB; pg ; such that:
i) e is a pre-assembly equilibrium and
ii) given L(e); policy xA maximizes Party As expected probability of winning.
Note that, given a pre-assembly equilibrium, the probability with which each pre-
assembly proposal can be selected is directly derived from sincere voting behavior at the
post-electoral assembly.6
6A similar analysis could be made in which participants at the post-electoral assembly vote strategi-
cally. None of our results rest on the sincere voting assumption.
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2.3 The assembly with full attendance
We follow the citizen-candidate model proposed by Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) in order
to dene how endogenous political platforms can be proposed at the assembly. Osborne
and Slivinsky (1996) consider a continuum of citizens with single-peaked preferences over
the set of policy positions. Citizens can choose to enter or not and if they enter, they
propose their ideal policy. After the citizens have made their entry decision, they vote
over the proposals and under plurality rule one of them is selected. These authors do
neither refer to an assembly, nor they consider that citizens belong to a political party.
However, the result (in their Proposition 2) can be directly applied to our setting given
that the entry stage in their model resembles our pre-electoral assembly stage. Their
Proposition 2 can be rewritten as:
Lemma 1 In every pre-assembly equilibrium with two proposals, these must be located
symmetrically around the position of the median voter, i.e. x1B = xM " and x2B = xM+";
where " 2 (c; ") and the winning probabilities must coincide p1 = p2:
Thus, in every pre-assembly equilibrium with two proposals, these should gather an
equal probability of winning. The upper bound " is dened as to avoid the entrance of a
third proposal in between the two others. Thus, " depends upon the distribution of voters
and this is dened as to guarantee that for all " < ", there is no citizen that proposing a
policy in the interval [xM   "; xM + "] can either defeat one of the policies x1B, x2B at the
post-electoral assembly, or can give the victory at the post-electoral assembly to one of
the policies x1B or x
2
B that she prefers.
7
At Stage 3, given a pre-assembly equilibrium with two proposals, the optimal decision
of the voters with ideal policy xi 2 [0; xM   "] and in the case that xA > xM   " is such
that:
7Following Osborne and Slivinsky, this basically implies that there is no policy position in the interval
[xM   "; xM + "] such that either is strictly preferred by more than 1=3 of the electorate or that it can
facilitate the victory of the closest proposal for the voter announcing this policy position.
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when  < xM   xA they vote for Party A
when  = xM   xA they abstain from voting
when  > xM   xA they vote for Party B.
(2.3)
where  = B   A:
When xi 2 [xM + "; 1] and in the case that xA < xM + " we have that:
when  < xA   xM they vote for Party A
when  = xA   xM they abstain from voting
when  > xA   xM they vote for Party B.
(2.4)
where  = B   A:
We refer to those voters whose ideal policy satises that xi 2 [0; xM   "] as low-
outsiders and to those for whom xi 2 [xM + "; 1] as up-outsiders. We refer to the
insiders as those voters such that xi 2 (xM   "; xM + ") :
Regarding the insiders, Eui(L(e)) = B   ": Let di = jxi   xAj ; then,
those insiders such that  < "  di vote for Party A.
those insiders such that  > "  di vote for Party B.
(2.5)
There is no abstention among insiders given that the probability for an agent to satisfy
di = "  is negligible. Figure 1 represents the provided classication of voters.
Figure 2-1: Location of the low-outsiders, the insiders and the up-outsiders with respect
to the assembly.
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Next, we derive the electoral result at the general election depending on the degree
of social protest of the society, . We describe which degree of discontent is favorable
for Party B to win the elections.
Proposition 1 In every political equilibrium with two proposals at the pre-electoral as-
sembly, Party B wins the elections if and only if   "
2
:
Proof. First, we show that if   "
2
then, Party B always wins. We consider that
 = "
2
:
If xA 2 [0; xM   "] ; according to (4), the up-outsiders vote for Party B and by (5), for
those insiders such that xi 2
 
xM   "2 ; xM + "

we have di > "2 ; which implies that they
also vote for Party B. Thus, Party B obtains a strict majority of votes. By a symmetric
type of argument, if xA 2 [xM + "; 1] ; Party B wins.
If xA 2
 
xM   "; xM   "2

; by (4), the up-outsiders vote for Party B and by (5), for
those insiders such that xi 2 [xM ; xM + ") we have di > "2 ; which implies that they vote
for Party B. Thus, Party B obtains a strict majority of votes. By a symmetric type of
argument, if xA 2
 
xM +
"
2
; xM + "

; Party B wins.
If xA 2
 
xM   "2 ; xM

; by (3) and (4) all the outsiders vote for Party B. Thus, Party A
only obtains the vote of the insiders such that di < "2 : However, in every pre-assembly
equilibrium, no subinterval of size " in between (xM   "; xM + ") can contain more than
1
3
of the votes and the rest of insiders vote for Party B.8 Thus, Party B obtains a strict
majority of votes. By a symmetric type of argument, if xA 2

xM ; xM +
"
2

; Party B
wins.
In the last case, when xA = xM   "2 by (3), the low-outsiders abstain from voting.
However, by (4) the up-outsiders vote for Party B and among the insiders, by (5), those
with xi 2 (xM ; xM + "] vote for Party B. Thus, even though Party B may not obtain a
strict majority, Party A cannot obtain more than 1
3
of the votes by the above argument
8Observe that for every xi 2 (xM   "; xM + ") ; the size of the interval, according to sincere voting
in the citizen candidate approach, is given by xi [xM "]2 +
xM+" xi
2 = ":
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and Party B wins. By a symmetric type of argument, if xA = xM + "2 ; Party B wins.
Given that Party B wins when  = "
2
; it also wins when  > "
2
:
Second, we show that when  < "
2
; Party B is defeated.
Suppose that xA = xM   "2 and let  = "2    with  ! 0: Then, by (3), the low-
outsiders vote for Party A and by (5), those insiders such that xi 2 (xM   "; xM ] also
vote for Party A. Thus, Party A obtains a strict majority. Given that Party A wins when
 = "
2
 ; it also wins locating at xA = xM  "2 for every other case where  2

0; "
2

:
This result gives a clear prediction of the party winning at the general election as a
function of the degree of social protest. If the degree of social protest is su¢ ciently high,
we show, Party A must locate in one of the insiders positions as this will guarantee the
votes of two di¤erent fractions of the electorate, some insiders and some outsiders. When
  "
2
; regardless of the location of Party A, there are no options for Party A to obtain
a majority of votes.
Figure 2 shows that the smaller the value of the parameter that denes the proposals
of the assembly ", the higher the chances of Party B to win at the general election.9 In the
horizontal axis we represent the values of " to which we refer as the degree of polarization
within the assembly. We say that the assembly proposals are moderated when " takes a
small value. In the vertical axis we represent the degree of social protest. Thus, we can
interpret the rst result in Proposition 1 as one showing that the more moderated is the
assembly, the higher the probability of the assembly party to win at the general election.
Polarization of the assembly, on the other hand, reduces the set of values  for which
the assembly party can win at the general elections.
So far, we have paid attention to describing which party can win at the general
election. Next, we describe the equilibrium location of Party A. In Proposition 1, we
9We take c! 0 so that Figure 2 does not account for those values of "! 0 for which an equilibrium
fails to exist.
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Figure 2-2: An illustration of Proposition 1.
showed that Party A can only win by supporting certain political positions. We next
show that only two symmetric locations will be optimally selected by Party A in every
political equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In every political equilibrium with two proposals at the pre-electoral as-
sembly, Party A sets its political platform either at xA = xM   "2 or at xA = xM + "2 :
Proof. The objective function of Party A is dened by Expression (3.1) hence, Party
A only derives benets from winning the elections. By Proposition 1, Party A cannot
win the elections when   "
2
. In this case, Party A is indi¤erent between every policy
position. We analyze the case where  = "
2
  ; with  ! 0: As shown in Proposition
1, xA = xM   "2 guarantees the victory of Party A in this case (similar reasoning for
xA = xM +
"
2
). We proceed by showing the following statements:
i) extremist locations of Party A such that xA 2 [0; xM   "] or xA 2 [xM + "; 1] cannot
guarantee the victory of Party A.
ii) every other location xA 2 (xM   "; xM + ") such that xA 6= xM   "2 or xA 6= xM + "2
cannot guarantee the victory of Party A.
First, we show i). We consider that xA 2 [0; xM   "]. By (3), the low-outsiders vote for
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Party A. Among the insiders, by (5), those agents with di > "2 +  vote for Party B.
Thus, those insiders such that xi 2
 
xM   "2 + ; xM + "

vote for Party B. By (4), the
up-outsiders vote for Party B. Therefore, Party B obtains a strict majority and wins. By
a symmetric type of argument, if xA 2 [xM + "; 1] ; Party B wins.
Next, we show ii). We distinguish two cases, when xA 2
 
xM   "; xM   "2

and when
xA 2
 
xM   "2 ; xM

:
First, we suppose that xA 2
 
xM   "; xM   "2

: If xi = xM ; by (5), the median agent
prefers Party B over Party A when
 > "  (xM   xA) (2.6)
Given that xM   xA > "2 ; we have that the second term of Expression 2.6 is smaller than
"
2
. If we take  = "
2
   where  ! 0, we can always dene  su¢ ciently close to 0 such
that "
2
   > "  (xM  xA): Then, an agent located at xi = xM votes for Party B as they
do those agents located at xi 2 (xM ; xM + "). Besides, by (4), the up-outsiders also vote
for Party B.
Second, we suppose that xA 2
 
xM   "2 ; xM

: By (3) and (4) and given that  >
jxM   xAj the outsiders vote for Party B. By (5), Party A only obtains the vote of those
insiders such that di < "2 + : In other words, the votes of Party A are those contained in
an interval of size "+ 2: Given that in every interval of size "; there is strictly less than
1/3 of the votes, for  close to 0, Party A derives strictly less than 1/3 of the votes.
Thus, when  = "
2
  with  ! 0 there are only two policies that guarantee the victory
of Party A (xA = xM   "2 and xA = xM + "2) besides, these two policies also guarantee
the victory of Party A when  < "
2
  . Then, this proves that these two policies are
the only ones that maximize Party As probability of winning. This completes the proof.
We have shown that locating in a platform too close to the median voter does not
allow Party A to defeat Party B. The main argument for this is that in order to obtain
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votes from insiders as well as from outsider voters, Party A must set its platform at one
of the sides of the median voter. In particular, we nd that when  = "
2
  , with
 ! 0, the only two locations that guarantee the victory of Party A are xA = xM   "2
and xA = xM + "2 . Besides, for every other degree of social protest below  =
"
2
  ,
these locations also guarantee the victory of Party A.
Our analysis reveals that Party A must di¤erentiate its policy from the median voter
position to attract a majority of the electorate. In a similar vein, but in a di¤erent setting,
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and Groseclose (2001) show that when a candidate has
an advantage over another, the weaker candidate moves away from the center.10 In
Figure 3, we represent both winning strategies of Party A. The strategy xA = xM   "2
gives Party A the support of those voters located in the interval [0; xM ] whereas the
strategy xA = xM + "2 assures Party A the votes of those located in the interval [xM ; 1] :
Figure 2-3: An illustration of Proposition 2.
10Observe that our result di¤ers from the one of Shepsle (1972) who shows that when a party stands
at the median, the other has incentives to take a lottery stand. See also Page (1976).
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2.4 The assembly with partial attendance
In the previous section, we analyzed the case in which two policies symmetrically located
around the median voter are proposed at the pre-electoral assembly. In addition, we
took for granted that all the citizens attended the pre-electoral and the post-electoral
assemblies of Party B.
Now, we want to consider a scenario where just a fraction of voters with close policy
positions attend the assembly. We still maintain the pre-assembly equilibrium concept.
Hence, the previous section is a particular case in which the median voter position of
both the assembly and the electorate coincide. We dene the assembly median voter
position as xaM and from now on, xM is the electorate median.
Following the pre-assembly equilibrium concept, in every political equilibrium with
two expected proposals at the assembly, these are symmetrically located around the
assembly median, i.e., xaM   " and xaM + "; where " 2 (c; ") and the winning probabilities
coincide p1 = p2:11
Next, we derive the electoral result at the general election depending on the location of
the assembly median voter position xaM with respect to xM . We distinguish two scenarios:
a centrist assembly, which occurs when the electorate median voter is an insider, i.e.
xaM   " < xM < xaM + "; and a non-centrist assembly, which implies that the assembly
is either to the left or to the right of the electorate median voter, i.e. xM  xaM   " or
xM  xaM  ": In each situation, we take into account the degree of social protest. Voting
decisions as described by (3), (4) and (5) do not change except for substituting xM by
xaM :
11Where the bounds (c; ") should be recalculated accounting for the truncated distribution of voters
that attend the assembly.
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2.4.1 The centrist assembly
We study the case where the electorate median voter xM is among the bounds of the
assembly, i.e. xaM   " < xM < xaM + ": In Figure 4, we show di¤erent locations of the
centrist assembly with respect to xM . The rst case shows a centrist-left assembly where
xaM < xM . The second case shows a centrist assembly where both the assembly and the
electorate median voter coincide. This case is similar to the one we have analyzed in the
previous section. The last case shows a centrist-right assembly where xM < xaM .
Figure 2-4: Centrist assemblieslocation with respect to xM .
The party winning the elections in the case of a centrist assembly also depends on the
degree of social protest. As we next show, the optimal position of the traditional party
is not the electorate median but it is the midpoint between the electorate median and
one out of the two proposals of the assembly.
Proposition 3 Consider that the assembly median di¤ers from the electorate median
and that the assembly is centrist. Then, Party B wins the elections if and only if  
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"
2
+ 
2
where  = jxM   xaM j : Besides, in every political equilibrium with two proposals at
the pre-electoral assembly, Party A locates at:
i) xA =
xM+x
a
M+"
2
in the case of a centrist-left assembly (xaM < xM)
ii) xA =
xM+x
a
M "
2
in the case of a centrist-right assembly (xaM > xM).
Proof. Following Proposition 1, we know that there is a threshold value  above
which Party B always wins the elections. Besides, by Proposition 2, we know that
just below the threshold there are two symmetric strategies for Party A that guarantee
its victory, these strategies clearly reduce to one when the assembly moves either to
the right or to the left of the median. We calculate the corresponding threshold and
the corresponding unique location of xA in the case of a centrist-left assembly where
xaM < xM . When the assembly is centrist-left, Party A cannot achieve equal votes
locating at symmetric positions around the electorate median. In fact, in this case, it is
easier for Party A to achieve a majority of votes among those located to the right of the
electorate median, that is, those voters in the interval [xM ; 1]. First, we study the agents
with ideal policy xi = xM and xi = xaM + ": For agent xi = xM ; she votes for Party A
when
xA <   + "+ xM (2.7)
For agent xi = xaM + ", the utilities derived from voting Party A and Party B are
A   jxaM + "  xAj and B   "; respectively. Then, she votes for Party A when A  
jxaM + "  xAj > B   " which implies that:
xA >  + x
a
M (2.8)
The values  for which Party A can obtain the votes in the interval [xM ; xaM + "] is
deduced from the above two equations and it yields  < "
2
+ 
2
: Moreover, the only
strategy that guarantees that Party A obtains all the votes in the interval [xM ; xaM + "]
when  = "
2
+ 
2
   where  ! 0 is deduced by substituting the value  = "
2
+ 
2
in Expression (2.7) or (2.8). We deduce that xA =
xM+(xaM+")
2
: By (2.4), this value of
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xA also guarantees that the up-outsiders vote for Party A. Finally, if xA =
xM+(xaM+")
2
guarantees the victory of Party A when  = "
2
+ 
2
  ; it also guarantees the victory of
Party A for smaller values of : This implies that this strategy of Party A maximizes
its expected probability of winning. The symmetric case in which there is a centrist-right
assembly follows a similar reasoning.
We nd that when there is a centrist-right assembly and  < "
2
+ 
2
where  =
xM   xaM ; Party A locating at xA =
xM+(xaM ")
2
obtains the support of those voters
whose ideal policy is in the interval (0; xaM   ") plus a fraction of the voters which ideal
policy is in the interval (xaM   "; xaM + ") : Symmetrically, when there is a centrist-left
assembly and  < "
2
+ 
2
where  = xM   xaM ; Party A wins the elections locating at
xA =
xM+(xaM+")
2
given that voters to the right of the electorate median vote for Party A.
2.4.2 The non-centrist assembly
We study the case in which the electorate median xM is either to the left of the assembly
xM  xaM " or to the right of the assembly xM  xaM+":We can interpret the assembly
in these cases as left-extremist or right-extremist. Figure 5 shows the intervals in which
a right-extremist assembly and a left-extremist assembly can be located.
Figure 2-5: Location of the non-centrist assemblies with respect to xM :
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In both cases, we show that for every degree of social protest, Party A wins the
elections and besides, its strategy consists of locating at the electorate median.
Proposition 4 Consider that the assembly median di¤ers from the electorate median
and that the assembly is non-centrist. Then, Party B wins the elections if and only if
   where  = jxM   xaM j : Besides, in every political equilibrium with two proposals
at the pre-electoral assembly, Party A locates at xA = xM :
Proof. We calculate the greatest degree of social protest for which Party A can defeat
Party B. Consider the case of a right-extremist assembly where xM < xaM : The easiest
way for Party A to win the elections is by obtaining the votes of those located to left of
the policy space, that is those in the interval [0; xM ] : If voter xi = xM votes for Party A,
all the other voters in this interval also vote for Party A. In the best scenario for voter
xi = xM ; Party A locates at xA = xM : Following Expression (3), all the voters in [0; xM ]
vote for Party A when  < xaM  xA and substituting xA = xM we obtain that  < :
Besides, when  =    where  ! 0 there is no other value xA 6= xM that guarantees
a majority of votes for Party A. Thus, xA = xM is the unique strategy of Party A that
maximizes its expected probability of winning. Finally, if    the strategy xA = xM ;
cannot guarantee a majority of votes for Party A, and it is in fact Party B which wins
with the votes of the agents in the interval [xM ; 1]. The case of a left-extremist assembly
follows a similar reasoning.
We have shown that for every  <  where  = jxM   xaM j ; Party A can always
guarantee a majority of voters locating at the electorate median. Thus, the electorate
median is the policy that maximizes the expected probability of winning of Party A.
In Figure 6, we summarize the obtained results regarding the optimal location of
Party A as a function of the location of the assembly median voter along the policy
space. Interestingly, the presence of an assembly party makes the traditional party to
move along the policy space.
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Figure 2-6: Strategies of Party A with respect to the location of the assembly median
voter xaM .
On the one hand, in the case of an extremist assembly, regardless of the ideology of the
assembly, Party A moderates its policy and it locates at the median voter position, i.e.
xA = xM . On the other hand, in the case of a centrist assembly, Party A locates either
to the left or to the right of the median voter location, just in the opposite direction of
the assembly median location. This is due to the fact that Party A needs to di¤erentiate
from the assembly proposals in order to attract not only centrist voters but also voters
to one of the sides of the median. As we have shown, this is the type of strategy that
guarantees the victory of Party A when the victory is possible.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the consequences of political competition between a party
implementing assembly democracy (Party B) and a traditional Downsian party (Party
A). We have introduced, in terms of a valence characteristic, the social preferences in
favor or against new forms of democracy. Citizens when participating at the assembly
38
are strategic and they want their proposals to achieve a majority at the assembly. Party
A is a pure o¢ ce seeking party which selects its platform as to maximize its probability
of winning the general election. We have compared di¤erent scenarios regarding the
location of the assembly party.
We nd that the more centrist the assembly party is, the more chances it has of
winning the elections. Interestingly, we also nd that the location of the assembly party
induces Party A to locate at di¤erent platforms.
Surprisingly, due to the competition with an assembly party, when the assembly is
centrist, the traditional party moves its platform away from the median voter location in
order to attract a larger fraction of voters. In particular, we nd that a centrist assembly
party located to the left of the overall median, moves the traditional party to the right,
whereas a centrist assembly party located to the right of the overall median, moves the
traditional party to the left. The centrist assembly party, therefore, generates a centrifu-
gal e¤ect over the traditional party, which moves it in the opposite direction. However,
when the assembly party is non-centrist (or extremist), we nd that the traditional party
moves towards the median of the electorate. In this case, the extremist assembly party
leaves an empty center which can be occupied by a traditional party.
Our main message is that extremist assembly parties may have no e¤ect regarding the
location of a traditional o¢ ce-seeking party, whereas moderated assembly parties have an
impact by moving away from the median the traditional political party. In equilibrium,
the traditional party moves in the opposite direction of the assembly proposals but within
the bounds of the proposals made by the assembly. As a result, the assembly party
generates divergence between the platforms of the parties which is in close contrast to
the convergence prediction of the pure Downsian model.
We have shown that new assembly parties may not only have a direct e¤ect when
winning the elections and taking the assembly as their policy making body, but also an
indirect e¤ect by a¤ecting the policy of its competing parties. This is a testable prediction
that is open to empirical scrutiny.
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In this study, we only include the results for assemblies with two proposals. We leave
the analysis with more than two proposals for further research.
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Chapter 3
Political Competition between
parties with heterogeneous factions
3.1 Introduction
In many democracies partieselite do not always delegate authority into new party can-
didates. As an example, Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) has recently approved primary
elections to nominate candidates and in the meanwhile, the party-elite   composed by
the partys most experienced members   still denes the partys manifesto.
It is not uncommon to observe democracies in which di¤erent practices are used
by di¤erent political parties to elect its candidates. Many countries follow the described
pattern by which primary elections have just been adopted by some (but not all) political
parties: Denmark, France Finland, Greece, Italy, Japan, Israel or the United Kingdom are
additional examples (Kenig, 2009). Renewed parties in these countries usually compete
against traditional parties which candidates are selected by former party leaders.
We propose a game theoretical setting to analyze political competition between two
heterogeneous parties. One of the parties has two factions, the elite faction and the
opportunistic faction (represented by the nominated candidate). The elite faction de-
fends the ideology of the founders of the party. The opportunistic faction sets another
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platform with the aim of winning the election. From the votersviewpoint there is un-
certainty regarding which of the two proposals will prevail. The other party sets a single
platform to win the election. We propose a sequential game in which the two-faction
party decides rst. This sequentiality captures that the two-faction party celebrates its
convention and announces its nominee (possibly elected by primaries), whereas the other
party has no convention and therefore can set its platform afterwards. We analyze the
resulting political and electoral outcome when there is uncertainty about the parties
valence advantage.
Models of political competition typically consider parties that only di¤er in some pa-
rameters such as incumbent versus challenger positioning (Bevia and Llavador, 2009), va-
lence characteristic (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000), or ideological cleavages (Wittman,
1983), among others. From the well-known Downsian model (Downs, 1957) to the
Wittman model, or the Citizen-candidate model (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996), homoge-
neous parties compete in di¤erent political environments. Uncertainty about the median
voters position (in Wittman model) or strategic candidacy (in the Citizen-candidate
model) are key assumptions to predict divergent political platforms. A new and di¤erent
scenario arises when parties are considered to be composed by di¤erent factions (Roemer,
2001). In contrast to our framework, in Roemers model each faction struggles to achieve
a di¤erent objective and factions have to agree on a unique platform.
This note proposes an alternative framework in which parties with di¤erent con-
stituencies compete against each other. As far as we know, ours is a rst contribution
to analyze competition between heterogeneous parties from this perspective. Our results
are in coherence but cannot be directly derived from the literature on political ambiguity
(Shepsle, 1972; Page, 1976).1
1The two-faction party launches two policy proposals. In terms of Shepsle (1972), this party is
perceived by voters as a lottery over the two proposals.
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3.2 Model
An election is going to be held in which voters elect by majority voting either a leftist
(Party L) or a rightist (Party R) political party.
Party L has two factions: one representing the partys elite with xed platform xEL 2
[0; 1] ; and another representing an opportunistic party faction that seeks to win the
election by proposing a platform xOL 2 [0; 1] where xOL  xEL : Party R has a single faction
that seeks to win the election by proposing a platform xR 2 [0; 1].
Each party is associated to a valence characteristic L; R 2 R, on which all agents
are in agreement. Valence can measure the retrospective judgement on economic issues,
or the parties perceived ght against corrupt practices. Let  = L   R be the
di¤erential valence. Parties are uncertain about the di¤erential valence :
There is a continuum of voters whose ideal policies are distributed over the unidimen-
sional policy space. Let xi 2 [0; 1] be the ideal policy of voter i and let xM be the ideal
policy of the voter in the median of the distribution. Preferences of voters over Party R
are measured by valence minus the absolute distance between the partys platform and
the voters ideal policy
ui (R) = R   jxR   xij :
Preferences of voters over Party L are measured by the vNM utility function dened over
the platforms xEL and x
O
L ; when assigned equal probability
Eui(L) =
1
2
(L  
xEL   xi) + 12(L   xOL   xi) = L   (jxEL xij+jxOL xij)2 :
Preferences of the opportunistic faction of Party L and the single faction of Party R
over the policy proposals
 
xEL ; x
O
L

and xR, are measured by the following vNM utility
function
vj((x
O
L ; x
E
L ); xR) =
8<: 1 if Party j wins0 otherwise for all j 2 fL;Rg :
The timing of the proposed electoral game unfolds as follows.
43
Stage 1 : Given the xed proposal of the elite faction, where w.l.g. xEL < xM ; the
opportunistic faction of Party L sets its political platform xOL as to maximize the expected
payo¤ given its uncertainty about 
xOL 2 argmaxEvL((xOL ; xEL ); xR):
Stage 2 : Party R observes the announced policy of Party L and sets its platform xR as
to maximize the expected payo¤ given its uncertainty about 
xR 2 argmaxEvR((xOL ; xEL ); xR).
Stage 3 : The election is held and voters opt for one of the two political parties
if L  
(jxEL xij+jxOL xij)
2
> R   jxR   xij voter i opts for Party L,
if L  
(jxEL xij+jxOL xij)
2
< R   jxR   xij voter i opts for Party R.
When a voter is indi¤erent between Party L and Party R, we consider that he/she abstains
from voting.
3.3 The competition game
We solve the proposed game by backward induction. First, we describe voting decisions
at Stage 3. Second, we describe Party Rs best response. Finally, we solve for Party Ls
optimal decision. We only account for those equilibria in which parties preserve their
ideological cleavages and therefore, the mean platform of Party L, xL =
xEL+x
O
L
2
; is more
leftist than the platform of Party R, i.e., xL  xR.
Stage 3:
First, we analyze the voting decision of the agents with ideal policies xi 2

0; xEL

. For
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these agents, Eui(L) = L   (xL   xi) and since xL  xR;
when  > xL   xR, they vote for Party L, (3.1)
when  < xL   xR, they vote for Party R.
Second, for those voters such that xi 2

xEL ; x
O
L

; Eui(L) = L  (x
O
L xEL )
2
:When compar-
ing this term with the utility derived from voting for R,
when  > x
O
L xEL
2
  jxR   xij , they vote for Party L, (3.2)
when  < x
O
L xEL
2
  jxR   xij , they vote for Party R.
Third, when xi 2
 
xOL ; 1

then Eui(L) = L  (xi  xL): Regarding the location of Party
R with respect to voter i; there are two possibilities, either xR < xi or xR > xi: In the
rst case,
when  > xR   xL, they vote for Party L, (3.3)
when  < xR   xL, they vote for Party R.
In the second case,
when  > 2xi   xL   xR, they vote for Party L, (3.4)
when  < 2xi   xL   xR, they vote for Party R.
Stage 2:
For every location of the opportunistic faction of Party L, we solve for the platform
that maximizes the probability of Party R winning a majority of votes. Since the party
is uncertain about the di¤erential valence  = L   R, the optimal policy has to
guarantee a majority of votes up to some maximal value of the di¤erential valence.
First, suppose that xOL < xM : If Party R sets its platform too close to Party Ls mean
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platform xL then, the two political parties o¤er too similar positions and the party with
the highest valence obtains a majority. Therefore, the best location for Party R consists
of preserving certain distance with respect to the policy xL, while achieving a majority
of votes. If Party R o¤ers the median voters ideal policy xR = xM then, by (3.3) all
the voters with ideal policy xi 2 [xM ; 1] vote for Party R when the di¤erential valence is
such that
 < xR   xL = xM   xL: (3.5)
Therefore, Party R wins the election for every  < xM   xL: If instead xR < xM ; by
(3.5) there are less values  for which Party R guarantees a majority. And if xR > xM ;
by (3.4) those voters such that xi 2 [xM ; xR] vote for Party R when  < 2xM xR xL.
When comparing this expression with (3.5), we nd that 2xM   xR  xL < xM   xL; i.e.,
there are less values  for which Party R guarantees a majority. We deduce that when
xOL < xM , the optimal policy of Party R is x

R = xM :
Second, suppose that xOL > xM : For Party R to guarantee that every voter such that
xi 2 [xM ; 1] votes for Party R, there are two conditions that should hold. On the one
hand, if xi 2 [xM ; xOL ], condition (3.2) implies that
 <
xOL xEL
2
  jxR   xij : (3.6)
On the other hand, by (3.3) and (3.4), if xi 2 [xOL ; 1]
 < xR   xL when xi > xR (3.7)
 < 2xi   xL   xR when xi < xR: (3.8)
If xR 2 [xM ; xOL ], we check for the maximum value  below which Party R guarantees a
majority. By expression (3.6), x
O
L xEL
2
  jxR   xij is decreasing in xR when xi 2 [xM ; xR]
and it is strictly increasing in xR when xi 2 [xR; xOL ]; and by (3.7) xR   xL is always
strictly increasing in xR: When (3.6) is decreasing, the most adverse case for Party R
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corresponds to the minimal value of  which is achieved when xi = xM : When (3.6)
is increasing, the most adverse case for Party R corresponds to the minimal value of
 which is achieved when xi = xOL : In this last case, however, substituting xi = x
O
L in
(3.6) yields  < x
O
L xEL
2
+ xR   xOL = xR   xL which is equivalent to (3.7). Thus if the
inequalities  < x
O
L xEL
2
 xR+xM and  < xR xL hold, Party R achieves a majority
of votes. Figure 1 represents the shaded area in which both conditions simultaneously
hold. Solving for xR in the intersection and substituting that
xOL xEL
2
= xOL   xL; yields
xR =
xOL+xM
2
. In addition to (3.6) and (3.7), expression (3.8) should also hold if xR > xOL
for those voters such that xi 2 [xOL ; xR]. Since (3.8) is not embedded neither in condition
(3.6) nor in (3.7), an additional restriction over  needs to be satised if xR > xOL . This
implies that the optimal policy has to be xR =
xOL+xM
2
when xOL > xM and xL  xM .2
Figure 3-1: Optimal platform of Party R.
2If xL > xM ; a symmetric argument shows that xR =
xEL+xM
2 and so, parties would not preserve
their ideological cleavages since xR 6 xL:
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Since xL  xM implies xOL  2xM   xEL ; the best response function of Party R to xOL
is
xR(x
O
L ) =
8<: xM if x
O
L  xM
xOL+xM
2
if xM < xOL  2xM   xEL
: (3.9)
Substituting xR in either (3.6) when xi = xM or in (3.7), we deduce the values of  for
which Party R achieves a majority of votes
 <
xOL+xM
2
  xL = xM x
E
L
2
: (3.10)
Stage 1:
We nally solve for the best platform of the opportunistic faction. This faction maximizes
the probability of achieving a majority of votes.
When xOL  xM then xR = xM : By (3.5), Party L obtains a majority of votes for
every value of the di¤erential valence  > xM   xL. Since xL = x
E
L+x
O
L
2
, the strategy
xOL with which Party L maximizes its probability of winning (and therefore, minimizes
the value xM   xL) is xOL = xM : By doing so, Party L guarantees its victory for every
 >
xM xEL
2
:
When xOL > xM then x

R =
xOL+xM
2
. By (3.10), Party L obtains a majority of votes for
every value of the di¤erential valence  > xM x
E
L
2
; which is independent of xOL :
Therefore, every xOL 2 [xM ; 2xM xEL ] is equivalent in terms of the expected payo¤that
Party L obtains. We conclude that backward induction displays the following equilibrium
predictions:
Proposition 1: Every pair of policy positions (xOL ; x

R) such that
xOL 2

xM ; 2xM   xEL

and xR =
xOL +xM
2
is an equilibrium of the competition game. Besides, in every equilibrium, if the valence
advantage of Party L over Party R satises that  > xM x
E
L
2
then Party L wins, if
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 <
xM xEL
2
then Party R wins, and in the remaining case there is a tie.
Our result shows that there are multiple equilibria and in all of them the opportunistic
faction of Party L sets its platform at the median xM or above the median. Party R sets
its platform in the midpoint between the median xM and xOL : Besides, Party L needs
a positive di¤erential valence to defeat Party R even though Party L has a rst mover
advantage.
3.4 Conclusion
We have showed that there are no electoral benets associated to a two-faction party
when its opponent has a single leader. Surprisingly, the Downsian equilibrium in which
both parties o¤er the same policy position is not an equilibrium in this framework, and
parties have incentives to o¤er divergent platforms.3 In every equilibrium, the expected
platform of the two-faction party, and the platform of its opponent locate at a di¤erent
side of the median voters ideal policy.
From the voters viewpoint, competition between heterogeneous parties generates
more pluralistic political platforms. From the partiesviewpoint, however, the ballot box
punishes the multi-faction party when competing against a united opponent.
3If Party L had a single leader, in the unique equilibrium of the proposed game, both parties would
propose the medians ideal policy.
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Chapter 4
When Parties want to be
Ambiguous but they cant
Coauthored with Socorro Puy. Submitted.
4.1 Introduction
Ambiguity as a political party strategy was rst mentioned by Downs (1957), assuring
that in a two-party competition,"it increases the number of voters to whom a party may
appeal." In the same vein, some authors refer to "catch-all parties" (Kirchheimer, 1966;
Williams, 2009) as those that try to appeal to a broad group of voters by being vague
about the preferences of the party leadership.
One of the advantages of ambiguous policy platforms, as opposed to a single policy,
is that it can facilitate intra-party politics. That is, political parties may nd it easier to
agree on a wider set of close policies instead of reaching an agreement on a concrete policy
platform. Moreover, a party can address a greater fraction of voters when proposing an
ambiguous platform.
We propose a theoretical model in which political parties are o¢ ce-seeking and have a
taste for ambiguity within the framework of the Downsian model of political competition
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(Downs, 1957).1 We solve the proposed model using the concept of Nash equilibrium in
weakly undominated strategies and analyze the extent to which ambiguous strategies are
sustained in equilibrium.
Political parties in our model simultaneously propose ambiguous policy platforms in
the form of lottery stands which assign a probability distribution over certain set of
policies (see also Zeckhauser, 1969; Fishburn, 1972; Page, 1976; Mckelvey, 1980). We
account for discrete and continuous lottery stands, where the former are probability
distributions over a discrete set of policies, and the latter are continuous probability
distributions over an interval of the policy space. In contrast to Berger et al. (2000),
parties propose not only a mean policy but also the variance of its policy platform.
Our main result is that o¢ ce-seeking incentives discard the existence of equilibria with
ambiguous strategies. We nd that when o¢ ce-seeking incentives are high in comparison
to partiesincentives for ambiguity, there is a unique equilibrium in which parties converge
to the ideal policy of the median voter. That is, political parties sacrice ambiguity when
competing for votes. When o¢ ce-seeking incentives are low in comparison to parties
incentives for ambiguity, there is no equilibrium. The intuition for this last result is that,
on the one hand, when parties propose ambiguous platforms with an equal expected
value, the less ambiguous proposal gets more votes. On the other hand, when parties
converge to a tying situation in which both propose the ideal policy of the median voter,
there are incentives to deviate to an ambiguous platform. Only when the benets from
holding o¢ ce are null, we nd that in the unique equilibrium, parties propose ambiguous
platforms.
Previous literature in strategic ambiguity is also related to our results. In particu-
lar, voters with risk acceptance attitudes is a key assumption which induces equilibria
with ambiguous platforms (Shepsle, 1972; Aragonès and Postlewaite, 2002). The seminal
contribution by Shepsle (1972) studies the case in which an incumbent that proposes a
1According to Downs (1957), if two o¢ ce-seeking parties compete in the one-dimensional policy space,
in the unique equilibrium, they locate at the median voter position.
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single policy competes against a challenger that proposes a lottery stand. He nds that
when a majority of voters is risk-acceptant, the challenger chooses a lottery stand when
the incumbent locates at the median. Aragonès and Postlewaite (2002) show equilibrium
strategies in which parties are ambiguous. Their results rest on two assumptions: inten-
sity of voters preferences over candidates, and some restrictions over the set of lottery
stands. They show that when a Condorcet winner is not the rst choice for a majority,
it can be defeated by an ambiguous strategy. As shown by Shepsle (1972), such result is
not possible when voterspreferences are risk-averse.2
There are other related contributions (Alesina and Cukierman, 1990; Aragonès and
Neeman, 2000), in which equilibria with ambiguous platforms are deduced when combin-
ing two assumptions, partiesuncertainty about the median voter and partiespreferences
for ambiguity. Alesina and Cukierman (1990) introduce a dynamic electoral model char-
acterized by policy-motivated parties that are uncertain about the location of the median
voter and by voters which are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent.
Politicians, in this case, face a trade-o¤ between the policies that maximize their choices
of re-election and the party ideology. Aragonès and Neeman (2000) propose a two-stage
political competition model. In the rst stage, candidates choose ideologies and in the
second, they choose their levels of ambiguity. As in our model, candidates benet from
winning the elections and from proposing ambiguous platforms. In contrast to our model,
candidates are uncertain about the median voter position. When o¢ ce-seeking incentives
are su¢ ciently high, candidates choose unambiguous policies and locate at the median.
When candidates assign a greater weight to ambiguity, they choose di¤erent ideologies
and equal levels of ambiguity.
Our model neither accounts for partiesuncertainty about voters nor for votersrisk-
acceptance attitudes, but we account for parties with a taste for ambiguous platforms.
In this way, we predict the extent to which the combination of partiestaste for ambigu-
2There is recent empirical evidence that tries to estimate votersrisk attitudes (see Tomz and Van
Houweling (2009), Berinsky and Lewis (2007) and Morgenstern and Zeckmeuster (2011), among others).
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ity and o¢ ce-holding incentives induce parties to propose ambiguous policy strategies.
While most of the contributions to the literature consider continuous lotteries (see, e.g.,
Aragonès and Neeman, 2000; Berger et al. 2000; Laslier, 2006), we additionally allow for
discrete lotteries. As far as we know, our proposal is the rst which accounts for these
two types of ambiguous strategies   discrete and continuous lottery stands  . Regard-
ing votersattitude towards risk, voters in our model are indi¤erent or strictly prefer
the certain expected value of a lottery, to the lottery itself, that is, we account for both
types, risk-neutral and risk-averse voters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the
model. Section 3 analyzes voterspreferences over lottery stands. Section 4 describes
equilibrium strategies. Section 5 concludes. We relegate all the proofs to the Appendix.
4.2 Model
A general election is going to be held in which, by majority voting, voters will elect one
out of two political parties, Party A and Party B. There is a continuum of voters. Each
voter i has an ideal policy xi 2 [0; 1]. The ideal policies of the voters are distributed over
the interval [0; 1] according to a continuous and strictly increasing distribution function,
which is common-knowledge. We denote the ideal policy of the median voter by xM 2
[0; 1].
The platform of each political party can be a single policy x 2 [0; 1] or a lottery stand,
which consists of a probability distribution over some policies in [0; 1]. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that lottery stands are uniform distributions.
Lottery stands are interpreted by voters as ambiguous policy proposals and every
voter equally interprets the probability with which each party will implement each of its
proposals once in o¢ ce. Parties can propose two types of lottery stands: continuous and
discrete.
Continuous lottery stands are continuous uniform distributions over subintervals of
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the policy space. Continuous lottery stands are characterized by two parameters (x; ");
where x 2 [0; 1] is the mean of the lottery interval and " is the level of ambiguity that
denes the interval [x  "; x+ "] of possible implemented policy. The maximum level of
ambiguity is denoted by "max = 1
2
; which corresponds to a lottery stand centered in the
midpoint of the unit interval x = 1
2
and such that its extreme policies coincide with the
upper and lower bound of the unit interval. Therefore, the level of ambiguity that a
party j 2 fA;Bg can propose is contained in the interval "j 2

0; 1
2

:
Discrete lottery stands are discrete uniform distributions over a nite number of policy
stands in the interval [0; 1], with the particular simplifying assumption that every two
adjacent policies gather the same distance. Thus, discrete lottery stands are characterized
by a set of m policies X = fx1; x2; :::; xmg where each single policy belongs to the policy
space [0; 1] and where policies can be ordered as follows: x1 < x2 < ::: < xm: The smallest
proposal (or the leftist) is x1 and, in the opposite side, the greatest (or rightist) proposal
is xm: As already mentioned, every two adjacent policies gather the same distance, which
implies that x2   x1 = x3   x2 = ::: = xm   xm 1.3 Thus, if the number of policies m
is an odd number, the mean policy is one of the polices in X (for example, if m = 3;
then the mean policy is x2): However, if the number of policies is even then, the mean
policy does not belong to the set X. In order to characterize a discrete lottery stand, we
use three parameters (m;x; ") where m is an integer number which indicates the number
of policies, policy x is the mean policy which coincides with one of the policies in the
lottery when m is odd and it does not coincide when m is even, and nally " is the level
of ambiguity which satises that x  x1 = xm   x = ":
We use notation Lm(x; ") to represent a discrete lottery stand with m proposals
centered around policy x and where " measures the distance between the mean and the
extreme policies in the lottery stand. For example, the lottery stand L2(x; ") consists of
two policies fx  "; x+ "g, where each of them gathers equal probability. The lottery
3Related to this assumption, Aragonès and Xefteris (2014) propose a policy space with equidistant
policies.
54
stand L3(x; ") consists of three policies fx  "; x; x+ "g where each of them gathers equal
probability, and so on and so forth. A particular case is m = 1 where the lottery stand
is a degenerate distribution, " = 0, and this is denoted by L1(x; 0). Note that when
a party proposes a single policy, there is no uncertainty regarding the policy that this
party will implement in the case of holding o¢ ce. When m ! 1; the proposed lottery
is continuous. In this case, we use notation LC(x; ") to represent the continuous lottery
stand centered in x and with a level of ambiguity ". To simplify notation, when possible,
we write Lm when referring to discrete lottery stands and LC when referring to continuous
lottery stands.
Political parties do not only care about winning the elections but also about their
proposed level of ambiguity ":When proposing a lottery stand instead of a single policy,
the political party represents a wider range of the policy space and this entails certain
benets in terms of internal stability among its members (Alesina and Cukierman, 1990;
Aragonès and Neeman, 2000).4 Besides, parties derive benets from holding o¢ ce when
winning the elections.
Let L denotes the space containing every lottery stand or degenerate lottery that
a party can propose, i.e., in terms of a game form, L is the strategy space of Party A
and Party B. Both parties simultaneously announce their strategies, after which elections
are held and voters cast their ballots. The party holding o¢ ce is the one achieving a
majority of votes and, in the case of a tie, both parties face an equal probability of holding
o¢ ce. Once in o¢ ce, the party can implement one of the policy proposals included in its
announced lottery.
Given two lottery stands, the one proposed by Party A and that of Party B, (LA; LB) 2
L2, the preferences of each party j 2 fA;Bg over these proposals are represented by the
following utility function vj:
4Our results are robust to the case of including the number of policies m as an extra-benet in the
partiesutility function.
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vj(L
A; LB) =
8>>><>>>:
"j +  if Party j wins
"j +

2
if parties tie
"j if Party j loses
(4.1)
where "j 2

0; 1
2

is the level of ambiguity proposed by Party j and   0 represents the
benets derived from holding o¢ ce. In the case of winning and when  > 0, the party
derives benets not only from winning but also from its level of ambiguity. In the case
of a tie, both political parties gather an equal probability of holding o¢ ce and therefore,
parties just account for the value 
2
plus their proposed level of ambiguity. In the case of
losing the elections, the parties also derive a positive payo¤when holding certain level of
ambiguity.
The preferences of each voter i over single policies are represented by the negative
absolute distance between the policy proposals and the ideal policy of the voter, xi. In
this way, the preferences of voters are single-peaked over the policy space and can be
represented by the utility function ui (x) =   jx  xij. Preferences of voters over discrete
lottery stands are measured by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation so
that the expected utility is
Ui(Lm) = ELm [ui(x)] =
1
m
X
xn2Xm
ui(xn) =   1
m
mX
n=1
jxn   xij (4.2)
where every policy is weighted by voters with an equal probability.
In the limit, whenm!1, the lottery stand is the uniform distribution over the poli-
cies in the interval [x  "; x+ "], characterized by the uniform density function f(xn) = 12"
for every xn 2 [x  "; x+ "]. In this case, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility repre-
sentation over the continuous lottery yields the following expected utility
Ui(LC) = ELC [ui(x)] =
x+"Z
x "
ui(xn)f(xn)dxn =  
x+"Z
x "
jxn   xij
2"
dxn: (4.3)
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Given the strategy of the parties
 
LA; LB

, agent i votes for Party A when Ui(LA) >
Ui(L
B); votes for Party B when Ui(LA) < Ui(LB) and abstains from voting when
Ui(L
A) = Ui(L
B). Another interpretation of this latter case is that citizens are not
motivated to vote when partiesplatforms are not substantially di¤erent (Hortala-Vallve
and Esteve-Volart, 2011).
When elections are held, the party holding o¢ ce is the one achieving a majority of
votes. In the case of a tie, both parties face an equal probability of winning. When both
parties propose the same strategy LA = LB; we assume that there is a tie.
We say that (LA; LB) is an equilibrium when none of the political parties can benet
from unilateral deviations of its strategy and moreover, both strategies, LA and LB, are
weakly undominated.
Formally, the pair of strategies (LA; LB) 2 L2 is an equilibrium when i) and ii) are
satised:
i) vA(LA; LB)  vA(LA0 ; LB) for every LA0 2 L and vB(LA; LB)  vB(LA; LB0) for every
LB
0 2 L,
ii) @LA0 2 L such that vA(LA0 ; L)  vA(LA; L) for every L 2 L with strict inequality for
some L, and @LB0 2 L such that vB(L;LB0)  vB(L;LB) for every L 2 L with strict
inequality for some L.
Requirement (i) implies that (LA; LB) is a Nash Equilibrium, and requirement (ii)
implies that neither LA nor LB are weakly dominated strategies. That is, the proposed
equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies.
4.3 Voting over lottery stands
In this section, we evaluate the preferences of voters over di¤erent lottery stands. As an
example, consider the comparison between two lotteries: L2 (x; ") and L3 (x; "). These
lotteries are equal in terms of the level of ambiguity " and the mean policy x, and they
only di¤er in the number of policies, m = 2 against m = 3. Whereas in the lottery
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L2 (x; ") the set of policies is X2 = fx  "; x+ "g, in the lottery L3 (x; ") the set of
policies is X3 = fx  "; x; x+ "g. Evaluating the preferences of voters with ideal policy
xi 2 [0; x  "] over L2 (x; "),
Ui(L2) =  1
2
(jx  "  xij+ jx+ "  xij) =   jx  xij :
The peak of the voters with ideal policy in the interval [0; x  "] is out of the range of the
lottery L2 (or coincides with the lotterys lower bound), then both policies fx  "; x+ "g
are in the decreasing side of the single-peaked shape of the preferences of voters. There-
fore, each of these voters is risk-neutral with respect to this lottery stand and Ui(L2) =
ui(x); i.e., the utility of the lottery is equal to the lotterys expected value.
A similar reasoning follows for every voter with ideal policy in the interval [x+ "; 1]
and for whom Ui(L2) = ui(x).
For every voter i with ideal policy in the open interval (x  "; x+ "), we have that
Ui(L2) =  1
2
(jx  "  xij+ jx+ "  xij) =  ": (4.4)
Regarding L3 (x; "), for every voter i such that xi 2 [0; x  "] or xi 2 [x+ "; 1], we
can also apply risk neutrality by which Ui(L3) = ui(x) =   jx  xij. And for every other
voter i such that xi 2 (x  "; x+ "), we have that
Ui(L3) =  1
3
(jx  "  xij+ jx  xij+ jx+ "  xij) =  2"
3
  jx  xij
3
: (4.5)
As a result, all the voters with ideal policy in the intervals [0; x  "] and [x+ "; 1] derive
an equal utility from the two lottery stands given that Ui(L2) = Ui(L3) =   jx  xij
and they are indi¤erent between the two lotteries. For the remaining voters, we compare
Expressions (4.4) and (4.5). Since jx  xij < "; for every voter with ideal policy xi 2
(x  "; x+ ") ; we deduce that Ui(L2) < Ui(L3).
Thus, we have showed that L3(x; ") weakly dominates L2(x; "): both strategies pro-
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pose an equal level of ambiguity, but L3(x; ") provides greater utility to a fraction of
voters which translates into additional situations in which a party can win when propos-
ing L3(x; ") instead of L2(x; "):5
Given a lottery stand L 2 L, we refer to the outsider voters as those whose ideal
policies are out of the bounds of the lottery, that is, those for whom xi 2 [0; x   "] and
xi 2 [x + "; 1]. We refer to insider voters as those whose ideal policies are inside the
bounds of the lottery, that is, xi 2 (x  "; x+ ").
In general, given a lottery Lm 2 L, its corresponding set of policies Xm can be
calculated as a sequence of policies dened by
Xm =

x  m  1  2j
m  1 "
m 1
j=0
: (4.6)
From Expression (4.6), we can describe the set of policies for every value m  2; for
example m = 4 yields X4 =

x  "; x  "
3
; x+ "
3
; x+ "
	
:
The utility of an outsider voter over a lottery stand is equal to the utility of the
lotterys expected value, that is Ui(L) =   jx  xij for all L 2 L. The utility of an
insider voter depends on the number of policies m. According to Expressions (4.2) and
(4.6), we deduce that the expected utility of an insider voter over every discrete lottery
stand is measured by
Ui(Lm) =   1
m
m 1X
j=0
x  m  1  2jm  1 "  xi
 : (4.7)
When the lottery stand is a continuous lottery LC over the interval [x  "; x+ "],
the corresponding density function is f(x) = 1
2"
: Expression (4.3) evaluates the expected
utility of an insider voter over LC : Decomposing the integral and substituting the absolute
5The fact that the lottery L3(x; ") defeats the lottery L2(x; ") does not contradict the result by
Zeckhauser (1969). This author shows that there is always a lottery stand with two policies that can
defeat a lottery stand with three policies. The range of the lotteries in the comparison proposed by
Zeckhauser, however, is di¤erent.
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values we deduce that
Ui(LC) =   1
2"
24 xiZ
x "
(xi   xn) dxn +
x+"Z
xi
(xn   xi) dxn
35 (4.8)
where note that xi   xn  0 for every xn 2 [x  "; xi] and xn   xi  0 for every xn 2
[xi; x+ "] : Solving for the integrals and simplifying we derive the following expression6
Ui(LC) =  (x  xi)
2
2"
  "
2
: (4.9)
Now, we compare the expected utility over the continuous lottery LC (x; ") with the
expected utility over the discrete lottery Lm (x; ") where m > 1. Both lotteries gather
an equal level of ambiguity and an equal mean policy position x. These two lotteries
are equivalent for the outsider voters given that they provide an equal expected value x.
For the insider voters, however, these two lotteries are not equivalent. Given Expression
(4.7) and Expression (4.9), the di¤erential utility for every insider voter i over these two
lotteries is dened by
Fi = Ui(LC)  Ui(Lm): (4.10)
If Lm = L2(x; "), we have that Ui(L2) =  " and comparing this utility level with that
of Expression (4.9), we deduce that condition   (x xi)2
2"
  "
2
>  " implies that Fi > 0.
Simplifying yields, x   xi < ", and given that the insider voters are those for whom
xi 2 (x  "; x+ ") ; this condition holds.
We have then shown that, for every voter, when comparing the lotteries LC (x; ")
and L2 (x; "), Ui(LC)  Ui(L2) and where this inequality is strict for the insider voters.
In addition, the lotteries LC (x; ") and L2 (x; ") gather an equal level of ambiguity and
therefore, according to the utility function of the parties in Expression (4.1), strategy
6Expression (8) yields   12" [ (xixn   x
2
n
2 )
xi
x "
+ (
x2n
2   xixn)
x+"
xi
] =   12" [x2i   2xix + x2 + "2] =
  (x xi)22"   "2 :
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L2 (x; ") is weakly dominated by LC (x; ") (i.e., whatever the strategy of the opponent
political party, the strategy LC (x; ") always provides equal or higher payo¤s for the po-
litical party than the strategy L2 (x; ")). We deduce that there cannot be an equilibrium
in which one or both parties propose the strategy L2 (x; ").
The following proposition analyzes the extent to which every discrete lottery stand
Lm(x; ") is weakly dominated by the continuous lottery stand LC(x; ").
Proposition 5 According to the preferences of the political parties, every discrete lottery
Lm (x; ") with m > 1 is weakly dominated by the continuous lottery LC (x; ") with equal
mean policy x and equal level of ambiguity ".
Proof. For every insider voter, the utility over Lm (x; ") is measured by (4.7). We
can decompose and substitute the absolute values of Expression (4.7) so that
Ui(Lm) =   1
m
"
jX
j=0

 i +
(m  1  2j)
m  1 "

+
m 1X
j+1

i  
(m  1  2j)
m  1 "
#
where i = x  xi and j = k   1 with k being the number of policy proposals xn 2 Xm
such that xn < xi. The above expression is equivalent to
Ui(Lm) =   1
m
"
  (j + 1) i + (j + 1) "  2"m 1
jX
j
j=0
+ (m  1  j) i
  (m  1  j) "+ 2"
m 1
m 1X
j+1
j
#
:
Substituting that
jX
j
j=0
= j
(j+1)
2
,
m 1X
j+1
j = (n 1)n
2
  j(j+1)
2
and simplifying yields
Ui(Lm) =   1
m

(m  2  2j) i +
2" (j + 1) (m  1  j)
m  1

:
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Substituting the above expression and Expression (4.9) into (4.10) we deduce
Fi =  
2
i
2"
  "
2
+
(m  2  2j) i
m
+
2" (j + 1) (m  1  j)
m (m  1) :
Next, we show that Fi > 0 for all i 2 ( "; "). When i ! ", the value of j = 0 so that
Fi(i) =
2i
2"
  "
2
+ (m 2)i
m
+ 2"
m
. This function is continuous in i from where
limFi
i!"
(i) = Fi(") = 0:
The value of the parameter j changes with i. Expression (4.6) denes the values xn in
Xm. Then, we can dene the values i for which j
 changes, as the ones in the sequence
m 1 2j
m 1 "
	m 1
j=0
. In particular, for every agent i such that i 2
h
m 1 2(j+1)
m 1 ";
m 1 2j
m 1 "
i
,
the value of j is the same (e.g., j = 0 for all i 2 [m 3m 1"; "); and j = 1 for all
i 2

m 5
m 1";
m 3
m 1"

). We show that in each of these intervals, F 0i is strictly increasing
when evaluated in its lower bound and strictly decreasing when evaluated in its upper
bound. Solving for the derivative evaluated in its lower bound
@Fi(
m 1 2(j+1)
m 1 ")
@i
=  m 1 2(j+1)
m 1 +
m 2 2j
m
= 2(j
+1 m)
(m 1)m
where given that 0  j  m 2 then, j+2  m, from where j+1 < m and the above
derivative is strictly negative. Solving for the derivative evaluated in its upper bound
@Fi(
m 1 2j
m 1 ")
@i
=  m 3 2j
m 1 +
m 2 2j
m
= 2+2j

(m 1)m > 0:
Given that @
2Fi
@2i
=  1
"
< 0, Fi is concave in each of the proposed intervals. Besides, @
3Fi
@3
=
0 implies that in each of the intervals, function Fi is symmetric around its maximum value.
Let max0 be the agent with maximum Fi in the interval where j
 = 0. Starting from the
interval where j = 0 and therefore, i 2 [m 3m 1"; "), we rst show that the agent in the
upper bound, i =
m 3
m 1" is closer to 
max
0 than the agent in the lower bound, i = ".
This feature, together with the symmetry of Fi and the fact that Fi(") = 0 implies that
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Fi > 0 in the interval i 2 [m 3m 1"; "). Second, we show that in every subsequent interval,
where j > 0, the agent in the upper bound is not further from maxj than the agent in
the lower bound. By continuity of Fi this implies that Fi > 0 in the interval i 2 ( "; ").
In each interval, dened by a value of j where 0  j  m   2, the lower and upper
bounds are dened by L =
m 1 2(j+1)
m 1 " and U =
m 1 2j
m 1 ", respectively. We want
to show that maxj   L  U   maxj for every j, which is equivalent to showing that
maxj  U+L2 . The maximum in each interval is deduced from the rst order condition
@Fi
@i
=  i
"
+ (m 2 2j
)
m
= 0 which yields maxj = "
m 2 2j
m
. Calculating the mean value
U+L
2
= "m 2j
 2
(m 1) . Substituting in condition 
max
j  U+L2 yields (m   1)  m which
always holds. This shows that Fi > 0 for every insider voter, which implies that LC (x; ")
weakly dominates Lm (x; ") for every m > 1.
In the proof we show that for every insider voter, the utility derived from the contin-
uous lottery is greater than the utility derived from every other lottery stand with the
same mean policy and with the same level of ambiguity. Besides, given that outsider
voters are indi¤erent between these two lottery stands, each political party derives a
greater utility when proposing the continuous lottery than when proposing every other
discrete lottery with equal mean policy and equal level of ambiguity.
For a given value " > 0 and a xed policy x; Figure 1 illustrates the value Fi in
Expression (4.10) as a function of xi; that is, it indicates the di¤erential utility between
the continuous lottery LC and the discrete lottery Lm when m = 2 up to m = 10: We
show how the greater m; the smaller the di¤erential utility and, in all the cases, Fi > 0
for all xi 2 (x  "; x+ "):
Finally, we argue why the lottery LC(x; ") and the single policy L1(x; 0) cannot be
compared in terms of domination. Note that in those situations in which both proposals,
LC(x; ") and L1(x; 0); display the same electoral result, the party strictly prefers the
continuous lottery over the single policy since it has a positive level of ambiguity " > 0:
However, in some situations L1(x; 0) can guarantee the electoral victory but LC(x; ")
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Figure 4-1: Values of the di¤erential utility when m = 2 up to m = 10:
cannot. This is the case, for instance, when one party proposes L1(x; 0) and the other
LC(x; "): Then, for those agents with ideal policy close to x; they strictly prefer L1(x; 0)
over LC(x; "): If a majority of voters has their ideal policies around x; this shows that
the single policy can guarantee the victory over the continuous lottery. Consequently,
in this situation, the party strictly prefers L1(x; 0) over LC(x; ") if the benets from
holding o¢ ce are su¢ ciently high. Thus, the non-weakly dominated set of strategies in
our setting contains continuous lotteries and single policies.7
4.4 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we analyze equilibrium existence. We rst discard non-equilibrium strate-
gies and we second analyze lottery stands that either di¤er in the proposed mean policies
or in the proposed level of ambiguity.
Our rst result shows that there cannot be an equilibrium in which one party wins
and the other loses the elections.
7Thus, the non-weakly dominated set of strategies in our setting is equivalent to the set of strategies
proposed by Aragonès and Neeman (2000).
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Lemma 1 If an equilibrium exists then, there is a tie.
Proof. When  > 1, the minimum payo¤ that a political party derives from tying

2
is always greater than the maximum payo¤ associated to losing "max and therefore, a
party always strictly prefers tying to losing. When   1; however, this is not the case.
Suppose to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium in which one party loses and the
other wins. We distinguish two cases depending on the value of :
When  > 1, the losing party can deviate by selecting the same strategy as the winning
party, which guarantees a tie. This is a protable deviation in contradiction with an
equilibrium situation.
When   1; consider wlog that Party A wins and Party B loses. Then, because Party
B cannot improve deviating, its unique optimal strategy is LB = LC(12 ; "
max) with vB =
"max = 1
2
since for every other lottery stand such that " < "max; vB = " < 12 : Given
that Party A is winning, its strategy has to be di¤erent from that of Party B. Let
LA = LC (x; ") with " 2 [0; "max) ; then, Party As utility is vA = +":We nd, however,
that LA = LC (x; ") with " 2 [0; "max) and LB = LC(12 ; "max) is not a Nash equilibrium: if
Party A deviates to LA
0
= LC
 
1
2
; "0

where " < "0 < "max, it still wins (as we show next)
and its payo¤s increase vA(LA
0
; LB) = +"0 > vA(LA; LB) = +":We show that Party A
wins when LA
0
= LC
 
1
2
; "0

and LB = LC(12 ; "
max). By Expression (4.9), @Ui
@"
=
( 1
2
 xi)2
"2
 1
where the fact that (1
2
  xi)2 < "2 implies that @Ui@" < 0; that is, insider voters prefer the
lottery with smaller " whereas outsider voters remain indi¤erent. Thus, voters with ideal
policy xi 2 (12 "0; 12+"0) prefer the lottery with smaller "; i.e., LA
0
= LC
 
1
2
; "0

. Then, for
"0 su¢ ciently close to "max; Party A obtains a majority of votes and wins, in contradiction
with an equilibrium situation.
Lemma 1 shows that every pair of strategies in which one party wins and the other
loses cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. The proof distinguishes between two
cases: when  > 1 (the benets from holding o¢ ce are more than two times the maximum
benets derived from ambiguity "max = 1
2
), and when   1. When  > 1; the losing
party improves inducing a tie by selecting the same strategy as its opponent. When
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  1; there can be situations in which the losing party has no incentives to induce a tie,
but in those cases, the winning party improves by proposing a more ambiguous lottery
stand. In particular, in the hypothetical case of an equilibrium in which a party wins,
the losing party proposes the maximum level of ambiguity "max: We then show that the
winning party always has a protable deviation in which it increases its proposed level
of ambiguity (up to some level below "max). Interestingly, this deviation guarantees the
electoral victory due to the fact that insider voters, when comparing lotteries with equal
mean policies, strictly prefer the less ambiguous one.
From Lemma 1 we deduce that the search for equilibrium strategies can be restricted
to tying situations. The following lemma discards certain lottery stands as equilibrium
strategies in a tying situation. In particular, we show that in the case of an equilibrium
in which parties tie, parties cannot hold di¤erent levels of ambiguity.
Lemma 2 If there is an equilibrium in which parties tie then, parties propose an equal
level of ambiguity, "A = "B:
Thus, in a tying situation, partiestaste for ambiguity makes them propose equal ":
Some additional strategies can also be discarded as equilibrium strategies when the
proposed mean policies do not satisfy certain conditions.
Lemma 3 If there is an equilibrium in which parties tie then, partiesmean policies are
either equal xA = xB; or equidistant to the ideal policy of the median voter, jxA   xM j =
jxB   xM j.
The fact that in a tying equilibrium both parties propose an equal level of ambiguity
implies that parties mean policies have to be either symmetric around the median or
equal. The proof shows that in any other case, there is a party which achieves a majority
of votes, in contradiction with a tying equilibrium. When parties propose mean policies
that are symmetric around the median voter, all the voters with ideal policy to one of the
sides of the median (say right) vote for one of the parties, the voters with ideal policy to
the other side of the median voter (left) vote for the other party and the median voter is
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indi¤erent between the two proposals. When both parties propose the same mean policy
and given that their proposed levels of ambiguity have to be equal, we also obtain a tying
situation.
According to the results obtained so far, we next show that we can discard all but
one of the partiesstrategies in the case of a tying situation. The strategy that is not
discarded is the degenerate lottery in which the party proposes the ideal policy of the
median voter.
Lemma 4 If there is an equilibrium in which parties tie then, parties propose the unam-
biguous ideal policy of the median voter, xM :
In the proof we show that equilibrium strategies in which parties propose equal mean
policies and certain positive level of ambiguity " > 0 can be discarded. In fact, when par-
ties propose equal mean policies, one of the parties has incentives to deviate by proposing
less ambiguity. We show that the lottery with smaller level of ambiguity " is more pre-
ferred for those insider voters (of one or the other lottery), whereas outsider voters (of
both lotteries) remain indi¤erent between them. This is very intuitive given that once
a voter is within the bounds of a lottery stand, the smaller the level of ambiguity, the
higher the probability assigned to policy proposals which are closer to the voters ideal
policy. From the outsidersviewpoint, the two lottery stands yield an equal expected
value and these voters are immune to di¤erent levels of ambiguity. Therefore, this result
reveals that voters dislike ambiguity and that the smaller the range over which the lot-
tery stand is distributed, the greater the electoral support. In every other situation in
which the parties propose di¤erent mean policies we nd that, independent of the level
of ambiguity "; a protable deviation always exists in which a party moves closer to the
median voter.
In our last result, we show that equilibrium existence crucially depends on the mag-
nitude of the o¢ ce-holding benets. We distinguish three scenarios: one in which the
benets from holding o¢ ce are above or equal to one   1, another in which 0 <  < 1;
and the one in which  = 0 (i.e., where there are no o¢ ce-holding benets).
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Proposition 6 When   1; there is a unique equilibrium (LA; LB) in which the two
parties propose, with no ambiguity, the ideal policy of the median voter, i.e., LA = LB =
L1(xM ; 0). When 0 <  < 1; there is no equilibrium. When  = 0; there is a unique
equilibrium (LA; LB) in which the two parties propose the maximal level of ambiguity,
i.e., LA = LB = LC
 
1
2
; "max

.
When o¢ ce-holding incentives are su¢ ciently rewarding (in comparison to ambigu-
ity), there is a unique equilibrium prediction in which parties converge to the ideal policy
of the median voter. Surprisingly, once the benets from holding o¢ ce are not high
enough (in comparison to the extra-benets derived from ambiguity), an equilibrium
fails to exist. When o¢ ce-holding benets are not present, the only prediction consists
of both parties proposing the maximal level of ambiguity.
From a theoretical perspective, the proposed payo¤ function is discontinuous. For
example, when parties strategies are the same and equal to LC(12 ; "
max); one of the
parties strictly improves announcing LC(12 ; ") where " is slightly smaller than "
max; which
induces a winning situation. In fact, the discontinuity of the payo¤ function implies
that the standard result by Glicksberg (1952) on existence of mixed-strategy equilibria
does not apply to our model. However, according to Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), we
cannot discard existence of other type of equilibrium in mixed-strategy.8 An equilibrium
in mixed strategies in which parties do not propose continuous or degenerate lottery
stands would imply mixing over di¤erent levels of ambiguity or/and mixing over non-
connected intervals of the policy space. In both cases, interpretation of such strategies
are di¢ cult and this would only apply to a scenario in which 0 <  < 1 which means that
o¢ ce-holding benets are less than two times the benets derived from being ambiguous.
8Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) maintain that mixed-strategy equilibria can exist when the set of
discontinuities is of (Lebesgue) measure zero.
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4.5 Concluding remarks
Our main result states that o¢ ce-seeking incentives mitigate partiestaste for ambiguity
or, in other words, when o¢ ce-seeking incentives are present, ambiguous policy platforms
cannot be sustained as (Nash) equilibrium strategies. When the intensity of parties
preferences over ambiguity is low (with respect to winning the elections), parties converge
to the ideal policy of the median voter. However, an equilibrium fails to exist when the
intensity of preferences over ambiguity is high. Convergence to the median voter is
not any more an equilibrium prediction in this last case since parties have incentives to
deviate to an ambiguous platform even when this implies losing the elections.
Our proposal accounts for two types of ambiguous strategies  discrete and continuous
lottery stands  . Continuous lotteries, we show, weakly dominate discrete lotteries.
Among the continuous lottery stands, when comparing lotteries with equal mean policy,
we nd that the less ambiguous lottery attracts more votes. Intuitively, once the preferred
policy of a voter is within the bounds of a lottery stand, the smaller the level of ambiguity,
the higher the probability assigned to policy proposals which are not far from the voters
ideal policy. This result derives from the single-peaked shape of preferences, by which
those voters whose ideal policies are within the bounds of a lottery stand behave as
risk-averse voters.
According to our results and the existing literature, we conclude that there are two
key features that induce ambiguous strategies   voters with risk-acceptance attitudes
and parties with uncertainty about voterspreferences  . In particular, in a setting with
uncertainty about voters preferences and a taste for ambiguity, parties may sacrice
some probability of winning in exchange for the extra-benets derived from proposing an
ambiguous platform. When there is no uncertainty about voterspreferences, we show,
both parties perfectly predict the election result and this eliminates those protable
trade-o¤s between ambiguity and votes.
Our theoretical prediction, by which uncertainty about voterspreferences generates
ambiguous platforms whereas ambiguous strategies vanish when there is no uncertainty,
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is open to empirical scrutiny. We propose a two-round election as a suitable scenario for
this purpose. In this setting, the rst election round can be interpreted as one in which
parties are more uncertain about voterspreferences, and the second election round as
one with less uncertainty. The variance and location of parties policy proposals, as
perceived by voters in election surveys, reveal information about partiesstrategies. This
a natural experiment which, we believe, can provide additional insights into the electoral
use of strategic ambiguity.
There are several directions in which our proposed theoretical model can be extended.
Among others, we can analyze strategic ambiguity in a setting with more political parties
and di¤erent electoral rules, from majority rule to proportional representation. The
analysis of these scenarios is left for further research.
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4.6 Appendix
This Appendix presents the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemmas 1 to 4.
Proof of Proposition 1. For every insider voter, the utility over Lm (x; ") is
measured by (4.7). We can decompose and substitute the absolute values of Expression
(4.7) so that
Ui(Lm) =   1
m
"
jX
j=0

 i +
(m  1  2j)
m  1 "

+
m 1X
j+1

i  
(m  1  2j)
m  1 "
#
where i = x  xi and j = k   1 with k being the number of policy proposals xn 2 Xm
such that xn < xi. The above expression is equivalent to
Ui(Lm) =   1
m
"
  (j + 1) i + (j + 1) "  2"m 1
jX
j
j=0
+ (m  1  j) i
  (m  1  j) "+ 2"
m 1
m 1X
j+1
j
#
:
Substituting that
jX
j
j=0
= j
(j+1)
2
,
m 1X
j+1
j = (n 1)n
2
  j(j+1)
2
and simplifying yields
Ui(Lm) =   1
m

(m  2  2j) i +
2" (j + 1) (m  1  j)
m  1

:
Substituting the above expression and Expression (4.9) into (4.10) we deduce
Fi =  
2
i
2"
  "
2
+
(m  2  2j) i
m
+
2" (j + 1) (m  1  j)
m (m  1) :
Next, we show that Fi > 0 for all i 2 ( "; "). When i ! ", the value of j = 0 so that
Fi(i) =
2i
2"
  "
2
+ (m 2)i
m
+ 2"
m
. This function is continuous in i from where
limFi
i!"
(i) = Fi(") = 0:
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The value of the parameter j changes with i. Expression (4.6) denes the values xn in
Xm. Then, we can dene the values i for which j
 changes, as the ones in the sequence
m 1 2j
m 1 "
	m 1
j=0
. In particular, for every agent i such that i 2
h
m 1 2(j+1)
m 1 ";
m 1 2j
m 1 "
i
,
the value of j is the same (e.g., j = 0 for all i 2 [m 3m 1"; "); and j = 1 for all
i 2

m 5
m 1";
m 3
m 1"

). We show that in each of these intervals, F 0i is strictly increasing
when evaluated in its lower bound and strictly decreasing when evaluated in its upper
bound. Solving for the derivative evaluated in its lower bound
@Fi(
m 1 2(j+1)
m 1 ")
@i
=  m 1 2(j+1)
m 1 +
m 2 2j
m
= 2(j
+1 m)
(m 1)m
where given that 0  j  m 2 then, j+2  m, from where j+1 < m and the above
derivative is strictly negative. Solving for the derivative evaluated in its upper bound
@Fi(
m 1 2j
m 1 ")
@i
=  m 3 2j
m 1 +
m 2 2j
m
= 2+2j

(m 1)m > 0:
Given that @
2Fi
@2i
=  1
"
< 0, Fi is concave in each of the proposed intervals. Besides, @
3Fi
@3
=
0 implies that in each of the intervals, function Fi is symmetric around its maximum value.
Let max0 be the agent with maximum Fi in the interval where j
 = 0. Starting from the
interval where j = 0 and therefore, i 2 [m 3m 1"; "), we rst show that the agent in the
upper bound, i =
m 3
m 1" is closer to 
max
0 than the agent in the lower bound, i = ".
This feature, together with the symmetry of Fi and the fact that Fi(") = 0 implies that
Fi > 0 in the interval i 2 [m 3m 1"; "). Second, we show that in every subsequent interval,
where j > 0, the agent in the upper bound is not further from maxj than the agent in
the lower bound. By continuity of Fi this implies that Fi > 0 in the interval i 2 ( "; ").
In each interval, dened by a value of j where 0  j  m   2, the lower and upper
bounds are dened by L =
m 1 2(j+1)
m 1 " and U =
m 1 2j
m 1 ", respectively. We want
to show that maxj   L  U   maxj for every j, which is equivalent to showing that
maxj  U+L2 . The maximum in each interval is deduced from the rst order condition
@Fi
@i
=  i
"
+ (m 2 2j
)
m
= 0 which yields maxj = "
m 2 2j
m
. Calculating the mean value
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U+L
2
= "m 2j
 2
(m 1) . Substituting in condition 
max
j  U+L2 yields (m   1)  m which
always holds. This shows that Fi > 0 for every insider voter, which implies that LC (x; ")
weakly dominates Lm (x; ") for every m > 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. When  > 1, the minimum payo¤ that a political party
derives from tying 
2
is always greater than the maximum payo¤ associated to losing "max
and therefore, a party always strictly prefers tying to losing. When   1; however, this
is not the case. Suppose to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium in which one party
loses and the other wins. We distinguish two cases depending on the value of :
When  > 1, the losing party can deviate by selecting the same strategy as the winning
party, which guarantees a tie. This is a protable deviation in contradiction with an
equilibrium situation.
When   1; consider wlog that Party A wins and Party B loses. Then, because Party
B cannot improve deviating, its unique optimal strategy is LB = LC(12 ; "
max) with vB =
"max = 1
2
since for every other lottery stand such that " < "max; vB = " < 12 : Given
that Party A is winning, its strategy has to be di¤erent from that of Party B. Let
LA = LC (x; ") with " 2 [0; "max) ; then, Party As utility is vA = +":We nd, however,
that LA = LC (x; ") with " 2 [0; "max) and LB = LC(12 ; "max) is not a Nash equilibrium: if
Party A deviates to LA
0
= LC
 
1
2
; "0

where " < "0 < "max, it still wins (as we show next)
and its payo¤s increase vA(LA
0
; LB) = +"0 > vA(LA; LB) = +":We show that Party A
wins when LA
0
= LC
 
1
2
; "0

and LB = LC(12 ; "
max). By Expression (4.9), @Ui
@"
=
( 1
2
 xi)2
"2
 1
where the fact that (1
2
  xi)2 < "2 implies that @Ui@" < 0; that is, insider voters prefer the
lottery with smaller " whereas outsider voters remain indi¤erent. Thus, voters with ideal
policy xi 2 (12 "0; 12+"0) prefer the lottery with smaller "; i.e., LA
0
= LC
 
1
2
; "0

. Then, for
"0 su¢ ciently close to "max; Party A obtains a majority of votes and wins, in contradiction
with an equilibrium situation.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which both parties tie
and where "A < "B. Then, vA(LA; LB) = "A + 2 < vB(L
A; LB) = "B +

2
. In this case,
Party A can benet by selecting the same strategy as Party B, which also guarantees a
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tie and besides, this increases its payo¤s. This contradicts an equilibrium situation.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let xA and xB be the mean policies of the lottery stands
proposed by Party A and Party B, respectively. Suppose to the contrary that there is
an equilibrium in which parties tie and where xA and xB are neither equidistant to xM
nor equal. We take, wlog, the case xB < xA, where xA is closer to xM than xB; i.e.
(jxA   xM j < jxB   xM j): By Proposition 1, equilibrium strategies if they exist, can only
be continuous lotteries or single policy stands. Moreover, by Lemma 2, there cannot be
a tying situation in which one party proposes a single policy and another a continuous
lottery. Therefore, either both parties propose a single policy or both parties propose a
continuous lottery with an equal level of ambiguity. In the former case, Party A wins the
election in contradiction with a tying situation. Thus, we just account for tying situations
in which both parties propose continuous lottery stands with equal ". Then, the group
of voters with ideal policy xi 2 [xM ; 1] ts into one of the three following cases:
- Case 1. Agents with xi 2 [xM ; 1] are all outsider voters of the lottery stands of Party A
and Party B. This can only occur in a situation where xB < xA < xM : For these agents,
Ui(L
A) =   jxA   xij and Ui(LB) =   jxB   xij and they prefer the party which mean
policy is closer to their ideal policy. Given that xB < xA < xM ; all outsider agents prefer
xA: Therefore, a majority votes for Party A, in contradiction with a tying situation.
- Case 2. Agents with xi 2 [xM ; 1] are of two types: agents with xi 2 [xA + "; 1] are
outsider voters of Party A and Party B, and agents with xi 2 [xM ; xA + "] are insider
voters of Party A. This can occur either in a situation where xB < xA < xM or xB < xM <
xA: For every outsider voter, Ui(LA) =   jxA   xij and Ui(LB) =   jxB   xij and they all
prefer Party A over Party B since their ideal policies are closer to xA than to xB: Insiders
of Party A evaluate LA according to Expression (4.9), i.e. Ui(LA) =   (xA xi)22"   "2 : By
denition, an insider voter satises that jxA   xij < " and so,  (xA   xi)2 >  "2; from
where Ui(LA) >   "22"   "2 =  ": For these voters Ui(LB) =   jxB   xij and, given that
they are outsider voters of Party B, then   jxB   xij <  ": We deduce that Ui(LB) <
 " < Ui(LA); i.e. insider voters of Party A strictly prefer Party A over Party B. Thus,
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a majority votes for Party A, in contradiction with a tying situation.
- Case 3. Agents with xi 2 [xM ; 1] are of three types: agents with xi 2 [xA + "; 1] are
outsider voters of Party A and Party B, agents with xi 2 [xB + "; xA + "] are insider voters
of Party A and agents with xi 2 [xM ; xB + "] are insider voters of both parties. This can
occur either in a situation where xB < xA < xM or xB < xM < xA: For every outsider
voter, Ui(LA) =   jxA   xij and Ui(LB) =   jxB   xij and they all prefer Party A since
xA is closer to their ideal policy than xB: Insider voters of Party A evaluate LA according
to Expression (4.9), i.e. Ui(LA) =   (xA xi)22"   "2 ; and evaluate Party B by Ui(LB) =
  jxB   xij : Since jxA   xij < " and  (xA   xi)2 >  "2; then Ui(LA) >   "22"   "2 =  ":
Given that   jxB   xij <  " we deduce that Ui(LB) <  " < Ui(LA); i.e. insider voters
of Party A strictly prefer Party A over Party B. Insider voters of Party A and Party B
evaluate LA and LB according to Expression (4.9) so that Ui(Lj) =   (xj xi)
2
2"
  "
2
; for
j = A;B: Given that " is equal in LA and LB; these voters prefer the party which mean
policy is closer to their ideal policy, which is xA: Thus, a majority votes for Party A in
contradiction with a tying situation.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider to the contrary a tying equilibrium in which the
strategies of the parties di¤er from L1(xM ; 0): By Proposition 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
the possible equilibrium strategies in a tie situation are restricted to one of the following
three cases:
- Case 1. Suppose that parties gather equal mean policies in their lotteries and that
LA = LB = LC (x; ") where " > 0: Then, parties tie and obtain the payo¤s " + 2 :
Consider that Party A deviates to LA = LC(x; "0) where "
0
< ": According to Expression
(4.9), @Ui
@"
= (xA xi)
2
"2
  1 where the fact that (xA xi)2 < "2 implies that @Ui@" < 0; that is,
insider voters prefer the lottery with smaller "; while outsider voters remain indi¤erent.
Thus, for "0 < " su¢ ciently close to "; Party A can win the elections and obtain a payo¤
"0 + ; that is greater than "+ 
2
; in contradiction with an equilibrium situation.
- Case 2. Suppose that parties gather equal mean policies in their lotteries and that
LA = LB = L1 (x; 0) where x 6= xM : Then, parties tie and obtain the payo¤s 2 : Suppose
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that Party A deviates to LA = L1(x0; 0) where jxM   x0j < jxM   xj : Then, Party A can
win with this strategy since the median voter now strictly prefers Party A over Party B.
This implies that Party A obtains a greater payo¤ with this deviation, in contradiction
with an equilibrium situation.
- Case 3. Suppose that parties mean policies are di¤erent and equidistant to xM so that
LA = LC (xA; ") and LB = LC (xB; ") where, wlog xB < xM < xA with xA   xM =
xM   xB, and where "  0: In this tying situation each of the parties obtains the payo¤
" + 
2
: Suppose that Party A deviates to LC(x0A; "); where xM < x
0
A < xA; reducing the
distance to the median voter location. Then, Party A can win with this strategy since
the median voter now strictly prefers Party A over Party B: if the median voter is an
outsider voter, then x0A is closer to xM than xB; which implies that Party A is more
preferred than Party B; if xM is an insider voter of both lottery stands, by Expression
(4.9), Ui =   (xj xM )
2
2"
  "
2
; j = A;B, so that the fact that x0A is closer to xM than
xB; together implies that Party A is more preferred than Party B for the median voter.
Party A wins the elections and obtain the payo¤ " + ; that is greater than " + 
2
; in
contradiction with an equilibrium situation.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we show existence of equilibrium when   1:
By Lemma 1, if there exist some equilibrium strategies, these induce a tie. Moreover,
by Lemma 4, all the strategies but L1 (xM ; 0) are discarded as equilibrium strategies in
a tying situation. Thus, it remains to show that LA = LB = L1 (xM ; 0) are equilibrium
strategies. Suppose to the contrary that (LA; LB) is not an equilibrium and consider,
wlog, that Party A has a protable deviation. There are up to three possible deviations:
i) L1 (x0A; 0) where x
0
A 6= xM ; ii) LC(xM ; "A) where "A (0; "max] and iii) LC(x0A; "A) where
x0A 6= xM and "A 2 (0; "max]. This is su¢ cient to analyze these deviations given that, by
Proposition 1, a discrete lottery is weakly dominated by a continuous lottery.
i) Suppose that Party A deviates to LA
0
= L1(x
0
A; 0), where, wlog, x
0
A < xM : Given
that Party Bs platform is the median voter location xM ; those voters with ideal pol-
icy xi 2 [xM ; 1] vote for Party B. Thus, Party A loses the election and its utility is
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vA(L
A0 ; LB) = 0; whereas vA(LA; LB) = 2  12 ; in contradiction with a protable devia-
tion.
ii) Suppose that Party A deviates to LA
0
= LC(xM ; "A) where "A 2 (0; "max] : Those
voters with ideal policy xi 2 [0; xM   "A] ; xi 2 [xM + "A; 1] are outsider voters so that
Ui(L
A0) = Ui(L
B) =   jxM   xij and they abstain from voting. Insider voters of Party A
compare Ui(LB) =   jxM   xij with the utility of the lottery stand which, according to
Expression (4.9), is Ui(LA
0
) =   (xM xi)2
2"A
  "A
2
: We want to show that Ui(LA
0
) < Ui
 
LB

for every insider voter. Take, wlog, xi 2 (xM   "A; xM ] and let  = jxM   xij : Then,
condition Ui(LA
0
) < Ui
 
LB

can be rewritten as   2
2"A
  "A
2
+  < 0, from where
 2+2"A "2A < 0:We dene Fi() =  2+2"A "2A. Since F 0i () =  2+2"A > 0 for
 2 (0; "A) ; Fi(0) =  "2A and Fi("A) = 0, we deduce that Fi() < 0 for every  2 (0; "A).
This implies that Ui(LA
0
) < Ui
 
LB

for every voter such that xi 2 (xM   "A; xM ] and,
in an equivalent way, for those voters such that xi 2 (xM ; xM + "A). Thus, Party A
loses the elections with this deviation and its utility is vA(LA
0
; LB)  "max = 1
2
; whereas
vA(L
A; LB) = 
2
 1
2
; in contradiction with a protable deviation.
iii) Suppose that Party A deviates to LA
0
= LC(x
0
A; "A) where x
0
A 6= xM and "A 2
(0; "max] : Take, wlog, x0A > xM : Then, those agents with ideal policy xi 2 [0; x0A   "A]
are outsider voters and for them, Ui(LA
0
) =   jx0A   xij < Ui(LB) =   jxM   xij ; so
they vote for Party B. For those agents such that xi 2 [x0A   "A; xM ] ; their utility over
Party A is measured by Expression (4.9) so that Ui(LA
0
) =   (x0A xi)2
2"A
  "A
2
and Ui(LB) =
  jxM   xij : We want to show that Ui(LA0) < Ui
 
LB

for every insider voter. In the
analysis of deviation (ii), we have shown that  (xM xi)2
2"A
  "A
2
<   jxM   xij for every agent
with xi 2 (xM "A; xM ]: Since (x0A xi) > (xM xi) then, (x0A xi)2 > (xM xi)2, which
implies that (x0A xi)2 <  (xM xi)2 and  (x
0
A xi)2
2"A
  "A
2
<   (xM xi)2
2"A
  "A
2
<  (xM xi):
Then, those voters to the left of the median (including the median) prefer Party B over
Party A. Thus, Party A loses the elections and its utility is vA(LA
0
; LB)  "max = 1
2
;
whereas vA(LA; LB) = 2  12 ; in contradiction with a protable deviation.
We have showed that all the deviations from L1(xM ; 0) (when the strategy of the oppo-
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nent is L1(xM ; 0)); are such that the party deviating loses the election. This also proves
that L1(xM ; 0) is not weakly dominated by any other strategy and this completes the
proof.
Second, we show non existence of equilibrium when 0 <  < 1:
By Lemmas 1 and 4, this is su¢ cient to show that LA = LB = L1 (xM ; 0) is not an
equilibrium in this case. Consider that Party A deviates to LA
0
= LC(
1
2
; "max): As
shown above, in deviations (ii) and (iii), Party A cannot defeat Party B when proposing
LC(
1
2
; "max) where either 1
2
 xM or 12 > xM : However, when  < 1; Party A derives
more utility when proposing LA
0
= LC(
1
2
; "max) than when proposing LA = L1 (xM ; 0):
vA(L
A0 ; LB) = "max = 1
2
and vA(LA; LB) = 2 <
1
2
: Therefore, LA = LB = L1 (xM ; 0) is
not a Nash equilibrium and this completes the proof.
Third, we show that LA = LB = LC
 
1
2
; "max

is an equilibrium when  = 0:
In this case, parties only derive benets from being ambiguous and therefore, the strat-
egy LC
 
1
2
; "max

is a strictly dominant strategy for each party and the unique Nash
equilibrium.
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Chapter 5
Conformity in voting
Coauthored with Bernardo Moreno. Published in Social Choice and Welfare
(2017) 48:519. DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-1023-7.
Sooner or later if a guy sits in the General Assembly for ten years, I think it is crazy
not to think that he is gonna make at least one judgement on, maybe, his principle...[But]
what good is it for me to sit there and vote what I feel would be my principle - in terms
of the philosophy that I would have on how government ought to be run relating to an
issue - and I voted against my constituency and voted my political philosophy, and then
still when they took the tally, I was still on the losing side?...When you are really in a
position where you can make it happen, then it would be rewarding enough to say, Ill
see you guys later; beat me in an election! I dont care whatever it is, that is where it
makes it worthwhile. Otherwise you are crazy, in my estimation.
A pro-Equal Rights Amendment legislator in Why we lost the ERA, Mansbridge (1986,
p. 162).
5.1 Introduction
A group of agents has to decide whether to accept or reject a proposal. Each agent
is either in favor of or against the proposal. Agents vote and the proposal is accepted
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if the number of agents in favor of the proposal is greater than or equal to a certain
threshold. There are real life situations in which agents misrepresent their preferred
options when voting (as shown in the abovementioned quotation from the pro-Equal
Rights Amendment legislator, these agents may adopt similar reasoning when voting:
why confront others by voting following my philosophy if I cannot obtain any gain by
doing so?). The tendency of agents to adapt their votes to those of other agents is known
as conformity.
In this study, we analyze the consequences of agents voting by considering not only
their true opinions about the proposal but also the votes of the rest of the voters. We
refer to these agents as conformists. By contrast, when voters consider only their own
opinions when voting, we call them independents. Our objective is to implement the
q truthful social choice function, which takes as messages the true opinion of the agents
and accepts the proposal if the number of those in favor is greater than or equal to certain
threshold.
First, we consider a situation in which agents vote simultaneously. When all agents
are independents, the unique weakly undominated Nash equilibrium announces their true
opinions. That is, independent agents always vote truthfully. The question that arises is
as follows: when all agents are conformists, is announcing the true opinion also the unique
equilibrium strategy?1 Do new equilibrium strategies emerge? In such a case, we check
whether the decision associated with any equilibrium when all agents are conformists
coincides with that obtained if all agents vote truthfully.
Let h be any integer number from 1 to n  1. We interpret h as the minimal number
of agents that any conformist voter wants to coincide with in situations in which her vote
does not determine the decision.
When all agents are conformists, we show that for any required threshold to accept
the proposal, there are undominated Nash equilibria in which the decision does not
1In the sequential version of the game, in Section 5, the equilibrium concept used is that of subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
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coincide with that obtained when all agents vote truthfully. This result holds regardless
of the minimal number of agents that each conformist voter wants to coincide with. In
particular, for any threshold, there are proles of true opinions in which the decision in
some equilibria is di¤erent from that obtained when all agents vote truthfully. We refer
to such proles as problematic. To compare preference proles, a possible criterion is
referring to a preference prole as more problematic than another if the set of q truthful
social choice functions that cannot be implemented is greater in the sense of set inclusion
for the former than for the latter. Following this criterion, the most problematic proles
of true opinions are either all agents preferring to accept the proposal or all agents
rejecting it. In addition, we use the word problematicwhen referring to q truthful
social choice functions. That is, a q truthful social choice function is problematic if
there are proles of true opinions in which the decision in some equilibrium is di¤erent
from that obtained when all agents vote truthfully. To compare q truthful social choice
functions, we can also use a similar criterion and referring to a q truthful social choice
function as more problematic than another if the set of preference proles in which the
former q truthful social choice function cannot be implemented is greater in the sense
of set inclusion than the latter q truthful social choice function. Those q truthful
social choice functions in which either all agents (unanimity to accept the proposal) or
only one agent (unanimity to reject the proposal) are required to accept the proposal are
equally problematic among them and they are the least problematic among all q truthful
social choice functions. Surprisingly, for certain q truthful social choice functions and
preference proles, announcing the true opinion is not even an equilibrium.
In the corporate world, committees are concerned about the possibility of agents
misrepresenting their opinions when taking decisions. One way to face this problem
is to replace some committee members by external advisors who provide unbiased and
independent opinions about the decision-making procedure.2 With this idea in mind, our
2We assume that external advisors or consultants have incentives only for being sincere and repre-
senting the interests of their employers; they receive no gain by deviating from that behavior.
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next step is to ask whether there is any partition of independent and conformist agents
that, in any equilibrium, yields the decision obtained when all agents vote truthfully for
any prole of true opinions. We o¤er a positive answer assuming uniformity of h. We
show that the minimum number of independent agents depends on the number of agents,
the required threshold to accept the proposal, and h.
In addition, the number of independent agents allows us to identify which thresh-
olds are more problematic, that is, the greater the number of independent agents, the
more problematic a threshold is. Interestingly, the least problematic are the unanimous
thresholds, either to accept or to reject the proposal, which is similar to the case in which
all agents are conformist.
Other versions of conformity can be studied. Among those that are anonymous, an
intuitive one is to consider that agents want to conform to as many agents as possible.
We show that this alternative way of modeling conformity is equivalent to considering
that agents in our case want to conform to at least a majority of voters. This case is very
demanding in the sense that almost all agents must be independent to guarantee that
the decision coincides with that obtained when agents vote truthfully.
Finally, we consider a situation in which agents vote sequentially. We show that for
any threshold and any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the decision obtained is not
a¤ected by the conformist behavior of the agents. This result holds regardless of the
number of conformist and independent agents, h, and the sequence in which agents vote.
Section 2 outlines a summary of the literature regarding the conformity phenomenon.
Section 3 presents the model and an impossibility result when the equilibrium concept
used is that of weakly undominated Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we provide the
number of independent agents that is su¢ cient to obtain, in any equilibrium, the decision
obtained when all agents vote for their own opinions. Section 5 solves the sequential
version of the problem. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 6. We relegate the
proofs of the results of Sections 4 and 5 to the Appendix.
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5.2 Previous Research
Conformity is rst analyzed by Asch (1951), showing how agents misrepresent their
true opinions when they are persuaded by the vote of a majority within a group. In
Aschs (1951) experiment, agents have to match a line of a specic length to one of
three lines. All members of the group except one are accomplices of Asch (1951). The
aim of the experiment is to observe whether agents conform to the wrong answer of the
rest of the agents, despite the correct answer being obvious. On average, about one-
third of the tested subjects conform to the wrong option. Critics of this study have
arisen owing to the open ballot nature of the experiment. However, Deutsch and Gerard
(1955) show evidence of conformity, even when agents report their vote secretly (see also
Bernheim and Exley, 2015). In addition, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) identify two types of
social inuence: informational and normative. Informational inuence refers to updating
an opinion taking into account othersprevious opinions, whereas normative inuence
describes the behavior of stating an opinion that ts with the group choice.
In this study, we analyze conformity from a normative perspective. Under normative
conformity, it is common to use the social distance approach, which is characterized by
a penalty term that accounts for the distance between the preferred option of the agent
and the group option (see also Jones, 1984; Bernheim 1994; Akerlof, 1997; Luzzati, 1999).
Bernheim (1994) endogenizes conformity assuming that agentspreferences are based on
an intrinsic utility and a preference for status, which is not observed by the rest of agents
(see also Akerlof, 1997). Multiple equilibria exist and, in particular, people conform to
a social norm when status is su¢ ciently important. Luzzati (1999) investigates how to
account for conformity within economic models. Following Jones (1984), Luzzati (1999)
models conformity exogenously and shows that, when the production of a public good
depends on voluntary contributions by agents, the introduction of conformism allows for
multiple equilibria, including agents contributing with positive amounts. According to
Luzzati (1999, p. 130), what social psychology seems rather to suggest is that agents,
although they sometimes consciously use conformism as a strategy, are more truly (un-
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consciously) conformists and therefore, it should be considered as a model of social
interaction. In addition, Postlewaite (1998) highlights that traditional economic model-
ing is su¢ cient to explain agentsbehavior when accounting for conformity. In fact, he
suggests that social environments are crucial in determining agentsbehavior.
We opt to study conformity by introducing it in the preferences of the agents. First,
agents want their opinions to prevail. If their votes have no e¤ect on the decision, confor-
mity arises and they want their messages to coincide with the messages of other agents.
In Dutta and Sen (2012), agentspreferences are lexicographic, but in the sense that
agents have a preference for honesty when announcing the true state does not change
their welfare. Dutta and Sen (2012) call agents partially honest.Our agents, however,
are not necessarily partially honest. A conformist agent strictly prefers to conform to
the opinion of some reference group when her message does not have any inuence on
the decision, regardless of whether her message corresponds with her true opinion.3 Our
approach, although di¤erent, has some degree of similarity with the literature of inter-
dependent preferences (Sobel, 2005).4 In this literature, agentsutility depends on the
utility of others, whereas in our case, agentsutility depends on the votes of others and
not their utility.
It is common to consider agentsheterogeneity in models with social interaction. In
particular, conformist agents are those that are inuenced by others and independent
agents are those that state their unbiased opinions irrespective of the consequences of
doing so. Bernheim (1994) identies in his model the role of independent agents as
those whose preferences are extreme enough to refuse to conform. Herrera and Martinelli
(2006), in a model of participation in elections, characterize conformists as those agents
inuenced by leaders, who also inuence the election outcome (see also Glaeser et al.,
1996). Rivas and Rodríguez-Alvarez (2014) consider leaders, independent agents, and
3We acknowledge that it could be very natural to think that when agents have di¤erent groups to
conform to, they prefer to conform to those whose messages coincide with their own opinions. Our
results hold under this assumption.
4See Sobel (2005) for a study of interdependent preferences applied to the ultimatum game case in
which agentspreferences also depend on the consumption of others.
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conformist agents in a model that includes information revelation prior to the voting
stage, and Buechel et al. (2015) study a model of opinion formation in di¤erent discussion
rounds in a social network framework consisting of leaders, conformist agents, counter-
conformist agents, and honest agents.
Finally, there are other studies investigating voting procedures involving di¤erent
thresholds. Maggi and Morelli (2006) present a model with a self-enforcing voting system.
They conclude that unanimity is the optimal system if there is no external enforcement
and majority rule is the ex-ante e¢ cient rule. In addition, Buchanan and Tullock (1962)
support the use of unanimity. The idea of considering other thresholds apart from the
simple majority and unanimity rule also appears in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998),
who suggest combining a super-majority rule with a larger jury in cases in which they
want to reduce the probability of convicting the innocent.
5.3 The model and basic result
Let N = f1; :::; ng be any nite set of agents. This group of agents has to decide whether
to accept or reject a proposal. Let capital letters C; S  N denote subsets of agents. We
refer to the true opinion of an agent i 2 N as ti 2 f0; 1g, where ti = 0 stands for agent i
rejecting the proposal and ti = 1 for accepting the proposal. Let t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 f0; 1gn
be a prole of true opinions.
To take a decision on the proposal, we ask agents to vote in favor of or against such
a proposal. Therefore, agents are asked to announce a message in this sense.
A prole of messages is denoted by m 2M where M is the set of messages. For any
agent i 2 N and any prole of messages m 2 M , let mi denote the message of agent i
and m i 2M i = j2NnfigMj the messages of all agents except i.
In most of the study, we assume that agents vote simultaneously.5 Then, Mi = f0; 1g
is the set of messages for agent i 2 N , where mi = 0 means that agent i votes against
5Section 5 analyzes a sequential version of the game.
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the proposal and mi = 1 that agent i votes in favor of the proposal. Proles of messages
are denoted in two possible ways. When they are part of a given prole of messages,
we use notation mi 2 Mi to denote that this is the message of agent i in the prole.
In other cases, we want to have a name for a given message, and we use superscripts,
that is, mtii stands for agent i 2 N voting according to her true opinion ti 2 f0; 1g. In
addition, we write m1S when mi = 1 for all i 2 S and S  N , m1 = (m11; :::;m1n) and
m0 = (m01; :::;m
0
n).
The description of the preferences di¤ers from the standard case in that they depend
not only on the decision taken but also on the prole of messages. Let f0; 1g M be
the set of alternatives, and (x;m) 2 f0; 1g M be an alternative, where x 2 f0; 1g
stands for the decision taken. Let eRi be the set of all possible preference relations for
agent i 2 N dened on f0; 1g M satisfying reexivity, transitivity, and completeness.
Let i2 eRi be a preference relation for agent i 2 N , and = (1; :::;n) 2 i2N eRi be an
admissible preference prole. Since we want to have a name for a given preference relation,
we use superscripts, that is, tii is the preference relation when agent i has opinion
ti 2 f0; 1g. We also write 1C when i=1i for all i 2 C and C  N , 1= (11; :::;1n),
and 0= (01; :::;0n).
Next, we dene a social choice function.
Denition 7 A social choice function f is a mapping from the set of admissible
preference proles to the set of alternatives, f : eRn ! f0; 1g M .
We introduce two properties regarding agentspreference relations. We call the rst
property selshness. An agents preference relation satises selshness if, when compar-
ing two di¤erent pairs of alternatives, she prefers that alternative in which the decision
matches her opinion.6
Denition 8 Agent is preference relation i2 eRi is selsh if for any true opinion,
6Note that our property of selshness is related to the notion of selsh preferences used in Sobel
(2005), which refers to the preferences that do not directly depend on the messages of others.
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ti 2 f0; 1g and for any (x;m); (x0;m0) 2 f0; 1gM such that x = ti and x0 6= ti, we have
(x;m) i (x0;m0).
The second property is referred to as h conformity. Let h = f1; :::; n   1g. We
interpret h as the minimal number of agents that any conformist voter wants to coincide
with in situations in which her vote does not determine the decision. An agents prefer-
ence relation satises h conformity if, when comparing two di¤erent pairs of alternatives
with identical decision, she prefers the alternative in which the number of agents with
the same message as hers is greater than or equal to h.7
Before presenting this concept, we dene when two agents conform.
Denition 9 For any m 2 i2NMi, and any i; j 2 N , we say that agent i conforms
to agent j if and only if mi = mj.
Denition 10 For any h 2 f1; :::; n   1g, agent is preferences satisfy h conformity
if for any ti 2 f0; 1g and for any x 2 f0; 1g :
(x;m) i (x;m0) if and only if agent i conforms to at least h other agents given m, and
conforms to at most h  1 other agents given m0.
In addition, we dene when an agent is conformist.
Denition 11 For any h 2 f1; :::; n 1g; an agent i 2 N is conformist if any admissible
preference relation for i satises selshness and h conformity.
We now illustrate that the properties of selshness and h conformity completely
determine the set of admissible preferences of the agents. We also want to stress, as shown
7Moreno and Ramos-Sosa (2015) opens the door to more general versions of conformity. Agents may
pay attention to some specic subsets of agents. Those subsets of agents could be either groups of
experts, or a leader, or, as Kenneth Shepsle proposed to the authors, an agent may want to conform to
some agents and not to others. Note that in these cases, the identity of the agents plays an important
role.
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in Example 1 that, when comparing alternatives, agents look rst at the decision and,
only after, at the vote of other agents. Therefore, agentspreferences are lexicographic.8
Example 12 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and h = 1: The set of admissible preference relations for
agent 1 satisfying selshness and h conformity is given in the following two tables:
Table 5.1: Preferences of agent 1 when 01.
01
f(0; 0; 0; 0); (0; 0; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1; 0); (0; 1; 1; 1); (0; 0; 1; 0); (0; 1; 0; 1)g
f(0; 1; 0; 0); (0; 0; 1; 1)g
f(1; 0; 0; 0); (1; 0; 0; 1); (1; 1; 1; 0); (1; 1; 1; 1); (1; 0; 1; 0); (1; 1; 0; 1)g
f(1; 1; 0; 0); (1; 0; 1; 1)g
Table 5.2: Preferences of agent 1 when 11.
11
f(1; 0; 0; 0); (1; 0; 0; 1); (1; 1; 1; 0); (1; 1; 1; 1); (1; 0; 1; 0); (1; 1; 0; 1)g
f(1; 1; 0; 0); (1; 0; 1; 1)g
f(0; 0; 0; 0); (0; 0; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1; 0); (0; 1; 1; 1); (0; 0; 1; 0); (0; 1; 0; 1)g
f(0; 1; 0; 0); (0; 0; 1; 1)g
Each alternative (x;m1;m2;m3) consists of two components. The rst component, x,
corresponds to the decision taken. The second component consist of the messages of each
of the agents. For instance, in alternative (1; 0; 1; 0) the rst component, 1; is the de-
cision taken after agent 1 announces m1 = 0, agent 2 announces m2 = 1 and agent 3
announces m3 = 0.
Table 1 refers to the case in which agent 1 is against the proposal. Agent 1 has four indif-
ference classes, each row representing each class. The rst indi¤erence class includes the
8An anonymous referee proposes to us another version of conformity in which agents want to conform
to as many agents as possible. In Section 4, we show how this alternative version of conformity relates
to that proposed in this study.
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alternatives in which the decision coincides with agent 1s true opinion and she conforms
to at least one other agent. The second indi¤erence class includes the alternatives in
which the decision coincides with agent 1s true opinion but she does not conform to any-
one. Similarly, in the last two rows, the decision obtained di¤ers from the true opinion
but in the third row, agent 1 conforms to some other agent and in the last row, she does
not.
Table 2 is interpreted in the same way as Table 1.
Example 1 illustrates that h conformity and the true opinion of an agent completely
determine her preference relation. For each h, there are only two admissible preference
relations, each of which corresponds to the two possible true opinions of an agent.
For any i 2 N; and any hi 2 f1; :::; n 1g; Rhii denotes the set of admissible preference
relations satisfying selshness and h conformity. When a preference relation is part of a
given prole of preferences, we use notation i2 Rhii to denote that this is the preference
relation of agent i in the prole.
Given hi; asking whether an agent is in favor of or against the proposal is equivalent to
asking for her preference relation. That is, when agent i sends message mi = 1 (mi = 0),
we interpret this as if agent i says that her preference relation is 1i (0i ).
Denition 13 Given hi and ti; we say that agent i votes truthfully when mi = ti for
any i 2 N:
Therefore, when we refer to voting truthfully or truthful voting, we mean that agents
announce their true preference relations, that is, their true opinions.
Now, we dene the class of social choice function that we are interested in. Given
hi 2 f1; :::; n  1g; for any preference prole i2 Rhii , the proposal is accepted if a given
number of agents q; where q 2 f1; 2; ::; ng, is in favor of the proposal, and it is rejected
otherwise. We refer to q as the threshold needed for the proposal to be accepted.
Next, we introduce the denitions of q threshold rule and q truthful social choice
function.
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Denition 14 Given any q 2 f1; ::::; ng; a q threshold rule gq(m) is such that, for
any m 2 i2NMi chooses x = 1 if the number of agents such that mi = 1 is greater than
or equal to q and x = 0 otherwise.
Denition 15 Given (h1; :::; hn); a q truthful social choice function f q; is such
that for any 2 i2NRhii chooses an alternative (x;m), where:
i) x = 1 if the number of agents such that ti = 1 is greater than or equal to q and x = 0
otherwise, and
ii) mi = ti for any i 2 N .9
Note that the q truthful social choice function do not have full range. In Example
2, we illustrate it for the 1  and 2 truthful social choice functions.
Example 16 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and (h1; :::; hn) be given.
The 1 truthful social choice function does not select alternative (0; 1; 0; 0) for any pref-
erence prole whereas (1; 1; 0; 0) is selected for preference prole (11;02;03).
The 2 truthful social choice function does not select alternative (1; 1; 0; 0) for any pref-
erence prole whereas (0; 1; 0; 0) is selected for preference prole (11;02;03).
Before dening the equilibrium concept used throughout this section, we make the
following assumption.
Assumption A: Any agent knows her preference relation and the preference relations
of the rest of the agents.10
9For every preference prole, the alternative selected by any q truthful social choice function species
the decision and vote of each agent. Alternatively, any q truthful social choice function could specify
the decision and number of agents voting for each option. The former could be related to an open ballot
scenario whereas the latter is more related to a secret ballot scenario in which the decision is made public
once all agents have voted. Our results remain valid under this alternative denition of a q truthful
social choice function.
10A more realistic scenario would be one in which the preference relations of the agents are unknown.
We assume complete information as a rst step before analysing the implications of incomplete informa-
tion in future research.
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Denition 17 For any (h1; :::; hn) and any q 2 f1; :::; ng, m 2M is a weakly undom-
inated Nash equilibrium of (M; gq) at 2 i2NRhii if for all i 2 N ,
(1) mi is not weakly dominated and
(2) for all m0i 2Mi, (gq(m);mi;m i) i (gq(m0i;m i); (m0i;m i)).
Given (h1; :::; hn) and 2 i2NRhii , UN((M; gq);; h) is the set of weakly undomi-
nated Nash equilibria of (M; gq) at .
Proposition 1 shows that for any (h1; :::; hn) and any q threshold rule, there are
undominated Nash equilibria yielding a decision di¤erent from that selected by the
q truthful social choice function for some preference proles. In what follows, we re-
fer to this by saying that the q truthful social choice function is not implemented for
a preference prole.
Proposition 1. For any (h1; :::; hn) and any q threshold rule, there are 2 i2NRhii for
which some undominated Nash equilibria do not implement the q truthful social choice
function for .
Proof. Let (h1; :::; hn) be such that hi 2 f1; :::; n 1g for any i 2 N . In order to prove
the result, we present the following three cases that apply to the 1, n, and q truthful
social choice function, respectively, where q 2 f2; :::; n  1g.
Case 1. 1 truthful social choice function. Let 2 i2NRhii be such that =0.
We show that m1 is a weakly undominated Nash equilibrium yielding (1;m1) where the
1 truthful social choice function is not implemented for 0.
Note that g1(m1) = 1 and g1(m0i ;m
1
 i) = 1 for any i 2 N . By h conformity, (1;m1)
0i (1;m0i ;m1 i) for any i 2 N . Since m1 2 UN((M; g1);; h), the 1 truthful social
choice function is not implemented for 0. 11
Case 2. n truthful social choice function. Let 2 i2NRhii be such that =1.
We show that m0 is a weakly undominated Nash equilibrium yielding (0;m0) where the
11Note that for any prole di¤erent from 0, any weakly undominated Nash equilibrium implements
the 1 truthful social choice function.
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n truthful social choice function is not implemented for 1.
Note that gn(m0) = 0 and gn(m1i ;m
0
 i) = 0 for any i 2 N . By h conformity, (0;m0) 1i
(0;m1i ;m
0
 i) for any i 2 N . Since m0 2 UN((M; gn);; h), the n truthful social choice
function is not implemented for 1. 12
Case 3. q truthful social choice function where q 2 f2; :::;n  1g. For any pref-
erence prole, all agents voting in favor or against the proposal is a weakly undominated
Nash equilibrium.
Let any 2 i2NRhii and any q 2 f2; :::; n 1g. Note that gq(m0) = 0 and gq(m1i ;m0 i) =
0 for any i 2 N . By h conformity, (0;m0) tii (0;m1i ;m0 i) for any i 2 N and
m0 2 UN((M; gq);; h) for any . Note also that gq(m1) = 1 and gq(m0i ;m1 i) =
1 for any i 2 N . By h conformity, (1;m1) tii (1;m0i ;m1 i) for any i 2 N and
m1 2 UN((M; gq);; h) for any . Therefore, m1;m0 2 UN((M; gq);; h) for any
q 2 f2; :::; n   1g and the q truthful social choice function is not implemented for any
.
Proposition 1 o¤ers a negative result. It shows that asking voters about their opinions
does not implement any given q truthful social choice function. In particular, for some
q truthful social choice functions, there are preference proles for which the q truthful
social choice function is not implemented. We refer to a preference prole as problem-
atic13 for a q truthful social choice function if it is not implemented. Alternatively,
a q truthful social choice function is problematic for a preference prole if it is not
implemented.
With this idea in mind, we could perform two exercises. We could compare either
preference proles or q truthful social choice functions.
A possible criterion that could be used to compare preference proles is the following.
Denition 18 A preference prole  is more problematic than 0; if the set of q truthful
12Note that for any prole di¤erent from 1; any weakly undominated Nash equilibrium implements
the n threshold rule.
13We thank the anonymous referee who advised us to refer to these preference proles as problematic
and to adopt a criterion stating when a preference prole is more problematic than another.
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social choice functions that cannot be implemented is greater in the sense of set inclusion
for  than for 0.
Applying this denition, we can present the following Corollary.
Corollary 19 Preference prole 0 is problematic for any q truthful social choice func-
tion such that q < n and 1 is problematic for any q truthful social choice function such
that q > 1. Therefore, preference proles 0 and 1 are not comparable among them.
Any other preference prole di¤erent from 1 and 0 is problematic for any q truthful
social choice function such that q 2 f2; :::; n 1g but not for q 2 f1; ng. Then, all of them
are equally problematic. Finally, preference proles 0 and 1 are the most problematic.
A similar criterion could be used to compare q truthful social choice functions.
Denition 20 A q truthful social choice function is more problematic than q0 if the set
of preference proles in which the q truthful social choice function cannot be implemented
is greater in the sense of set inclusion than that for the q0 truthful social choice function.
Applying this denition, we can present the following Corollary.
Corollary 21 The 1 truthful social choice function is problematic only for preference
prole 0 and the n truthful social choice function is problematic only for preference
prole 1. Therefore, the 1  and n truthful social choice functions are not compara-
ble among them. Any q truthful social choice function such that q 2 f2; :::; n   1g is
problematic for any preference prole. Then, all these q truthful social choice functions
are equally problematic among them. Thus, the 1 threshold and n truthful social choice
functions are the least problematic
Table 3 o¤ers a summary of which preference proles and q truthful social choice
functions are problematic. A "X" indicates which preference prole is problematic for a
q truthful social choice function and vice versa, as it is stated in Corollaries 1 and 2.
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Table 5.3: Problematic preference proles and q truthful social choice functions
q thresholds
Preference proles  q = 1 q = 2 ::: q = n  1 q = n
0     X
(1i ;0Nnfig) X    X
(1i ;1j ;0Nnfi;jg) X    X
(1Nnfi;jg;0i ;0j) X    X
(1Nnfig;0i ) X    X
1 X    
Finally, two remarks are in order. The rst is about the truthful behavior of the
agents in equilibrium. There are q threshold rules in which the truth is a dominated
strategy for the agents. Given (h1; :::; hn); for some q threshold rules, voting truthfully
is not a weakly undominated Nash equilibrium. We illustrate this with the following
example.
Example 22 Let, N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and hi = 2 for any i 2 N: Let = (11;12;13;04
;05): Take the 3 threshold rule. In message mt = (m11;m12;m13;m04;m05); all agents vote
truthfully. Note that g3(mt) = 1, g3(m14;m
t
Nnf4g) = 1 and (1;m
1
4;m
t
Nnf4g) 4 (1;mt):
Therefore, all agents voting truthfully is not a weakly undominated Nash equilibrium of
(M; g3):
The second remark deals with Pareto dominance. We nd that there is weakly undom-
inated Nash equilibrium driving to alternatives that are Pareto dominated. In the case of
any q threshold rule di¤erent from n; when =0, all agents voting in favor of the pro-
posal is a weakly undominated Nash equilibrium yielding alternative (1;m1). However,
alternative (0;m0) is strictly preferred to (1;m1) for any agent. For the n threshold
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rule, when =1, all agents voting against the proposal is a weakly undominated Nash
equilibrium yielding alternative (0;m0). However, alternative (1;m1) is strictly preferred
to (0;m0) for any agent.
5.4 Replacing conformist agents
In the previous section, we observe that all q truthful social choice function are prob-
lematic for at least one preference prole when all agents are conformists. By contrast,
when agentspreferences depend only on the decision, voting truthfully is the unique
weakly undominated Nash equilibrium. We refer to these agents as independent agents.
Denition 23 An agent i 2 N is independent if any admissible preference relation i
satises selshness and (x;m) i (x;m0) for all m,m0 2M .
Let I be the set of independent agents and NnI the set of conformist agents. Hence-
forth, we write I to emphasize the partition between the set of independent and con-
formist agents. Thus, I = ; accounts for the case in which all agents are conformists,
which is the case studied in the previous section, and I = N for the case in which all
agents are independents.
The composition of the set of agents taking the decision is important when imple-
menting a given q truthful social choice function. Assuming that the partition between
conformist and independent agents can be chosen, the relevant question is to study which
partition is the most appropriate to implement a given q truthful social choice function
by their associated q threshold rule in the presence of conformism. This scenario repre-
sents a common situation in the corporate world, in which it is usual to contact external
advisors when taking decisions.14 These external advisors are asked to produce unbiased
reports that are usually made available to the rest of the agents. In order to account for
this situation, we make the following assumption.
14We assume that these external advisors have incentives only to be sincere and to represent the
interests of their employers, and receive no gain by deviating from that behavior.
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Assumption B: All agents know the number of independent agents and their mes-
sages.15
For any q threshold rule and any (h1; :::; hn), our objective is to calculate the number
of independent agents guaranteeing that the q truthful social choice function is imple-
mented for any preference prole. We restrict our exercise to the symmetric case in order
to obtain a closed formula.16
Assumption C: For any i; j 2 NnI; we consider that hi = hj for any h 2 f1; :::; n 1g.
Next, we provide the intuition behind our main result. First, we x the number of
agents n: Let O be the set of all linear orderings of the agents. Let o0 = (o1; :::; on) 2 O
be an ordering in which ok is the k  th agent in ordering o0. Take a q threshold rule and
some h: Take one preference prole that is problematic for such q truthful social choice
function, say 2 i2NRhi . Check whether m0 and m1 are weakly undominated Nash
equilibrium and take that equilibrium in which the q truthful social choice function is
not implemented, say m: Take an ordering o 2 O of the agents. We now describe the
procedure used to obtain our main result:
Step 1. Replace the rst conformist agent in this ordering, o1, with an independent
agent with the same true opinion. Take (m
to1
o1 ;mNnfo1g): If it is a weakly undominated
Nash equilibrium not implementing the q truthful social choice function, go to Step 2.
If not, stop and register that the number of independent agents is 1.
...
Step k. Replace the k   th conformist agent in this ordering; ok, with an independent
agent with the same true opinion. Take (m
to1
o1 ; :::;m
tok
ok ;mNnfo1;:::;okg): If it is a weakly
undominated Nash equilibrium not implementing the q truthful social choice function,
15We acknowledge that in a more general model, conformist agents may not observe the message of
independent agents before they send their messages. For instance, conformist agents may know the
number of independent agents but do not know their identities. This is an interesting scenario that we
leave for further research.
16Admittedly, an exact number of independent agents could also be obtained for any given (h1; :::; hn)
but we consider that the symmetric case is a focal point.
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go to Step k + 1. If not, stop and register that the number of independent agents is k.
This procedure stops either in Step n 1 or before. If Step n 1 is reached, then it is
clear that (m
to1
o1 ; :::;m
ton 1
on 1 ;mon) is a weakly undominated Nash equilibrium implementing
the q truthful social choice function. We register the number of independent agents for
ordering o: We repeat the same procedure for any ordering o0 2 O. From all these pairs
of orderings and numbers of independent agents, we select the maximal and associate
that number with preference prole . We interpret this number as a measure of how
problematic this preference prole is for the q truthful social choice function. Following
the exercise presented after Proposition 1, we now propose comparing preference proles
based on the number of independent agents associated with each of them. A preference
prole  is more problematic than 0 if the number of independent agents needed to
implement the q truthful social choice function is greater for  than for 0. Therefore,
we can identify the number of independent agents associated with the most problematic
preference prole to the q truthful social choice function for any given n and h.
We repeat the same procedure for any h 2 f1; :::; n  1g, any q truthful social choice
function, and any n: In addition, we can propose a criterion to compare any pair of
q truthful social choice function. We say that a q truthful social choice function is more
problematic than q0 if the number of independent agents to implement the q truthful
social choice function is greater than that for the q0 truthful social choice function.
We use Example 4 below to show the application of the procedure described above
for some n and h.
Example 24 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and o = (o1; :::; o5): Take the 3 threshold rule and
h = 3. Take preference prole (11;0Nnf1g). By Proposition 1, m0 and m1 are weakly
undominated Nash equilibrium. For (11;0Nnf1g); the 3 truthful social choice function
selects (0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0) and the decision associated with m1 is 1. Therefore, m = m1: Take
ordering o = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5) of the agents. We now apply the procedure.
Step 1. Replace agent 1 with an independent agent whose true opinion is to accept the
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proposal. Take (m11;mNnf1g) = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1): Trivially, this is a weakly undominated Nash
equilibrium not implementing the 3 truthful social choice function. Therefore, we pro-
ceed to Step 2.
Step 2. Replace agent 2 with an independent agent whose true opinion is to reject the
proposal. Take (m11;m
0
2;mNnf1;2g) = (1; 0; 1; 1; 1): Since this is a weakly undominated
Nash equilibrium not implementing the 3 truthful social choice function, we proceed to
Step 3.
Step 3. Replace agent 3 with an independent agent whose true opinion is to reject the
proposal. Take (m11;m
0
2;m
0
3;mNnf1;2;3g) = (1; 0; 0; 1; 1): By selshness and since either
agent 4 or agent 5 voting 0 change the decision from 1 to 0, (m11;m
0
2;m
0
3;mNnf1;2;3g) is
not a weakly undominated Nash equilibrium. We stop and register that the number of
independent agents is 3. Then, for o = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5), the number registered is 3.
We repeat the same procedure for ordering o0 = (2; 3; 4; 5; 1).
Step 1. Replace agent 2 with an independent agent whose true opinion is to reject the
proposal. Take (m02;mNnf2g) = (0; 1; 1; 1; 1): Trivially, this is a weakly undominated Nash
equilibrium not implementing the 3 truthful social choice function. Therefore, we pro-
ceed to Step 2.
Step 2. Replace agent 3 with an independent agent whose true opinion is to reject the
proposal. Take (m02;m
0
3;mNnf2;3g) = (0; 0; 1; 1; 1): By selshness and since either agent 4
or agent 5 voting 0 change the decision from 1 to 0 (m02;m
0
3;mNnf2;3g) is not a weakly
undominated Nash equilibrium. We stop and register that the number of independent
agents is 2. Then, for o0 = (2; 3; 4; 5; 1), the number registered is 2:
In any ordering in which agent 1 occupies either the rst or second position, the procedure
is as in o and the number of independent agents is 3: In any other ordering, the procedure
is as in o0 and the number of independent agents is 2: From all these pairs of orderings
and numbers of independent agents, the maximal number of independent agents is 3 and
we associate 3 with preference prole (11;0Nnf1g).
We repeat the same procedure for every problematic preference prole for the 3 truthful
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social choice function. Table 4 o¤ers the number of independent agents for each q truthful
social choice function and the preference proles that are problematic for that rule.
For example, the case of the 3 truthful social choice function and preference prole
(1i ;0Nnfig) yields that the number of independent agents is 3, which corresponds to
the number in the third cell of the second row.
The rst row in Table 4 corresponds to the number of independent agents associated with
each q truthful social choice function for preference prole 0 : For the q truthful so-
cial choice function such that q = f1; 2; 3g; this number is 2; as the 4 truthful social
choice function is 1 and this preference prole is not problematic for the 5 truthful so-
cial choice function. For this preference prole, the most problematic q truthful social
choice functions are q = f1; 2; 3g; then the 4 truthful social choice function, and nally,
the 5 truthful social choice function. The second and subsequent rows correspond to dif-
ferent preference proles and, as can be observed in the table, the q truthful social choice
functions that are more problematic depend on the preference proles shown in each row.
The last row corresponds to the number of independent agents associated with the most
problematic preference prole for each q truthful social choice function.
Table 5.4: Independent agents when n = 5 and h = 3.
q thresholds
Preference proles  q = 1 q = 2 q = 3 q = 4 q = 5
0 2 2 2 1 -
(1i ;0Nnfig) - 3 3 2 -
(1i ;1j ;0Nnfi;jg) - 4 4 3 -
(1Nnfi;jg;0i ;0j) - 3 4 4 -
(1Nnfig;0i ) - 2 3 3 -
1 - 1 2 2 2
#I 2 4 4 4 2
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The following theorem o¤ers a formula that provides the number of independent
agents as a function of n; q and h:
Theorem 25 Let any n, h 2 f1; :::; n   1g and q threshold rule. Every undominated
Nash equilibria yields the decision selected by the q truthful social choice function for
any preference prole if
#I =
8<: minfh; n  hg when q 2 f1; ng;minfn  1;maxfq   1; n  qg+minfh; n  hgg when q 2 f2; :::; n  1g:
Proof. See Appendix A.
We identify the most problematic q truthful social choice function using the formula
provided by the above theorem. It turns out that unanimous thresholds (either to accept
or to reject the proposal) are the least problematic ones. Interestingly, as we remark
below, after unanimity, the least problematic q truthful social choice function is the
majority.
Remark 26 For any number of agents, n, and any h = f1; ::; n 1g, there is a complete
ranking of the q truthful social choice function in terms of the number of independent
agents. Moreover, unanimous thresholds are the least problematic and for any q; q0 2
f2; ::; n  1g , q is weakly less problematic than q0 if and only if q   n+1
2
  q0   n+1
2
.
To complete this section, we compare our way of modeling conformism with another
reasonable and intuitive way of doing so. We can assume that agentspreferences satisfy
selshness but when it comes to conformity, they want to conform to as many agents
as possible.17 We now show that this property over the preferences of the agents is
17We thank an anonymous referee for proposing this alternative way of modeling conformity.
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equivalent to considering that agents want to conform to at least the majority of agents,
that is, h = n
2
when n is even and h = n+1
2
when n is odd.
Lemma 27 Let any n and q threshold rule. Suppose that the preferences of any con-
formist agent satisfy selshness and that such an agent wants to conform to as many
agents as possible. Every undominated Nash equilibria yields the decision selected by the
q truthful social choice function for any preference prole if
#I =
8<: h if q 2 f1; ng;n  1 if q 2 f2; :::; n  1g:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Interestingly, this alternative way of modeling conformity is very demanding in the
sense that almost all agents must be independent to guarantee that any non-unanimous q truthful
social choice function is implemented. Still, the least problematic q truthful social choice
function are unanimity either to accept or to reject the proposal.
5.5 Sequential Voting
In this section, we study situations in which agents take turns when voting. As in
Section 3, we maintain Assumption A but relax Assumptions B and C. Therefore, all
agents are conformists and we do not impose uniformity of h. Suppose there is a xed
order of agents, indicating the sequence in which agents vote and, when voting, each
agent knows what preceding agents have voted for. In what follows, wlog, we suppose
that o = f1; 2; :::; ng, that is, agent 1 plays in the rst stage, agent 2 plays in the second
stage, and so on. Note that for any other ordering of the agents, say o0 2 O, we can
rename the agents and call agent 1 the rst agent in o0, agent 2 the second agent in o0,
etc.
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We now introduce some additional notation. Let y be a node and let Y be a nite
set of nodes that form a tree, with Z  Y being the terminal nodes. For each y 2 Y , let
i(y) be the agent playing in node y and let h^(y) denote the set of nodes that are possible
given what player i(y) knows. Thus, if y0 2 h^(y); then i(y0) = i(y) and h^(y0) = h^(y): Let
Hi be the set of information sets at which player i moves, that is, the set of information
set at stage i of the game:
Hi = fS  Y : S = h^(y) for some y 2 Y with i(y) = ig:
A message for agent i is an action for each node y such that i(y) = i; and the message
space for agent i is Mi = f0; 1g2i 1.
We refer to Gf1;::;ng;q = ((M; gq);) as a game for agents 1 to n, threshold q, and
2 Rhi.
We introduce the following function  : i2NMi ! f0; 1gn, mapping each prole of
messages, m 2 i2NMi, to the prole of actions,  (m) = (1 (m) ; :::; n (m)), where i
is the action in mi corresponding to the node y in which agent i(y) plays given h(y). In
this context, we now dene when two agents conform, the adaptation of the q truthful
social choice function and the q threshold rule for the sequential game.
Denition 28 For any m 2 i2NMj, and any i; j 2 N , we say that agent i conforms
to agent j if and only if i (m) = j (m).
Denition 29 Given (h1; :::; hn), a q truthful social choice function, f q, is such
that for any 2 i2NRhii chooses an alternative (x;(m)) where:
i) x = 1 if the number of agents such that ti = 1 is greater than or equal to q and x = 0
otherwise, and
ii) i(m) = ti for any i 2 N .
Denition 30 Given any q 2 f1; ::::; ng; a q threshold rule gq(m) is such that, for
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any m 2 i2NMi chooses x = 1 if the number of agents such that i(m) = 1 is greater
than or equal to q and x = 0 otherwise.
The equilibrium concept that we use is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Given
game Gf1;::;ng;q = ((M; gq);), SPN(Gf1;::;ng;q) is the set of subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria of (M; gq) at .
In Proposition 2, we make extensive use of whether an agent is pivotal. This remains
valid at any stage of the game Gf1;::;ng;q.
Denition 31 Given any q 2 f1; ::::; ng; agent i 2 N is pivotal relative to m i 2 M i
if there are mi;m0i 2Mi such that gq ((mi;m i)) 6= gq ((m0i;m i)).
Proposition 2 shows that any given q truthful social choice function is implemented
in any subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game Gf1;::;ng;q. The proof of Proposition
2 is divided in three Lemmas. Lemmas 2 and 3 o¤er direct proof for the 1  and the
n truthful social choice function, respectively. In the proof of these lemmas, we rst
analyze all preference proles for which the decision of the q truthful social choice func-
tion is to reject the proposal and then those for which the proposal is accepted. Then,
we solve the game from stage n; in which agent n votes, to stage 1. In each stage, we
analyze the equilibrium strategies for each of the voters, who vote taking into account
h^(y). In equilibrium, each agent votes according to her true opinion when she is pivotal
relative to what the rest of agents previously voted for, and according to h when she is
not pivotal. This completes the proof.
Finally, the proof for the q truthful social choice function where q 2 f2; ::; n  1g is
presented in Lemma 4. We introduce some additional notation. We denote as Gf1;:::;kg;q = ki=1Mi; gq; figki=1 a game consisting of agents 1 to k and threshold q, where i2 Rhii
for any i = f1; :::; kg. The strategy of proof is to show that given the equilibrium
strategy of the last agent in the sequence, the reduced game is either Gf1;:::;n 1g;q if 0n
or Gf1;:::;n 1g;q 1 if 1n. First, we describe the equilibrium strategies of this last agent in
two claims, A and B. Claim A applies when 0n and Claim B when 1n. Note that the
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new last agent in the reduced game is agent n   1. Then, we show that applying this
line of reasoning iteratively, we eventually end up in a game such that either Gf1;:::;kg;q
where q = 1 or Gf1;:::;kg;q where q = k. Once we obtain one of these two reduced games,
the proof is completed applying either Lemma 2 or Lemma 3.
Proposition 2. Let any n; any (h1; :::; hn), and any q threshold rule. Every subgame
perfect Nash Equilibrium yields the decision selected by the q truthful social choice func-
tion for any 2 i2NRhii .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that any q truthful social choice function is implemented for any (h1; :::; hn).
This implies that, under sequential voting, the presence of conformism does not a¤ect the
implementation of q truthful social choice function. When agents play strategies that
are a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, it is as if all players were pivotal, because they
anticipate the pivotality of those following them. Since conformity is lexicographically
inferior to the agentstrue opinions, the latter dominate the decisions of the players that
are relevant for the equilibrium path.
In both versions of the game, simultaneous and sequential, conformity is present. Un-
der simultaneous voting (Section 3), those equilibria not implementing a given q truthful
social choice function are generated by the presence of conformity. When we replace some
conformist agents with independent agents (Section 4), we assume that conformist agents
vote already knowing the number of independent agents and their messages. Therefore,
we impose a sequence in which rst, all independent agents vote simultaneously and
subsequently, all conformist agents vote simultaneously. In this case, given that the re-
placement of conformist agents with independent agents stops when the procedure makes
a conformist agent pivotal, conformity applies only when the decision is already set and
it is always possible to implement the q truthful social choice function. Under sequential
voting, conformity does not a¤ect the decision since agents vote selshly in any situation
in which they have the opportunity to do so.
104
Finally, the fact that in the sequential version of the game, any subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium implements the q truthful social choice function can be linked to the
literature about contribution to a public good. In the literature, there are ine¢ cient
equilibria in the simultaneous version of the contribution game, but any equilibrium in
the sequential version of the game is e¢ cient (see Coats et al., 2009 for experimental
evidence).
5.6 Concluding Remarks
The rst message from this study is that the presence of conformity may alter decisions
taken by agents. We show that no q truthful social choice function is implementable in
a simultaneous binary voting game if all agents are conformist.
The second message is that when designing committees in charge of taking decisions,
there are several aspects to be considered: the number of agents in the committee in
charge of the decision, the voting rule to use, the combination of independent and con-
formist agents in the committee, and the timing when agents announce their votes.
If the decisions are to be taken simultaneously, unanimous q truthful social choice
functions are the least problematic, followed by the majority q truthful social choice
function. Independent agents must be asked to reveal their opinions rst and then,
with this information in their hands, the rest of the agents vote and the decision is
obtained. In the corporate world, a great majority of companies normally include in
their committees external agents (what we call independent agents) who contribute with
external and unbiased opinions to decision-making processes. We ignore what motivates
the companies to do so, although we do know that this process helps to obtain decisions
that correspond to the true opinions of agents.
Finally, when the committee takes decisions sequentially, the presence of conformism
does not a¤ect these decisions.
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5.7 Appendix
This appendix includes the proofs of Theorem 1 and Lemmas 1, 2, 3, and 4. Before
proceeding with the proofs, we need to introduce some notation. Let lower-case letters
c; s denote the cardinality of subsets of agents C; S  N .
Proof of Theorem 1. We distinguish two cases, depending on the q threshold
rule. Case 1 presents the proof for the 1  and the n threshold rule and Case 2 presents
the proof for the remaining thresholds, q 2 f2; :::; n  1g:
Case 1. Let I 6= ; and the 1 threshold rule (the n threshold rule is symmetric). If
#I = minfh; n hg, the 1 truthful social choice function is implemented in equilibrium
when 0. In doing so, we show that m1i is weakly dominated by m0i for any i 2 NnI.
By assumption, any i 2 NnI knows that there are #I voting for 0. We distinguish two
cases:
Case 1.1. [Case 1.2.] n   h > h [n   h  h]. Let #I = h [#I = n   h]. Take
any agent i 2 NnI. For any m = (m1S;m0NnS) 2 UN((M; g1);0; h), I  NnS.
Since n   s  #I and by h conformity, (1;m0i ;m1Snfig;m0NnS) 0i (1;m1S;m0NnS). By
selshness, (0;m0i ;m
0
 i) 0i (1;m1i ;m0 i) and m1i is weakly dominated by m0i for any
i 2 NnI: Therefore, the result follows. Finally, if #I < h [#I < n   h  h] there
are m 2 UN((M; q);0; h) such that the 1 truthful social choice function is not imple-
mented. Let m = (m1S;m
0
NnS) where S = NnI. For any i 2 S, by h conformity and
since #I + 1 < h, (1;m1S;m
0
NnS) 0i (1;m0i ;m1Snfig;m0NnS).
Case 2. Let I 6= ; and any q threshold rule such that q 2 f2; :::; n 1g. We show that if
#I = minfn 1;maxfq 1; n qg+minfh; n hgg, the q truthful social choice function
is implemented in equilibrium for any q 2 f2; ::; n  1g and any . In doing so, we show
that for any i, mi 6= ti is weakly dominated by mtii for any i 2 NnI. By assumption,
any i 2 NnI knows there are #I independent agents voting for their true opinions. For
clarication, we divide the proof into three cases depending on the threshold.
Case 2.1. q 2 f2; :::; n+1
2
  1g (Case 2.2. when q 2 fn+1
2

+1; :::; n  1g is symmet-
ric). Then, q   1 < n  q. We distinguish two cases:
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Case 2.1.1. q   1  minfh; n   hg. Then, q  h + 1. Let #I = n   1 and
= (1C ;0NnC) 2 i2NRhi . Let agent i be the only conformist agent. If c < q   1, since
c < q 1  h, by h conformity, (0;m0i ;m i) tii (0;m1i ;m i). If c = q 1 and1i or c = q
and 0i , since c = q  1  h; by h conformity, (0;m0i ;m i) tii (0;m1i ;m i). If c = q  1
and 0i , by selshness (0;m0i ;m1C ;m0NnC[fig) 0i (1;m1i ;m1C ;m0NnC[fig). If c = q and 1i ,
by selshness (1;m1i ;m
1
Cnfig;m
0
NnC) 1i (0;m0i ;m1Cnfig;m0NnC). If c > q, when c < h + 1,
by h conformity, (1;m0i ;m i) tii (1;m1i ;m i); when c  h + 1, by h conformity,
(1;m1i ;m i) tii (1;m0i ;m i). Finally, suppose that #I < n   1. Let #I = n   2
and suppose, wlog, that 1; 2 2 NnI. In addition, let = (1C ;0NnC) 2 i2NRhi be such
that c = q, and 11;12. For m = (m01;m02;m f1;2g) such that for any k 2 I, mtkk and
i; j 2 f1; 2g, (1;m0i ;m0j ;m fi;jg) 1i (1;m1i ;m0j ;m fi;jg).
Case 2.1.2. q   1 > minfh; n  hg. We distinguish two subcases:
Subcase 2.1.2.a. [Subcase 2.1.2.b.] h < n   h [h  n   h]. Then, h  n
2
  1
[h > n
2
  1] and q > h + 1 [q < h + 1]. Let #I = n   q + h [#I = n   q + n   h] and
= (1C ;0NnC) 2 i2NRhi . If c < q, at most q   1 independent agents vote for 1 and at
least h independent agents vote for 0. Then, either by selshness or by h conformity, it is
a weakly dominant strategy to vote for 0 for any i 2 NnI such that 0i . If c  q, at least
h [n  h] independent agents vote for 1. Either by selshness or by h conformity, it is a
weakly dominant strategy to vote for 1 for any i 2 NnI such that 1i . Finally, suppose
that #I < n q+h [#I < n q+n h]. Let #I = n 1 (q h) [#I = n q+n h 1],
and suppose = (1C ;0NnC) is such that for h 1 [n h 1] independent agents 1i , for
n  q independent agents 0j and all k 2 NnI are such that 1k. Note that the decision
implemented by the q truthful social choice function is 1. Let m be such that all inde-
pendent agents tell the truth, and all conformist agents report mk = 0. Since h  n2   1
[h > n
2
  1], by h conformity, (0;m0k;m k) 1k (0;m1k;m k).
Case 2.3. n is even and q 2 fn
2
; n
2
+1g:18 Then, n  q > q 1. We distinguish two cases:
Case 2.3.1. q   1  minfh; n   hg. Then, q  h + 1. Let #I = n   1 and
18The proof when n is odd and q = n+12 is included in Moreno and Ramos-Sosa (2015).
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= (1C ;0NnC) 2 i2NRhi . Let agent i be the only conformist agent. If c  q; the proof
is analogous to Case 2.1.1. If c > q, when q < c < h + 1, at least q independent agents
vote for 1 and at most h agents vote for 1. Since q  h + 1  q + 1;by h conformity,
(1;m0i ;m i) tii (1;m1i ;m i). If q  h + 1  c, it could be either q  h + 1 < c
or q < h + 1  c: If q  h + 1 < c; at least h + 1 independent agents vote for 1:
If q < h + 1  c; at least h independent agents vote for 1: Then, by h conformity
(1;m1i ;m i) tii (1;m0i ;m i). Finally, suppose that #I < n   1: Let #I = n   2 and
suppose, wlog, that 1; 2 2 NnI. In addition, let = (1C ;0NnC) be such that c = q   1,
and 11;12. For m = (m01;m02;m f1;2g) such that for any k 2 I, mtkk , and i; j 2 f1; 2g,
since q   1 < n  q we have (0;m0i ;m0j ;m fi;jg) 1i (0;m1i ;m0j ;m fi;jg).
Case 2.3.2. q   1 > minfh; n  hg. We distinguish two subcases:
Subcase 2.3.2.a. h < n  h. Then, h  n
2
  1 and q > h+1: Let #I = n  (q  h) and
= (1C ;0NnC) 2 i2NRhi . If c < q, for i 2 NnI such that 1i , they vote for 1 when
the independent agents voting for 1 are enough to conform to at least h. Otherwise, by
h conformity, they vote for 0: For the particular case in which q  1 independent agents
vote for 1 and h independent agents vote for 0; since q > h+ 1 all i 2 NnI such that 0i
vote for 0 and all i 2 NnI such that 1i vote for 1 as q > h+ 1: The rest of the proof is
analogous to Subcase 2.1.2.a.
Subcase 2.3.2.b. h  n   h. Then, h > n
2
  1. Let #I = n   q + n   h, and
= (1C ;0NnC) 2 i2NRhi . If c  q, at least n   h independent agents vote for 1, and
there are strictly less than n q independent agents voting for 0. Given that n q > q 1
and q < h, either by selshness or by h conformity, it is a weakly dominant strategy to
vote for 0 for any i 2 NnI such that 0i . The rest of the proof is analogous to Subcase
2.1.2.b.
Proof of Lemma 1. We distinguish two cases, depending on the q threshold rule.
Case 1 presents the proof for the 1  and the n threshold rule and Case 2 presents the
proof for the remaining thresholds, q 2 f2; :::; n  1g:
Case 1. Let the 1 threshold rule (the n threshold rule is symmetric). Then, the
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1 truthful social choice function is not implemented when 0. Let #I = h and h =
n
2
(h = n+1
2
if n is odd). By assumption, any conformist agent knows there are h
independent agents voting for 0. Take any agent i 2 NnI. Since #I + i > n
2
  i, by
h conformity of agent i 2 NnI, (0;m0i ;m1Snfig;m0NnS) 0i (1;m1S;m0NnS). Finally, if #I =
h  1, by h conformity and since #I + i  h, (1;m1S;m0NnS) 0i (0;m0i ;m1Snfig;m0NnS).
Case 2. Let the q threshold rule where q 2 f2; :::; n  1g: We show that if #I = n  1,
the q truthful social choice function is implemented for any q 2 f2; ::; n  1g and any
= (1C ;0NnC) 2 i2NRhi . By assumption, the conformist agent knows there are n  1
independent agents voting for their true opinions. Let agent i be the unique conformist
agent. If 0i , by selshness (0;m0i ;m1C ;m0NnC[fig) 0i (1;m1i ;m1C ;m0NnC[fig) and if 1i , by
selshness (1;m1i ;m
1
Cnfig;m
0
NnC) 1i (0;m0i ;m1Cnfig;m0NnC). Therefore, in both cases, the
q truthful social choice function is implemented in equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that #I < n 1: Let #I = n 2 and suppose wlog that 1; 2 2 NnI. For
clarication, we divide the proof into four cases depending on the threshold. Take q < n
2
.
Let = (1C ;0NnC) be such that c = q, and 11;12. For m = (m01;m02;m f1;2g) such that
for any k 2 I, mtkk , and i; j 2 f1; 2g, (0;m0i ;m0j ;m fi;jg) 1i (0;m1i ;m0j ;m fi;jg). Take
q = n
2
and n is even. Let = (1C ;0NnC) be such that c = q   1, and 01;02. For m =
(m11;m
1
2;m f1;2g) such that for any k 2 I, mtkk , and i; j 2 f1; 2g, (1;m1i ;m1j ;m fi;jg) 0i
(1;m1i ;m
0
j ;m fi;jg). Take q =
n+1
2
and n is odd. Let = (1C ;0NnC) be such that
c = q   1, and 01;02. For m = (m11;m12;m f1;2g) such that for any k 2 I, mtkk , and
i; j 2 f1; 2g, (1;m1i ;m1j ;m fi;jg) 0i (1;m1i ;m0j ;m fi;jg). Take q > n2 . Let = (1C ;0NnC)
be such that c = q   1, and 01;02. For m = (m11;m12;m f1;2g) such that for any k 2 I,
mtkk , and i; j 2 f1; 2g, (1;m1i ;m1j ;m fi;jg) 0i (1;m0i ;m1j ;m fi;jg).
The proof of Proposition 2 makes use of three lemmas. Lemma 2 applies for the
1 truthful social choice function, Lemma 3 for the n truthful social choice function,
and Lemma 4 for the remaining q truthful social choice functions, q 2 f2; :::; n  1g:
Lemma 2. For any number of agents n, the 1 truthful social choice function is
implemented in any subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium on Rhi.
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Proof. Let n and the 1 threshold rule. Let 0. Then, x = 0. We have to
show that SPN(Gf1;::;ng;1) 6= ; and that for any m 2 SPN(Gf1;::;ng;1), g1(m) = 0.
We solve the game starting at stage n where agent n votes (remember that o = (1; ::; n)).
Since 0n, in equilibrium mn is such that for any emi 2 Mi where i < n, by selsh-
ness n (em1; ::; emn 1;mn) = 0 if agent n is pivotal relative to (em1; ::; emn 1), and by
h conformity, n (em1; ::; emn 1;mn) would be 0 or 1 depending on h if agent n is not
pivotal. Out of the path of play, agent n is indi¤erent. We proceed to stage n   1,
that is, to agent n   1. Applying the same reasoning iteratively, we reach stage 1.
Again, since 01, in equilibrium, m1 is such that (m2; ::;mn) as described above, by self-
ishness 1(m1; ::;mn) = 0, since agent 1 is pivotal relative to (m2; ::;mn). Note that
g1(m1; ::;mn) = 0. Then, m 2 SPN(Gf1;::;ng;1) and g1(m) = 0.
Let 2 Rhi be such that for some i, 1i . Then, x = 1. We have to show that
SPN(Gf1;::;ng;1) 6= ; and that for any m 2 SPN(Gf1;::;ng;1), g1(m) = 1. In doing so, we
show the proof by contradiction, that is, for any m 2 SPN(Gf1;::;ng;1), g1(m) = 0. We
solve the game starting at stage n where agent n votes. Let wlog, agent n in order o for
whom 1n. Since 1n, in equilibrium mn is such that for any emi 2 Mi where i < n, by
selshness n (em1; ::; emn 1;mn) = 1 if agent n is pivotal relative to (em1; ::; emn 1), and by
h conformity, n (em1; ::; emn 1;mn) would be 0 or 1, depending on h whether agent n is
not pivotal. Out of the path of play, agent n is indi¤erent. Note that for any emi 2 Mi
where i < n, g1(em1; ::; emn 1;mn) = 1. Therefore, any i < n is not pivotal relative to
any (em1; ::; emn 1;mn) for any emj 2 Mj for j 6= i, j < n. In equilibrium, for any i < n,
agent i announces mi according to h conformity at any node in which she plays. Then,
m 2 SPN(Gf1;::;ng;1) and g1(m) = 1; and we get a contradiction.
Lemma 3. For any number of agents n, the n truthful social choice function is
implemented in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium on Rhi.
Proof. The proof is symmetric to Lemma 2.
The proof of Lemma 4 makes extensive use of Lemmas 2 and 3.
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Lemma 4. For any number of agents n, the q truthful social choice function such
that q 2 f2; :::; n  1g is implemented in any subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium on Rhi.
Proof. Let n and any q threshold rule such that q 2 f2; :::; n   1g. We show that
for any Gf1;:::;ng;q, if agents play their equilibrium strategies, the reduced game obtained
can be either Gf1;:::;kg;q where q = k or Gf1;:::;kg;q where q = 1; which would depend on
the preferences of the agents. We solve the game starting at stage n where agent n votes
(remember that o = (1; :::; n)). Let 2 Rhi. We distinguish two claims, depending on
n:
Claim A. If 0n, in equilibrium mn is such that for any emi 2 Mi where i < n, by
selshness n (em1; :::; emn 1;mn) = 0 if agent n is pivotal relative to (em1; :::; emn 1), and
by h conformity, n (em1; :::; emn 1;mn) would be 0 or 1, depending on h if agent n is
not pivotal. Out of the path of play, agent n is indi¤erent. Then, the reduced game
obtained after agent n plays her equilibrium strategy is a game with agents 1 to n   1
and q threshold, that is, Gf1;:::;n 1g;q.
Claim B. If 1n, in equilibrium mn is such that for any emi 2 Mi where i < n, by
selshness n (em1; :::; emn 1;mn) = 1 if agent n is pivotal relative to (em1; ::; emn 1), and
by h conformity, n (em1; :::; emn 1;mn) would be 0 or 1, depending on h whether agent
n is not pivotal. Out of the path of play, agent n is indi¤erent. Then, the reduced game
is Gf1;:::;n 1g;q 1.
We now distinguish several cases, depending on the number of agents such that 1i .
Case 1.  such that #fi 2 N :1i g < q   1. We distinguish several cases, depending
on the preferences of agents 2 to n. If 0k, for k = fq + 1; :::; ng, Claim A applies at
stages n to q + 1 and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;qg;q. If 0q and 1j for exactly one
agent j 2 fq + 1; :::; ng, Claim B applies at stage j, and Claim A otherwise. Then, the
reduced game is Gf1;:::;qg;q 1. To solve stage q, we apply Claim A and the reduced game
is Gf1;:::;q 1g;q 1. If 0q 1, and 1j , 1k for exactly two agents, j; k 2 fq; :::; ng. Claim
B applies when we reach stages j and k, and Claim A otherwise. Then, the reduced
game is Gf1;:::;q 1g;q 2. To solve stage q   1, we apply Claim A and the reduced game is
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Gf1;:::;q 2g;q 2. By a similar reasoning, we end up in a case in which 03 and 1j for exactly
q 2 agents j 2 f4; :::; ng. Claim B applies when each of the q 2 agents play, and Claim
A otherwise. Then, the reduced game is Gf1;2;3g;2. To solve stage 3, we apply Claim A and
the reduced game is Gf1;2g;2. In all of the abovementioned cases, the q threshold equals
the number of agents remaining in the game. Applying Lemma 3, the result follows.
Case 2.  such that q < #fi 2 N :1i g. We distinguish several cases depending on
the preferences of agents 2 to n. If 1k for k = fn + 2   q; :::; ng, Claim B applies at
stages n to n + 2   q. Then, the reduced game is Gf1;:::;n+1 qg;1. If 1n+1 q and 0j for
exactly one agent j 2 fn + 2   q; :::; ng. Claim A applies when we reach stage j, and
Claim B otherwise. Then, the reduced game is Gf1;:::;n+1 qg;2. To solve stage n + 1   q,
we apply Claim B and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;n qg;1. If 1n q and 0j , 0k for exactly
two agents, j; k 2 fn+ 1  q; :::; ng. Claim A applies when we reach stages j and k, and
Claim B otherwise. Then, the reduced game is Gf1;:::;n+1 qg;2. To solve stage n   q, we
apply Claim B and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;n q 1g;1. By a similar reasoning, we end up
in a case in which 13 and 0j for exactly n  q  1 agents j 2 f4; :::; ng. Claim A applies
when each of the n  q  1 agents play, and Claim B otherwise. Then, the reduced game
is Gf1;2;3g;2. To solve stage 3, we apply Claim B and the reduced game is Gf1;2g;1. In all of
the abovementioned cases, for the obtained reduced games, the threshold is 1. Applying
Lemma 2, the result follows.
Case 3.  such that q   1  #fi 2 N :1i g  q: We distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 3.1. n  q < q   1. We distinguish several cases depending on the preferences
of agents 2 to n. If 0k for k = fq + 1; :::; ng, Claim A applies at stages n to q + 1.
Then, the reduced game is Gf1;:::;qg;q. If 0r+1 and 1j for exactly q  r agents, q > r > 1,
j 2 fr + 2; :::; ng. Claim B applies when each of the q   r agents play, and Claim A
otherwise, and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;r+1g;r. To solve stage r + 1, we apply Claim
A and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;rg;r. Lemma 3 applies. If 02 and 1j for exactly q   1
agents, j 2 f3; :::; ng. Claim B applies in the stages in which each of the above q   1
agents play, and Claim A otherwise, and the reduced game is Gf1;2g;1. Lemma 2 applies.
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Subcase 3.2. n  q > q  1: We distinguish several cases, depending on the preferences
of agents 2 to n. If 1k for k = fn+2  q; :::; ng, Claim A applies at stages n to n+2  q
and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;n+1 qg;1. If 1r+1 and 0j for exactly n   q   r agents,
n   q > r > 0, j 2 fr + 2; :::; ng. Claim A applies when each of the n   q   r agents
play, and Claim B otherwise, and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;r+1g;2. To solve stage r + 1,
we apply Claim B and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;rg;1. Lemma 2 applies. If 13 and 0j
for exactly n  q   r agents, j 2 f3; :::; ng. Claim A applies when each of the n  q   r
agents play, and Claim B otherwise, and the reduced game is Gf1;2g;1. Lemma 2 applies.
Subcase 3.3. n q = q 1. We distinguish several cases, depending on the preferences of
agents 2 to n. If 0r+1 and 1j for exactly q r agents, q > r > 1, j 2 fr+2; :::; ng. Claim
B applies when each of the q   r agents play, and Claim A otherwise, and the reduced
game is Gf1;:::;r+1g;r. To solve stage r + 1, we apply Claim A and the reduced game is
Gf1;:::;rg;r. Lemma 3 applies. If 1r+1 and 0j for exactly n  q   r agents, n  q > r > 0,
j 2 fr + 2; :::; ng. Claim A applies when each of the n  q   r agents play, and Claim B
otherwise, and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;r+1g;2. To solve stage r + 1, we apply Claim B
and the reduced game is Gf1;:::;rg;1. Lemma 2 applies.
Proof of Proposition 2. This follows from Lemmas 2, 3, and 4.
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Chapter 6
Conformity, Information and
Truthful voting
Coauthored with Bernardo Moreno and Ismael Rodríguez-Lara (Middlesex
University). Submitted.
6.1 Introduction
People frequently face binary decisions that require their opinion: board members choos-
ing whether to accept or reject a proposal (e.g., projects and budgets), senators and
congressmen voting on whether to pass a bill, or citizens voting in a referendum. In
these cases, agents might have a clear and strong opinion on what the best decision is.
If they do not pay attention to anything else, one can expect them to vote for the option
that best suits their opinions, that is, to vote truthfully. However, agents may decide
to misrepresent their opinion and conform to other agents by voting for the alternative
option, especially if they know that their vote will not inuence the adopted decision.1 In
this paper, we argue that the desire to conform to other agents in a voting game might
1Conformity can be dened as the tendency of agents to align attitudes, beliefs and behaviors with
those of some other agents (Myers, 2012).
114
be a¤ected by the voting rule, which in turn determines the pivotality of agents. We
also discuss the e¤ects of information in a conformity setting. Specically, we investigate
whether agents will be more likely to vote truthfully when they are informed that other
agents will vote truthfully.
The literature on conformity voting (summarized in Section 6.2) frequently assumes
that agents may want to vote for the winning option. Arguably, decisions are not al-
ways adopted using majority rules, therefore voting for the winning option is not always
equivalent to voting with the majority group. One of the goals of the current paper
is to re-examine the idea of conformity to account for decisions that require more than
majority to be adopted. The fact that many institutions employ di¤erent rules calls
for modeling the issue of conformity under di¤erent voting rules. In some States of the
United States, for example, juries require unanimity for nding a defendant guilty. In
the Council of the European Union, unanimity is also used for EU membership, while a
supermajority is required when the Council votes on a proposal by the Commission or
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign A¤airs and Security Policy.
Our goal in this paper is to study, both theoretically and empirically, how conformity
and information a¤ect agentstendency to vote truthfully under di¤erent voting rules.
On a theoretical level, we build a model of complete information in which a group of
ve agents face a binary decision, with one of the options requiring a certain degree of
support (majority, supermajority or unanimity) to be passed. Agents prefer one of the
two possible options, A and B. There is a group of three agents who prefer option B and
a group of two agents preferring option A. In what follows, we refer to agents preferring
option A (B) as type-A agents (type-B agents). We distinguish three scenarios. In the
rst scenario, agents only care about the adopted decision. Therefore, voting truthfully
is the unique undominated Nash equilibrium. In the second scenario, all agents are
conformists. They care about whether their preferred option is chosen and whether they
vote the same as the other agents. Conformist agentspreferences are lexicographical in
the sense that they always prefer their option to be elected and would conform if they are
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not pivotal. In this case, agents voting truthfully is an undominated Nash equilibrium and
there are also several equilibria in which some group of agents does not vote truthfully.
In the third scenario, we introduce heterogeneous types, and it is common information
that two type-B agents will vote for their preferred option. In this setting, we show that
truthful voting remains being an undominated Nash equilibrium and the set of equilibria
in which agents do not vote truthfully shrinks, compared with the case of conformity.
To empirically investigate these predictions, we conduct a laboratory voting game.
Following, among others, Gerber et al. (1998), Morton and Williams (1999), Battaglini
et al. (2010) or Bassi et al. (2011), we employ monetary incentives to induce subjects to
have preferences over alternatives that correspond to our theory. In our experiment, we
consider two di¤erent types of subjects. Each type receives the highest possible payo¤ if
the adopted decision coincides with their type. In our baseline treatment, subjects also
receive a small additional payo¤, regardless of how they vote. In our treatment with
conformity, the additional payo¤ is received only if the subjectsdecision coincides with
the decision of any other agent in their group. In a third treatment, a group of two
type-B agents is forced to vote truthfully, and this is known by all the agents before they
vote.2
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we nd that agents are more likely to vote
truthfully in the baseline treatment, compared with the treatment in which conformity is
induced. We also provide evidence on the e¤ects of the di¤erent voting rules (majority,
supermajority and unanimity) on the likelihood of each type of agent voting truthfully.
Our ndings indeed reveal an interplay between conformity and the pivotality of agents.
We show that the voting rule does not have any e¤ect on the likelihood of voting truthfully
when there is no conformity, as predicted by our theoretical model. In the presence of
conformity, the e¤ect of the voting rule seems to depend on the type of the agent. We nd
that all type-B agents vote truthfully when a majority is required, while type-A agents
2Note that each of the treatments corresponds to a theoretical scenario. Note also that we deliberately
abstract from the issue of whether subjects conform, focusing our attention on the e¤ects of inducing
conformity in a voting setting.
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are more likely to conform. Under supermajority, option B is selected only if at least one
type-A agent votes for it. We nd that type-A (type-B) agents vote more (less) truthfully
under supermajority, compared with majority rule. With unanimity, type-B agents are in
the majority group but anticipate the pivotality of type-A agents and vote less truthfully
as a result. Finally, our data support the e¤ects of being informed about the vote of
some agents as truthful voting becomes more pervasive. The e¤ects of conformity and
information translate into e¢ ciency losses and gains, respectively. Specically, we nd
that conformity (information) decreases (increases) the average total payo¤s and the
likelihood of obtaining the maximum possible total payo¤.
The next section o¤ers a review of the extant literature on conformity. In Section 6.3,
we present our theoretical model and the results for this particular setup. In Section 6.4,
we present the experimental design. We summarize the testable hypotheses in Section
6.5. The results are discussed in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 concludes. Additional material
such as the experimental instructions and the non-parametric analysis of our data are
relegated to the Appendix.
6.2 Literature Review
The term conformity is often used in the literature on social inuence to indicate agree-
ment with the majority position, brought about either by a desire to t inor be liked
(normative conformity) or because of a desire to be correct (informational conformity).3
In the current paper, we consider a voting game in which agents have a preferred op-
tion and obtain the maximum possible payo¤ if this is the adopted decision; therefore,
we focus on normative conformity. There is an ample literature studying information
cascades, which, according to Anderson and Holt (1997), occur "when initial decisions
coincide in a way that it is optimal for each of the subsequent individuals to ignore his or
her private signals and follow the established pattern." Readers interested in this type of
3See Myers (2012) or Goeree and Yariv (2015) for further discussion on the two types of conformity
and Sherif (1937), Asch (1955) or Milgram (1965, 1974) for seminal contributions in the eld.
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conformity can consult, among other contributions, Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al.
(1992), Dekel and Piccione (2000) or Barberà and Nicolò (2016) for theoretical models,
Coleman (2004), Morton et al. (2012), and Morton et al. (2015) for empirical studies
and Hung and Plott (2001), Morton and Williams (1999, 2000) and Goeree and Yariv
(2015) for experimental evidence.
In the experimental literature on conformity voting, Hung and Plott (2001) consider
a setting in which agents decide sequentially after receiving an informative signal con-
cerning the correct decision. In one of the treatments, the authors focus on informational
inuence by assuming that agents gain utility if they announce the correct decision. Re-
garding the e¤ects of normative inuence, Hung and Plott (2001) consider a treatment in
which agents receive a larger payo¤ if their individual decision coincides with the group
decision, which is determined by majority rule. In another treatment, the payo¤ for vot-
ing for the groups decision is larger than the payo¤ obtained from voting for the correct
option. In our setting, we consider the case of di¤erent voting rules. Furthermore, agents
in our model vote simultaneously and receive the largest payo¤ only if the group decision
coincides with their preferred option. Our agentspreferences are in line with Dutta and
Sen (2012), Gerber et al. (1998), Bassi et al. (2011) and Morton et al., (2012), in the
sense that agents have preferences dened not only on the outcomes but also on the mes-
sages of the rest of the agents. Although agents in our model have incentives to conform
to someone else, we do not assume that subjects want to vote for the same option as the
majority. This, in turn, also di¤erentiates our paper from bandwagon behavior, which
refers to the desire to vote for the predicted winner in an election (Morton et al., 2015;
Morton and Ou, 2015). In this literature, agentspreferences are frequently modeled by
assuming that agents experience a benet or cost depending on whether they vote with
the majority (Luzzati, 1999; Hung and Plott, 2001; Morton et al., 2012; Battaglini et al.
2010; Bassi et al. 2011; Michaeli and Spiro, 2015). We relax this assumption in at least
two ways. First, we assume that agents are willing to conform only if they cannot change
the outcome of the election. Second, we assume that agents may not consider the vote
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of the majority as a reference point but simply care about voting for the same option as
any other member of the group. Our experiment is then suited to study the interplay
between truthful voting and conformity in a setting in which (pivotal) agents may prefer
to vote with the minority if their votes determine the elected choice.
Our model is highly related to that of Bassi et al. (2011). In this model, agents are
told their types, to create an identity for them. As in our model, some agents are part
of the majority group and others of the minority group. The main di¤erence lies in the
fact that Bassi et al. (2011) provide incentives for agents to deviate from their assigned
types to be on the winning side of an election (bandwagoning voting), while we only
penalize agents who vote alone. Höchtl et al. (2012) is another paper related to ours.
They consider two types of agents (rich and poor) who vote for the level of redistribution
in a majority setting. The authors nd that the composition of the group (whether rich
or poor are in the majority group) is decisive in obtaining redistributive results, thereby
suggesting the e¤ects of pivotality in a majority setting. We extend these ndings by
investigating the e¤ects of di¤erent voting rules when we induce conformity among agents
such that the adopted decision does not necessarily coincide with that supported by the
majority group.
Our paper provides a set of important experimental ndings regarding the relevance
of voting rules for truthful voting. Overall, there is no wide consensus indicating the
appropriate voting rule, which depends on the issue at hand and the features of the
voting procedure. The theoretical work of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) pleads for
the use of the majority rule instead of the unanimity rule in a Condorcet-winner setting
(see also Guarnaschelli et al. 2000). Assuming strategy-proof rules in the voting stage
of the game, Barberà and Nicolò (2016) study under which of such voting rules informed
agents are more prone to disclose truthful information to uninformed agents, nding
that majority rule is better inducing information disclosure. The majority rule is also
preferred in Rivas and Rodriguez-Alvarez (2014) in a model of deliberation in which some
agents want to conform to leaders, while Moreno and Ramos-Sosa (2015) suggest that
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the decision in equilibrium is more likely to di¤er from that obtained by truthful voting
using the majority rule compared with the unanimity rule. Our results contribute to
this literature by providing experimental evidence on the e¤ects of di¤erent voting rules
on behavior in a setting with conformity. This relates our paper to the experimental
work of Anderson et al. (2015), who nd no di¤erence between the use of majority and
unanimity rules in a Condorcet-winner setting.
Finally, there are other studies in the literature that examine the e¤ects of having
agents who vote for their preferred opinion on the outcome. The social choice literature
nds that their presence benets the implementation of social choice correspondences
that satisfy no veto power (Dutta and Sen, 2012). There is also a benet in models of
information aggregation (Buechel et al., 2015) or information disclosure (Barberà and
Nicolò, 2016). In a conformity setting, Rivas and Rodríguez-Alvarez (2014) and Moreno
and Ramos-Sosa (2015) show that conformist agents become more truthful when it is
common information that other agents are voting truthfully. This, in turn, helps to
implement the socially desired option, which is the one that matches the state of nature
(Rivas and Rodríguez-Alvarez, 2014) or would be selected if agents voted truthfully
(Moreno and Ramos-Sosa, 2015).
6.3 Model
Consider ve agents N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g who have to vote between option A and option
B. Agents have their preferences dened over two possible options. Agents 1; 2 and 3
are type-B agents because they prefer option B to option A. Agents 4 and 5 are type-A
agents because they prefer option A to option B. The list of types t = (t1; t2; t3; t4; t5) =
(B;B;B;A;A) is common information, where ti 2 fA;Bg stands for the type of agent
i 2 N .
Agents vote simultaneously for one of the two options (abstention is not allowed).
Let Mi = fA;Bg be the set of messages for agent i 2 N , where mi = A (mi = B) stands
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for agent i voting for option A (option B).4 Let M = i2NMi be the set of messages and
m i 2 M i = j2NnfigMj be the messages of all agents except i: The set of all agents
except i is denoted by N i = Nnfig. We denote the prole of messages by m 2M .
The voting rule is such that for option B to be adopted, at least q agents have to
vote for it. We refer to q 2 f3; 4; 5g as the voting rule. A voting rule q = 3 (q = 4)
[q = 5] implies that option B requires simple majority (supermajority) [unanimity] to be
adopted. We dene q(m) as a mapping from M onto fA;Bg, where q(m) = B if q or
more agents vote for option B. Otherwise, q(m) = A.
Agentspreferences are dened over alternatives that consist of the adopted decision
and the prole of messages announced by the agents. Agentspreferences can then be
written as follows:
u(ti; q;m) = v(ti; q(m)) + c(m)
where
v(ti; q(m)) =
8<: v if q(m) = ti0 if q(m) 6= ti
c(m) =
8<: c if mi = mj, for any j 2 N i0 if mi 6= mj, for any j 2 N i :
The rst term v(ti; q(m)) species what agents receive if the adopted decision coincides
with their type. Thus, if option B receives the required support, agents 1; 2 and 3 receive
a payo¤ of v whereas agents 4 and 5 receive a payo¤ of 0. Agents may also receive an
additional payo¤ c(m) = c if their message coincides with that of any other agent j 2 N i.
If mi = mj, we say that agent i conforms to agent j 2 N i: Otherwise, c(m) = 0:We say
that there is conformity if c(m) is as described above.
4In our proofs, we also use mAi (m
B
i ) to denote that agent i votes for option A (B).
121
We assume that v > c > 0 to capture the idea that agents do not place their desire
to follow the rest of the agents before obtaining their preferred option. That is, agent i
will conform only if her message is irrelevant to the adopted decision; i.e., preferences to
conform are lexicographical.5
The aim of this paper is to investigate the e¤ects of introducing conformity into the
voting behavior of the agents. In particular, we want to study the extent to which truthful
behavior is a¤ected. We hereafter refer to agent i 2 N voting truthfully if she votes for
her own type, that is, mi = ti. We also want to study voting behavior when it is common
information that some agents will always vote for their type.
Next, we dene the equilibrium concept that we use throughout our paper.
Denition. For any q 2 f3; 4; 5g, m 2 M is a weakly undominated Nash equilibrium
(WUNE) if for any i 2 N ,
(1) mi is not weakly dominated and
(2) for any m0i 2Mi, ui(ti; q;mi;m i)  ui(ti; q;m0i;m i).
In our baseline scenario, we assume that all agents receive c(m) = c regardless of the
prole of messages m 2M . Then, there is no conformity.
Proposition 1. In the baseline scenario, all agents voting truthfully is the unique
WUNE, that is,
i) type-A agents vote for A for any q = f3; 4; 5g and
ii) type-B agents vote for B for any q = f3; 4; 5g.
Proof. If there is no conformity, ui(ti; q(m)) = v(ti; q(m)) + c: For any m i 2
M i = j2NnfigMj such that the vote of agent i 2 N does not determine the adopted
decision, ui(ti; q;mi;m i) = ui(ti; q;m0i;m i) where mi = ti and m
0
i 6= ti: For any m i 2
M i = j2NnfigMj such that the vote of agent i 2 N determines the adopted decision,
v + c = ui(ti; q;mi;m i) > ui(ti; q;m0i;m i) = c where mi = ti and m
0
i 6= ti:
5Admittedly, this is not the unique way of dening conformity. We could have opted for requiring an
agent to conform to some subset of N i. See Moreno and Ramos-Sosa (2015) for a discussion.
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Proposition 1 shows that all agents voting truthfully is the unique WUNE for any
voting rule q 2 f3; 4; 5g.
In our conformity scenario, we assume that c(m) = c whenmi = mj for some j 2 N i:
Then, agentspayo¤s depend on the adopted decision and how their messages relate to
other agentsmessages.
Proposition 2. In the conformity scenario, there are weakly undominated Nash equilib-
ria in which:
i) type-A agents vote for A and for B for any q 2 f3; 4g and
ii) type-B agents vote for A and for B for any q = f3; 4; 5g.
Proof. We show that there are WUNE in which agents do not vote truthfully.
Take q = 3 or q = 4 and consider the cases in which all agents vote unanimously for
one of the options. In these cases, agents get v + c or c, depending on whether their
preferred option is being elected or not. Any agent switching her message and voting
alone would be worst o¤, because the adopted decision will not change and c(m) = 0 (i.e.,
the agent that switches gets v or 0; depending on whether her preferred option is being
elected). When q = 5; these arguments apply for any type-B agent as well. However,
all agents voting for B is not an equilibrium prole as any type-A agent (say agent 5)
can deviate and vote truthfully to change the elected decision, getting v > c: Indeed,
u5(A; q;m
A
5 ;m 5) > u5(A; q;m
B
5 ;m 5) for any m 5 2M 5; where u5(A; q;mA5 ;m 5) = v
if mj = B for any j 2 Nnf5g; and u5(A; q;mA5 ;m 5) = v + c otherwise.
Proposition 2 shows that in the conformity scenario, voting truthfully remains as
an equilibrium strategy for all the agents. Moreover, there are also other equilibria in
which agents vote for an option that does not coincide with their type.6 This is true
for all agents and voting rules, except for type-A agents when q = 5. Type-A agents
vote truthfully in that case because they are pivotal and their decision determines the
6Note that the arguments in Proposition 1 can be applied to show that voting truthfully is also a
WUNE in this setting.
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adopted decision. Interestingly, for q = 3; all agents voting for option B (option A) is an
equilibrium. As no agent is pivotal, type-A (type-B) agents voting truthfully would be
penalized. Hence, type-A (type-B) agents are conforming to type-B (type-A) agents.
Finally, we study voting behavior when it is common information that some agents
will always vote for their type and conformity is still induced in the preferences of the
agents. This will be our informational scenario in which agents 1 and 2 vote for their
preferred option.
Proposition 3. In the informational scenario, there are weakly undominated Nash equi-
libria in which:
i) type-A agents vote for A and B for any q 2 f3; 4g and
ii) type-B agents vote for B for any q 2 f3; 4; 5g:
Proof. We show that there are WUNE in which type-A agents do not vote truthfully.7
Note that all agents voting unanimously for A and only one agent voting for B is dismissed
as agents 1 and 2 are forced to vote for B.
Take q = 3 or q = 4 and consider the case in which all agents vote unanimously for B. In
this case, this is a WUNE since any type-A agent (say agent 4) voting truthfully is worst
o¤ as u4(A; q;mB4 ;m
B
 4) = c > 0 = u4(A; q;m
A
4 ;m
B
 4): Note that, in this case, type-A
agents vote for B. The remaining type-B agent (agent 3) in this case votes truthfully as
u3(B; q;m
B
3 ;m
B
 3) = v + c > v = u3(B; q;m
A
3 ;m
B
 3): Besides, when q = 3; the prole
of messages where only two agents vote for B is not an equilibrium due to agent 3
voting truthfully can make the decision be B when voting for B. When q = 4; agent
3 also votes truthfully for any m 3 2 M 3 = j2Nnf3gMj since u3(B; q;mB3 ;m 3) 
u3(B; q;m
A
3 ;m 3): Therefore, two agents voting for B not being 1 and 2 are proles of
strategies that are not possible and agent 3 always votes truthfully.
Take q = 5: Consider the case in which all agents vote unanimously for B. In this case, this
is not a WUNE since any type-A agent (say agent 4) voting truthfully makes the decision
7Following Proposition 1, voting truthfully is a WUNE for each possible q 2 f3; 4; 5g.
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be A. That is, she is strictly better o¤ as u4(A; q;mA4 ;m
B
 4) = v > c = u4(A; q;m
B
4 ;m
B
 4):
Besides, agent 3 voting for A is not a WUNE since u3(B; q;mB3 ;m 3)  u3(B; q;mA3 ;m 3)
for any m 3 2M 3 = j2Nnf3gMj: Therefore, for q = 5; the unique WUNE is all agents
voting truthfully.
Compared with the conformity scenario, in the informational scenario the equilibrium
strategies reduce to only two: all agents voting truthfully and all agents unanimously
voting for B (except for q = 5).8 When we examine the possible e¤ects of the voting rule
in the informational scenario, we then note that type-A agents might vote for any option
when q = 3 or q = 4, but voting truthfully is a dominant strategy when q = 5. As for
type-B agents, voting truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for any possible voting
rule.9
In the next section, we present an experiment that is designed to test our theoretical
predictions.
6.4 Experimental Design
A total of 390 subjects were recruited to participate in our computerized sessions (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). Subjects were Economics or Business students from the undergraduate
population of the Universidad de Valencia, with no previous experience in similar ex-
periments. Subjects were invited to participate in our experiment using the recruitment
system of the laboratory (LINEEX).
8Therefore, all voting rules are strategy-proof because the decision adopted in the informational
scenario coincides with that obtained when all agents vote truthfully.
9Although the theoretical result also holds when only one type-B agent votes truthfully, we force
two agents to do so for experimental purposes. By forcing two agents to vote truthfully, the payo¤ for
conformity c > 0 is always guaranteed. Moreno and Ramos-Sosa (2015) provide the number of forced
agents (who they refer to as independent agents) within the voting group guaranteeing that the adopted
decision always coincides with the decision obtained when all agents vote truthfully. Their results hold
for any voting rule q 2 f1; ng; any number of agents n and any list of agentstypes t: In our setting,
having two forced agents guarantees that the adopted decision will coincide with the decision under
truthful voting for q = 3 and q = 5:
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We ran a total of 13 sessions with 30 subjects each. At the beginning of each session,
subjects were randomly assigned a type (Player A or Player B), which was held constant
throughout the session. Subjects were told that they were in a group of 5 subjects. It
was common information that each group consisted of 2 Players A and 3 Players B.
When subjects were informed of their types, they were asked to vote between option
A and option B across three di¤erent rounds. In each of the rounds, option B required
a di¤erent number of votes q = f3; 4; 5g to be the adopted decision. It was common
information that if option B did not receive at least q votes, then option A would be
the adopted decision. In our experiment, q was announced to subjects at the beginning
of each round. The order of q was randomly selected, and we balanced the number of
observations across sequences of decisions; e.g., we had the same number of observations
for sequences 3; 4; 5 and 5; 3; 4. As for the feedback, subjects voted in each q while
receiving no information whatsoever regarding previous decisions in their groups. Thus,
subjects voted without knowing what other subjects in their group had voted for or what
decision had been adopted in previous rounds. This, in turn, implies that our method
for eliciting the relevant behavior is free of historical contagion and learning e¤ects.
At the end of the experiment, one round was randomly selected for payment. Payo¤s
for each subject depended on whether i) the adopted decision in that round coincided
with their own type and ii) they voted for the same option as any other subject in their
group.
Our experiment relies on a between-subjects design (i.e., subjects only participate in
one of the three possible treatments). We summarize these treatments below:
 Baseline (BL, 120 subjects, 24 groups). Subjects received 75 ECUs if the adopted
decision coincided with their own type. Subjects received an additional amount of
25 ECUs, regardless of the option for which they decided to vote.
 Conformity (CON, 120 subjects, 24 groups). Subjects received 75 ECUs if the
adopted decision coincided with their own type. They received the additional payo¤
of 25 ECUs only if their vote coincided with that of any other subject in their group.
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 Informational (INF, 150 subjects, 30 groups). Payo¤s were as in the conformity
treatment, but it was common information that 2 subjects in the role of Player B
would be given no option but to vote for option B. The subjects forced to vote for
B were the same throughout the session. It was common information that they had
to vote for option B in each round, as this was the only option that appeared on
their computer screen.10
Instructions in each treatment were read aloud by the session monitor, and subjects
were allowed to ask any question in private before starting the treatment. We minimized
the probability of subjects failing to understand how payo¤s were generated using a pre-
experimental quiz, in which subjects were asked to compute the payo¤s of randomly
generated examples.
Each session lasted for approximately 1 hour, and the subjects received approximately
7.5 Euros for participating (10 ECUs = 1 Euro). The experiment included an additional
phase in which individual characteristics were elicited. Our questionnaire, together with
a translated version of our original instructions, is presented in Appendix A. We note that
the questionnaire includes gender, age, cognitive abilities, risk aversion, social preferences,
trust, happiness, satisfaction and inequality. We will use these variables as controls in
our econometric analysis in Section 6.5.
6.5 Testable Hypotheses
Our rst treatment (BL) resembles our theoretical model for the case in which c(m) = c
for any m 2 M ; therefore, subjects are expected to vote truthfully in this treatment
(Proposition 1). We induce conformity in our second treatment (CON) by paying subjects
the additional amount of money only if they vote for the same option as any other member
10We decided to have two subjects instead of the computer in the role of forced agents to avoid
any concern about social preferences; e.g., type-A agents can vote di¤erently depending on whether they
impose an externality on the computer or on another human subject. For the e¤ects of social preferences
on bandwagon voting, see Morton and Ou (2015) or Corazzini and Greiner (2007).
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of their group. Given our theoretical results (Proposition 2), we predict that truthful
voting will be less pervasive in this treatment. The rst hypothesis, which we want to
reject, is then as follows:
Hypothesis 1. The presence of conformity will not a¤ect the likelihood of voting
truthfully, which will be the same in BL and CON.
We expect that conformity will a¤ect the likelihood of truthful voting for both types
of agents, except when option B requires unanimity. Proposition 2 highlights that type-A
agents vote truthfully in that case because they are pivotal; therefore, we do not expect
any e¤ect of conformity if q = 5. In that vein, we can expect that inducing conformity
will have more e¤ects on type-B agents when q = 5, compared with the case in which
q = 3, thereby suggesting that the e¤ects of conformity might be a¤ected by the decision
rule and how pivotal agents are.
In our third treatment (INF), it is common knowledge that two type-B agents are
forced to vote for B. Our theoretical results display that voting truthfully is the unique
equilibrium strategy for the other type-B voter (Proposition 3). As a result, we expect
type-B agents to vote more truthfully in INF, compared with CON. The hypothesis that
we want to reject is then as follows:
Hypothesis 2. In a conformity setting, the presence of two type-B agents voting for
their types will not a¤ect the likelihood of truthful voting by the other type-B agent, which
will be the same in CON and INF.
Proposition 2 shows that type-A agents can vote for A or B when q = f3; 4g, whereas
voting truthfully is the unique WUNE for them when q = 5. The same is true when
forced agents are included; therefore, we do not expect any positive e¤ect of knowing the
presence of forced agents on the likelihood of type-A agents voting truthfully.
While we can examine the e¤ects of conformity and the presence of forced agents on
voting truthfully when there are di¤erent voting rules, we can also test for the e¤ect of
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the voting rule in each particular setting. We have shown that voting truthfully is the
unique WUNE in our BL treatment; therefore, the voting rule should not a¤ect agents
behavior in this treatment. This argument is also valid for type-B agents in the INF
treatment. In the CON treatment, however, type-A agents may vote for option A or B
when q = 3 or q = 4, but they should vote truthfully when q = 5: The hypothesis that
we want to reject is then as follows:
Hypothesis 3. The voting rule does not have any e¤ect on the agentslikelihood of
voting truthfully in BL, CON and INF.
Our prediction that type-A agents might vote more truthfully when q = 5, compared
with q = 3 or q = 4, highlights the importance of the pivotality of agents on the likelihood
of voting truthfully. Along these lines, type-B agents can anticipate that increasing the
voting rule makes it more di¢ cult for option B to be chosen in any possible setting.
Type-B agents can then be less likely to vote truthfully when the voting rule becomes
more stringent in CON.
6.6 Results
This section presents our experimental evidence. Section 6.6.1 focuses on the rst two
treatments (BL vs. CON) to show the e¤ects of conformity on the likelihood of vot-
ing truthfully. In Section 6.6.2, we assess whether knowing that two agents are voting
truthfully inuences agentsvoting behavior in a conformity setting (CON vs. INF). To
provide some insights into e¢ ciency, we evaluate our ndings in terms of total surplus in
Section 6.6.3.
6.6.1 On the e¤ects of conformity
Figure 6.1 depicts the e¤ect of conformity by plotting the average likelihood of voting
truthfully in BL and CON, separately for each type of agent. Error bars reect standard
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error of the mean. The results disaggregated by voting rule are presented in Table 6.1
below the gure.
Figure 6-1: E¤ect of conformity on the likelihood of voting truthfully.
In line with our theoretical prediction, we observe that the presence of conformity
decreases the average frequency of voting truthfully for type-A (from 0.75 to 0.60) and
type-B agents (from 0.87 to 0.75). As is shown in Table 6.1, conformity decreases the
likelihood of type-A agents voting truthfully for any possible voting rule, with the smallest
e¤ect when q = 5. For type-B agents, conformity decreases the likelihood of truth-telling
for each possible voting rule, except when q = 3.11
Type-A Type-B
BL CON BL CON
q = 3 0.71 0.46 0.90 0.94
q = 4 0.85 0.71 0.90 0.74
q = 5 0.69 0.62 0.83 0.57
N 48 48 72 72
Table 6.1: Frequency of truthful voting in BL and CON for each possible voting rule.
Table 6.1 allows us to also observe the e¤ect of the voting rule on the likelihood
of voting truthfully. When there is no conformity, Proposition 1 shows that there is a
11A non-parametric analysis suggests that these e¤ects are statistically signicant (see Appendix B).
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unique WUNE in which all agents vote truthfully regardless of the voting rule. Our
ndings seem to support this prediction by suggesting no e¤ect of the voting rule on the
likelihood of voting truthfully in the BL treatment. The voting rule, however, seems to
have a signicant e¤ect on the likelihood of voting truthfully in the CON treatment. In
particular, agents are less likely to vote truthfully under those voting rules under which
agents are less pivotal (q = 3 for type-A agents and q = 5 for type-B agents).12
One nal aspect that is worth mentioning is that our model predicts that all agents
will vote truthfully in the BL treatment. We nd, however, that type-B agents are more
likely to vote truthfully than type-A agents. This is an interesting nding in line with
Bassi et al. (2011), who report that members in the minority group do not vote truthfully
if decisions are made by majority rule.
In what follows, we perform an econometric analysis to study the behavior of type-A
and type-B agents in greater detail. For each type of agent, we estimate a logit model for
the likelihood of voting truthfully. The set of independent variables includes a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if there is conformity (dCON) and two dummy variables for
the value of the voting rules (dq4 = 1 if q = 4 and dq5 = 1 if q = 5). Our specication
also includes the interaction terms between the treatment and the voting rules (dCONdq4
and dCONdq5) to capture the (possibly di¤erent) e¤ects of conformity on the likelihood of
voting truthfully depending on the voting rule. We control for individual heterogeneity
by including the responses to the questionnaire as independent variables.
Figure 6.2 depicts the average marginal e¤ect (ME) of conformity, together with the
95% condence intervals, for each possible voting rule.13 The results for type-A agents
(type-B agents) are presented in the left panel (right panel). The reported e¤ects take
into account Ai and Norton (2003) and Karaca Mandic et al. (2012).14
12This is much in line with the comment made by Charles Plott to the authors in the sense that "the
votes under majority-rule institutions are typically overwhelming majorities because the minority, when
anticipating a loss on the vote, just go along with the majority."
13Appendix B contains the estimates of our logit regressions. As we discuss in Appendix B, our
ndings are robust if we instead consider a linear probability model.
14Ai and Norton (2003) and Karaca Mandic et al. (2012) discuss the correct way of estimating
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Figure 6-2: Marginal e¤ects of conformity on the likelihood of voting truthfully after 
logit specication.
We observe that conformity decreases the likelihood of type-A agents voting truthfully
when q = 3 (ME =  0:222, p = 0:017) and q = 4 (ME =  0:126, p = 0:003). Consistent
with our theoretical results, we do not observe any e¤ect of conformity on the likelihood
of type-A agents voting truthfully when q = 5 (ME =  0:036, p = 0:703). For type-
B agents, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of conformity having no e¤ect on the
likelihood of voting truthfully when q = 3 (ME =  0:0003 , p = 0:993). This null
hypothesis is rejected at any common signicance level when q = 4 (ME =  0:11,
p = 0:004) or q = 5 (ME =  0:319, p < 0:001).15 We conclude that these ndings
provide evidence against our rst hypothesis. The behavioral pattern observed in Figure
6-2 also suggests that inducing conformity is more likely to a¤ect behavior when 
agents are not pivotal.
Observation 1. Conformity decreases the likelihood of voting truthfully. The e¤ects of
conformity depend on how pivotal agents are.
Next, we study the e¤ects of the voting rule on the likelihood of agents voting truth-
marginal e¤ects in nonlinear models that include interaction terms. Hereafter, all the MEs reported in
our paper take their work into account.
15Our results indicate that conformity reduces the likelihood of type-A agents voting truthfully by
approximately 13%. The estimates for type-B agents suggest a reduction in the likelihood of voting
truthfully of 14%. Statistically, both e¤ects are signicant at the 1% level.
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fully in BL and CON by means of a logit analysis, where the explanatory variables are
the dummies for the voting rules (dq4 and dq5). The estimated MEs are summarized in
Table 6.2.
Type-A Type-B
BL CON BL CON
(dq4 = 1 if q = 4) 0.149 0.25*** 0.000 -0.208***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06)
(dq5 = 1 if q = 5) -0.021 0.167 -0.069 -0.375***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald 2 test 25.73** 19.55* 19.43 29.19***
Pseudo- R2 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.17
Observations 144 144 216 216
Table 6.2: Marginal e¤ects of the voting rule on the likelihood of voting truthfully in BL and
CON.
We support our conjecture suggesting no e¤ect of the voting rule on the likelihood
of voting truthfully in the BL treatment. For the CON treatment, there is no-clear
cut prediction regarding how subjects should vote under each voting rule. In that case,
our ndings suggest that type-A agents are more likely to vote truthfully as the voting
rule becomes more stringent, whereas type-B agents appear to vote less truthfully as the
voting rule becomes more stringent. This conrms the relationship between the likelihood
of voting truthfully and the pivotality of agents.16
16Rivas and Rodriguez-Alvarez (2014) show that agents are more likely to reveal truthful information
under the majority rule. In contrast, we nd that the majority rule induces type-B (type-A) agents to
vote more (less) truthfully, compared with the unanimity rule.
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Observation 2. i) The voting rule has no e¤ect on the likelihood of voting truthfully
when there is no conformity. ii) Under conformity, the voting rule has an e¤ect on the
likelihood of voting truthfully, with agents being more likely to vote truthfully when they
are pivotal.
Overall, these ndings highlight the importance of conformity and the pivotality of
agents on the likelihood of voting truthfully. Next, we investigate the inuence on voting
truthfully when agents know that there are two forced agents voting for their preferred
option.
6.6.2 On the e¤ects of information
We replicate our previous analysis and show the e¤ect on voting when agents know that
some agents are voting truthfully. Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3 report in aggregate levels the
likelihood of voting truthfully in INF for each type of agent. For the sake of comparison,
we include the results for CON. Importantly, two type-B agents were forced to vote for
their preferred option in our INF treatment. The reported data for the INF treatment
do not consider these agents; i.e., they focus only on the type-B agents who were not
forced to vote truthfully but allowed to vote for either of the two options. Error bars
reect standard errors of the mean.
Figure 6-3: E¤ect of information on the likelihood of voting truthfully.
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Type-A Type-B
CON INF CON INF
q = 3 0.46 0.35 0.94 0.97
q = 4 0.71 0.55 0.74 0.97
q = 5 0.62 0.67 0.57 0.67
N 48 30 72 60
Table 6.3: Frequency of truthful voting in CON and INF for each possible voting rule.
We observe that the presence of forced agents increases the likelihood of type-B agents
voting truthfully (from 0.75 to 0.86), which is in line with our theoretical predictions.
The results seem to be consistent for each possible voting rule. For type-A agents, the
presence of forced agents seems to decrease their likelihood of voting truthfully (from
0.60 to 0.52). This negative e¤ect occurs for each possible voting rule except when q = 5,
which is the only voting rule under which voting truthfully is the unique WUNE strategy
for type-A agents in both treatments due to their pivotality.17
Next, we perform our econometric analysis. We estimate a logit specication for the
probability of each type of agent voting truthfully. We control for individual heterogeneity
and include a dummy variable that takes value 1 if there are forced agents (dINF ) and two
dummies for the voting rules (dq4 and dq5). We allow for di¤erent e¤ects of the presence
of forced agents depending on the voting rules by including the interaction terms. The
logit estimates, together with the results of a linear probability model, are presented
in Appendix B. The estimated MEs and the corresponding 95% condence interval are
summarized in Figure 6.4.
The MEs indicate that the presence of forced agents decreases the likelihood of type-A
agents voting truthfully. The e¤ect is signicant when q = 3 (ME =  0:164, p = 0:057).
However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no e¤ect of the presence of forced agents
17See Appendix B for the results of the non-parametric analysis.
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Figure 6-4: Marginal e¤ects of information on the likelihood of voting truthfully after 
logit specication.
on the behavior of type-A agents when q = 4 and q = 5 (ME =  0:090, p = 0:131, and
ME =  0:013, p = 0:894, respectively).
Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we observe a positive e¤ect of the presence
of forced agents on the likelihood of type-B agents voting truthfully when q = 3 (ME =
0:062, p = 0:028) and q = 4 (ME = 0:121, p = 0:052). The e¤ect is not signicant when
q = 5 (ME = 0:086, p = 0:444).
When we estimate the average e¤ect of the presence of forced agents on the likelihood
of type-A agents voting truthfully, we nd that this is not signicant at any common level
(ME =  0:089, p = 0:12). The overall e¤ect for type-B agents is, however, signicant
(ME = 0:090, p = 0:043).
Observation 3. When agents know that two type-B agents are forced to vote truthfully,
the likelihood of voting truthfully increases for the remaining type-B agents.
Finally, we can examine the e¤ect of the voting rule on the likelihood of voting
truthfully in INF. Our results suggest that type-A agents are more likely to vote truthfully
when q = 4 and q = 5 (ME = 0:20, p = 0:029, and ME = 0:317, p = 0:001, respectively).
As a result, we conclude that the voting rule has a positive e¤ect on the likelihood of
type-A agents voting truthfully. For type-B agents, there is no e¤ect of the voting rule
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when we compare the likelihood of voting truthfully in q = 3 and q = 4. Surprisingly,
type-B agents are less likely to vote truthfully in the INF treatment when q = 5 (ME
= 0:310, p < 0:001). This occurs despite voting truthfully being the unique WUNE
strategy for type-B agents under all possible voting rules. Although we nd that the
presence of forced agents increases truthful behavior, our ndings suggest that type-B
agents are less likely to vote truthfully as we increase the stringency of the voting rule,
probably as a response to type As agents voting more truthfully when the voting rule
becomes more stringent. These ndings, in turn, support the idea that the pivotality of
agents a¤ects the likelihood of voting truthfully.
6.6.3 Maximizing total surplus
We consider the issue of e¢ ciency losses in this section. If agents care about the welfare
of the group (Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006), they will vote to
maximize total payo¤s. In our setting, this occurs when option B is selected, regardless
of whether all agents are voting for B. Our previous ndings suggest that conformity
decreases truthful voting, whereas receiving information fosters it. How do these results
translate into e¢ ciency gains or losses in terms of total surplus?
We use the behavioral data in each treatment to form all possible congurations of
groups consisting of three type-B agents and two type-A agents.18 We then compute the
average expected payo¤ and the likelihood of receiving the maximum possible payo¤ in
each treatment for each possible voting rule. These results are reported in Table 6.4.
18Given our data, we can form a total of 961,056 di¤erent groups in BL and CON. We can form at
least 53,100 groups in INF (when we do not combine the behavior of di¤erent subjects in the role of
forced type-B voters).
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BL CON INF
A. Average expected payo¤
q = 3 338.9 335.4 338.4
q = 4 290.6 285.4 314.0
q = 5 279.1 269.3 272.2
302.9 296.7 308.2
B. Likelihood of getting the highest possible payo¤
q = 3 0.85 0.50 0.54
q = 4 0.21 0.03 0.20
q = 5 0.06 0.03 0.07
0.37 0.19 0.27
Table 6.4: E¢ ciency and total surplus.
As we increase the stringency of the voting rule, we expect the likelihood of selecting
option B to decrease. Table 6.4 shows that the average expected payo¤and the likelihood
of receiving the highest possible payo¤ decreases with the voting rule, in every possible
treatment. When we compare across treatments, Table 6.4 shows that CON results in a
smaller average expected payo¤ and a lower likelihood of receiving the highest possible
payo¤ for any possible voting rule, compared with the BL treatment. E¢ ciency improves
in INF, as the expected payo¤ and the likelihood of maximizing the total payo¤ increase
for each possible voting rule.
Observation 4. i) The likelihood of maximizing total payo¤s is higher when there is
no conformity. ii) With the presence of forced agents, the likelihood of maximizing total
payo¤s increases. iii) In every setup, the socially e¢ cient outcome is less likely as the
voting rule becomes more stringent.
Our result that information improves e¢ ciency in a conformity setting supports the
theoretical works of Dutta and Sen (2012), Barberà and Nicolò (2016), Buechel et al.
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(2015), Rivas and Rodríguez-Alvarez (2014), Battaglini et al. (2010) and Moreno and
Ramos-Sosa (2015), who highlight the benets of assuming that some agents always vote
truthfully in a variety of settings.
6.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the e¤ects of conformity and information in a binary-decision voting
game in which agents are heterogeneous with respect to their preferred outcome. We
show that conformity reduces the likelihood of truthful voting for all agents. When
agents are informed that two type-B agents will vote truthfully, we expect the other
type-B agent to also vote truthfully. Our experimental data support these predictions
and highlight the importance of the voting rule in driving the results. In particular, we
nd that the willingness to vote truthfully and the e¤ects of information depend upon
the voting rule, thereby suggesting that there is an interplay between conformity voting
and the pivotality of the agents.
Considerable attention has been devoted to the incentives of agents to vote truth-
fully in the literature on Social Choice. There are numerous studies characterizing social
choice functions that satisfy strategy-proofness (i.e., truth-telling is a weakly dominant
strategy in the direct mechanism). Arguably, there are social choice functions satisfy-
ing desirable properties that fail to be strategy-proof. If we insist on the desirability of
those social choice functions, we should measure their manipulability. Although we lack
a unanimously way of doing so theoretically, laboratory experiments provide an excellent
means of empirically addressing this question. This paper is part of a more ambitious
project in which we want to test several well-known social choice functions in their ap-
propriate domains of denition. The current paper can be understood as a rst step in
this direction.
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6.8 Appendix A
6.8.1 Translated Instructions (originally in Spanish)
Welcome to the experiment!
This is an experiment to study decision-making. Instructions are simple and if you
follow them carefully you will be paid an amount of money at the end of the experiment.
Your earnings in this experiment may depend on your decisions and the decisions of other
participants. Your earnings will be given condentially so neither the other participants
in the lab nor the instructors will know your payo¤s. Similarly, your identity will be
anonymous throughout the whole experiment. Thus, nobody will know the decisions you
have taken during the experiment.
Please, from no on, do not communicate with other participants during the experi-
ment. If you have any questions please raise your hand. Out of this type of questions,
any kind of communication among the participants of the experiment is forbidden and
will be subject to immediate exclusion from the experiment.
Whats the experiment about?
In the experiment, there are two types of participants: A and B. Before starting
the experiment, the computer will randomly decide whether you are a type-A or type-B
participant. The type assigned by the computer will remain throughout the experiment.
In total, this experiment consists of three rounds. Before starting the rst round, we
will match you with other participants in the lab to form a group of 5 participants. Your
group will remain throughout the whole experiment and consists of 2 type-A participants
and 3-type B participants.
[BL and CON] In each of the rounds, you can choose between voting for Option A
or voting for Option B to determine which is the Chosen Option of that round. Before
you have to vote, we will announce to you (and to all the members of your group) how
many votes Option B needs to be chosen in that round.
[INF] In each of the rounds, the computer force two type-B participants to vote for
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Option B. If you are a type-B participant and you are forced by the computer to vote for
Option B you can only choose that option in the three rounds of the experiment. The
rest of the members of the group can choose in each round whether to vote for Option A
or Option B to determine which is the Chosen Option of that round. Before you have to
vote, we will announce to you (and to all the members of your group) how many votes
Option B needs to be chosen in that round.
Option B may need 3, 4 or 5 votes to be chosen, depending on the round.
 If Option B gets the number of votes needed, Option B will be the Chosen Option
in that round.
 If Option B doesnt get the number of votes needed, Option A will be the Chosen
Option in that round.
Baseline treatment
How can I earn money in this experiment?
At the end of the experiment, we will announce which has been the Chosen Option
in each round and what were your earnings in each round.
Your earnings in each round will depend, in part, on the Chosen option. You will
also receive an additional amount just for casting your ballot. The total earnings you
can receive are explained in detail as follows:
Earnings for the chosen option: If the Chosen Option in your group coincides with
your type you will receive 75 ECUS. That is, if you are a type-A participant and Option
A is the Chosen Option for the members of your group, you will receive 75 ECUS in that
round. In the same way, if you are a type-B participant and Option B is the Chosen
Option for the members of your group, you will receive 75 ECUS in that round.
Earnings for casting your ballot: Independently on whether you choose Option A or
Option B, you will receive 25 ECUS just for casting your ballot. This gain is received
independently on your type of participant and the Chosen Option in that round.
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To determine your earning in one round, we sum your earnings for the chosen option
and your earnings for casting the ballot. At the end of the experiment, after informing you
about your total earnings in each of the three rounds of the experiment, the computer will
randomly choose one round and we will pay you out depending on the earnings obtained
in that round.
Your will receive the equivalent in EURO according to the exchange rate 10 ECUS
= 1 Euro.
Next, we present some examples in order to show you how payo¤s are calculated.
(Examples)
Now, the computer will randomly choose whether you are a type-A or type-B partic-
ipant in this experiment. Next, we present a screen with two more examples. We ask
you to pay attention to these examples in order to understand correctly how earnings are
calculated before starting the experiment as after that you will take a simple test to check
that you have already understood everything. If after reading the examples or solving
the test you have doubts about how earnings are calculated, please, raise your hand and
ask the instructors. Knowing how earnings are calculated can help you to obtain more
money during the experiment.
Besides, bear in mind that:
1. Your type (A or B) will be the same and in your group there always be 2 type-A
participants and 3 type-B participants.
2. To determine which is the Chosen Option in one round, we check whether Option
B has obtained a determined number of votes in that round (3 votes, 4 votes or 5
votes). This information may change from round to round and will be announced
to all the members of your group before voting.
3. Your earnings will depend on whether the Chosen Option in one round coincides
with your type of participant. Besides, you will receive an additional amount just
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for casting the ballot (regardless of your vote).
Conformity and informational treatment:
How can I earn money in this experiment?
At the end of the experiment, we announce which has been the Chosen Option in
each round and what were your earnings in each round.
Your earnings in each round will depend, on the one hand, on the Chosen Option and
on the other, on the number of members of your group voting for the same option than
you. The total earnings you can receive are explained in detail as follows:
Earnings for the chosen option: If the Chosen Option in your group coincides with
your type you will receive 75 ECUS. That is, if you are a type-A participant and Option
A is the Chosen Option for the members of your group, you will receive 75 ECUS in that
round. In the same way, if you are a type-B participant and Option B is the Chosen
Option for the members of your group, you will receive 75 ECUS in that round.
Earnings for coinciding: If the option you have voted for in one round has in total
2 or more votes (that is, if somebody else has vote for the same option than you), then
you will receive 25 ECUS. You will receive these earnings regardless of your type of
participant and the Chosen Option in the round.
To determine your earnings in one round, we sum your earnings for the Chosen Option
and your earnings for coinciding. At the end of the experiment, after informing you
about your total earnings in each of the three rounds of the experiment, the computer will
randomly choose one round and we will pay you out depending on the earnings obtained
in that round.
Your will receive the equivalent in EURO according to the exchange rate 10 ECUS
= 1 Euro.
Next, we present some examples in order to show you how payo¤s are calculated.
(Examples)
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Now, the computer will randomly choose whether you are a type-A or type-B partic-
ipant in this experiment. Next, we present a screen with two more examples. We ask
you to pay attention to these examples in order to understand correctly how earnings
are calculated before starting the experiment as after that, you will take a simple test
to check that you have already understood everything. If after reading the examples or
solving the test you have doubts about how earnings are calculated, please, raise your
hand and ask the instructors. Knowing how earnings are calculated can help you to
obtain more money during the experiment.
Besides, bear in mind that:
1. Your type (A or B) will be the same and in your group there always be 2 type-A
participants and 3 type-B participants.
2. To determine which is the Chosen Option in one round, we check whether Option
B has obtained a determined number of votes in that round (3 votes, 4 votes or 5
votes). This information may change from round to round and will be announced
to all the members of your group before voting.
3. Your earnings will depend on whether the Chosen Option in one round coincides
with your type of participant. Besides, you will receive an additional amount if
someone else has voted for the same option than you.
[INF only] 4. There are 2 type-B participants in your group that are forced to vote
for Option B in the three rounds of the experiment.
6.8.2 Questionnaire
 Age: What is your age?. . . years.
 Gender: What is your gender? (00 male, 01 female).
 Risk aversion: We elicited risk attitudes using the investment decision in Gneezy
and Potters (1997). Each participant hypothetically received 10 Euros and was
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asked to choose how much of it, x, she wanted to invest in a risky option and
how much she wished to keep. The amount invested yielded a dividend equal to
2.5x with 1/2 probability, being lost otherwise. The money not invested in the
risky option (10-x) was kept by the participant. In this situation, the expected
value of investing is positive and increasing in the amount invested; therefore a
risk-neutral (or risk-loving) participant should invest the 10 Euros, whereas a risk-
averse participant will invest less. The amount not invested in the risky asset is a
natural measure of risk aversion.
 Trust: We use the question in the GSS to elicit attitudinal trust. Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to
be very careful in dealing with people? (Trust = 1 if the answer is "most people
can be trusted").
 Cognitive abilities: We use the Cognitive Reection Test (CRT) in Frederick
(2005).
 Social preferences: We use the answers to the social value orientation (SVO) in
Van Lange et al. (1997) to classify subjects as individualistic, prosocial, competi-
tive, or others.
 Satisfaction: "How do you feel in this moment with your life?" (1-7-scaled answer
from 1 (very satised) to 7 (Not at all satised).
 Happiness: "Taking everything into consideration, would you call yourself..." (01
not very happy, 02 quite happy, 03 very happy).
 Inequality: "Consider the following situation: Two secretaries with the same age
do exactly the same work. However, one of them earns 20 euros per week more than
the other. The one that is paid more is more e¢ cient and faster, while working.
Do you believe it is fair that one earns more than the other?" ($Ineq = 1$ if Yes).
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6.9 Appendix B
6.9.1 Non-parametric analysis
E¤ect of conformity
Table 6.1 in the main text shows the e¤ect of conformity by reporting the average like-
lihood of voting truthfully in BL and CON, for each type and each possible voting rule
separately. If we consider the Chi-2 test (one-side alternative), we nd that the pres-
ence of conformity decreases the average frequency of voting truthfully from 0:83 to 0:69
(p < 0:001). The negative e¤ect of conformity on voting truthfully is signicant for both
type-A (p < 0:003) and type-B agents (p < 0:001).
When we can look at the e¤ect of conformity for each possible voting rule in Table 6.1,
we observe that conformity decreases the likelihood of type-A agents voting truthfully
when the voting rule is q = 3 (p = 0:006), and when it is q = 4 (p = 0:042). As expected,
conformity has no e¤ect for type-1 voters when the voting rule is equal to q = 5 (p = 0:52).
As for type-B agents, we expect that conformity decreases the likelihood of truth telling
for each possible voting rule. Our ndings suggest no signicant e¤ect when the voting
rule is equal to q = 3 (p = 0:34), but when the voting rule equals to q = 4 (p = 0:004) or
q = 5 (p < 0:001). Overall, all these ndings are in line with our prediction.
Table 1 allows us to observe also the e¤ect of the voting rule on the likelihood of
voting truthfully. When there is no conformity, Proposition 1 shows that there is a unique
WUNE in which all agents vote truthfully regardless of the value of the voting rule. Our
ndings seem to support this prediction by suggesting no e¤ect of the voting rule on the
likelihood of voting truthfully in the BL treatment. The voting rule, however, seems to
have a signicant e¤ect in the likelihood of voting truthfully in the CON treatment. In
principle, we expect for type-A agents to vote more truthfully in q = 5. When we do
pairwise comparisons we nd that the likelihood of truth telling increases in q = 5 with
respect to q = 3, but the e¤ect is weakly signicant (p = 0:10). In fact, it seems that
type-A agents are more likely to vote truthfully in the CON treatment when q = 4. As
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for type-B agents, the likelihood of voting truthfully seems to decrease in the value of
the voting rule. We note that our theoretical result do not provide any prediction for
this behavior.
E¤ect of information
The introduction of two type-B agents forced to vote truthfully does not a¤ect the like-
lihood of voting truthfully for type-A agents (p = 0:18) but it does for type-B agents
(p = 0:012).
When we look at the e¤ects of forced agents for each possible voting rule in Table
1, we observe that knowing that two agents are forced to vote for B does not a¤ect the
likelihood of type-A agents voting truthfully when the voting rule is q = 3 (p = 0:253)
or q = 5 (p = 0:652). The e¤ect is, however, signicant when the voting rule is q = 4
(p = 0:046). As for type-B agents, the non-parametric analysis rejects the null hypothesis
that forced agents do not a¤ect the likelihood of voting truthfully when the voting rule is
equal to q = 4 (p = 0:004). This is, however, rejected when the voting rule equals q = 4
(p = 0:64) or q = 5 (p = 0:36).
We can also test the e¤ect of the voting rule on the likelihood of voting truthfully
in the INF treatment. Pairwise comparisons suggest a positive e¤ect of the voting rule
on the likelihood of type-A agents voting truthfully. This is because the likelihood of
voting truthfully is smaller in q = 3 than in q = 4 (p = 0:014) or q = 5 (p < 0:001).
If we compare q = 4 and q = 5 we nd no e¤ect of the voting rule p = 0:190. As for
type B agents, the voting rule has no e¤ect on the likelihood of voting truthfully when
we compare q = 3 and q = 4 (p = 1), but type-B agents are less likely to vote truthfully
when q = 5 compared with any of the other two voting rules (p = 0:003).
147
6.9.2 Econometric analysis
E¤ect of conformity
The rst two columns of Table B.1 present the maximum likelihood estimates of our logit
regression, for each of the two types of agents separately. We complement our analysis
by reporting the results of a linear probability model. In this latter case, the estimates
can be interpreted as the e¤ects of each independent variable on the probability of voting
truthfully. The set of independent variables include controls for gender, risk aversion,
trust, or social value orientation of the subject (see Appendix A for further details on
the questionnaire).
We see in the rst column that conformity has a signicant e¤ect on the likelihood
of type-A agents voting truthfully. The marginal e¤ect reported in Figure 2 in the main
text indicates that the likelihood of voting truthfully indeed decreases by 22:2 percent
when q = 3. This is in line with the results of the linear probability model in column
3, which estimates a decrease of 22:8 percent. The Chi-2 test suggests that the e¤ect of
conformity is also signicant when q = 4, but not when q = 5. Thus, we can observe that
the estimates of conformity in the linear probability regression ( 0:228) is roughly in the
same magnitude (but di¤erent sign) than the estimate when we interact the treatment
variable with the voting rule q = 5 (0:187).
Our analysis for type-B agents in columns 2 and 4 suggests that conformity has no
e¤ect on the likelihood of voting truthfully when q = 3, but in the rest of the cases. Thus,
note that the dummy variable for the treatment condition is not signicantly di¤erent
from 0, but the interaction terms with the voting rules are signicant. The estimates of
the linear probability model indeed suggest that the negative e¤ect of conformity when
q = 4 is around 18:1 percent (0:027   0:208). It is roughly 27:9 percent when q = 5.
Recall that the marginal e¤ects after the logit regressions reported in the main text are
 0:11 and  0:32 respectively.
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Dependent variable: Probability of voting truthfully
Logit model Linear Probability model
Type-A Type-B Type-A Type-B
dq4 (=1 if q = 4) 0.911 -1.10 e16 0.146 -2.62e-15
(0.57) (0.56) (0.09) (0.05)
dq5 (=1 if q = 5) -0.103 -0.629 -0.021 -0.069
(0.50) (0.56) (0.10) (0.06)
dCON (=1 if conformity) -0.990** 0.518 -0.228** 0.027
(0.49) (0.68) (0.10) (0.05)
dCON dq4 0.206 -1.852** 0.104 -0.208**
(0.74) (0.84) (0.14) (0.080)
dCON dq5 0.822 -2.003** 0.187 -0.306***
(0.68) (0.81) (0.15) (0.09)
Age -0.039 0.049* -0.009 0.006**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.003)
Women -0.669* 0.278 -0.131* 0.041
(0.34) (0.31) (0.07) (0.04)
Risk aversion -0.026 0.121** -0.005 0.015**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Trust -0.111 0.096 -0.025 0.011
(0.32) (0.32) (0.06) (0.04)
Inequality 0.503 0.014 0.104 0.006
(0.33) (0.34) (0.07) (0.04)
CRT -0.077 0.708 -0.019 0.094
(0.45) (0.50) (0.09) (0.06)
Individualistic -0.274 -0.294 -0.032 -0.031
(0.50) (0.50) (0.09) (0.07)
Prosocial -0.346 0.025 -0.046 0.009
(0.46) (0.49) (0.08) (0.06)
Competitive -0.084 -0.609 -0.001 -0.078
(0.80) (0.86) (0.14) (0.13)
Satisfaction -0.003 -0.167 -0.001 -0.023
(0.12) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02)
Happiness 0.058 -0.337 0.010 -0.045
(0.28) (0.31) (0.06) (0.04)
Constant 2.130 1.546 0.946*** 0.810***
(1.35) (1.43) (0.28) (0.18)
Wald-test 32.38*** 42.41*** 2.96*** 2.93***
(Pseudo) R2 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.131
Observations 288 432 288 432
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Table B. 1. Econometric analysis for the e¤ect of conformity19
19Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The log-pseudo likelihood in the logit
regressions is -165.94 and -179.33 for type-A and type-B agents respectively. Signicance *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
E¤ect of knowing that others vote truthfully
The rst two columns of Table B.2 present the maximum likelihood estimates of our logit
regression, for each of the two types of agents separately. We complement our analysis
by reporting the results of a linear probability model.
In line with our discussion in the main text, we nd that information a¤ects di¤erently
to type-A (who tend to vote less truthfully with the presence of forced voters) and type-B
agents (who tend to vote more truthfully). When q = 3, we nd that the e¤ect for type-B
agents is not signicant according to the linear probability model, but it is when q = 4.
This is the main di¤erence between the logit model reported in the main text and the
linear probability model. We also note that the reported estimates for the logit model in
Table B.2 cannot be used to compute the marginal e¤ects, according to Ai and Norton
(2003). The correct marginal e¤ects are reported in the main text.
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Dependent variable: Probability of voting truthfully
Logit model Linear Probability model
Type-A Type-B Type-A Type-B
dq4 (=1 if q = 4) 1.077** -1.871*** 0.250** -0.208***
(0.45) (0.64) (0.10) (0.06)
dq5 (=1 if q = 5) 0.693 -2.665*** 0.167 -0.375***
(0.44) (0.62) (0.11) (0.07)
dINF (=1 if information) -0.522 0.353 -0.123 -0.006
(0.41) (1.13) (0.10) (0.05)
dINF dq4 -0.239 1.871 -0.050 0.208**
(0.60) (1.63) (0.14) (0.08)
dINF dq5 0.647 -0.178 0.150 0.065
(0.63) (1.31) (0.15) (0.12)
Age -0.034 0.053 -0.008 0.005
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.003)
Women -0.425 0.313 -0.097 0.046
(0.29) (0.35) (0.07) (0.05)
Risk aversion 0.026 0.164*** 0.006 0.020***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Trust 0.047 0.113 0.011 0.013
(0.25) (0.35) (0.06) (0.05)
Inequality -0.127 -0.152 -0.028 -0.016
(0.31) (0.39) (0.07) (0.05)
CRT -0.439 0.664 -0.099 0.083
(0.40) (0.548) (0.09) (0.07)
Type_i -0.746 -0.366 -0.166 -0.043
(0.63) (0.69) (0.14) (0.09)
Type_p -0.647 -0.242 -0.143 -0.022
(0.59) (0.62) (0.13) (0.08)
Type_c -0.522 0.172 -0.119 0.043
(0.81) (1.02) (0.172) (0.13)
Satisfaction 0.050 -0.272* 0.0114 -0.036
(0.11) (0.15) (0.03) (0.02)
Happiness 0.118 -0.374 0.027 -0.047
(0.26) (0.40) (0.06) (0.05)
Constant 1.128 2.405 0.752** 0.904***
(1.39) (1.72) (0.32) (0.23)
Wald-test 20.34 46.51*** 1.60* 4.86***
(Pseudo) R2 0.06 0.20 0.08 0.18
Observations 324 303 324 303
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Table B.2. Econometric analysis for the e¤ect of information
Chapter 7
General Conclusions
This thesis studies theoretically the strategic behavior of two key components of democ-
racy: political parties and voters.
Among the great variety of topics regarding political parties, this thesis focuses on
two-party political competition when one of the parties is an o¢ ce-seeking traditional
party whilst the other has preferences for ambiguity.
The rst scenario analyzed is the one in which the ambiguous party acts as an as-
sembly party. Under this setting, results show that more moderate assemblies increase
the options of winning the elections. Interestingly, we nd that the location of the as-
sembly induces the traditional party to locate at di¤erent platforms. When the assembly
is centrist, the traditional party moves away from the median voter location. However,
when the assembly is extremist, the traditional party locates at a moderate position. As
a result, the assembly party generates divergence between the platforms of the parties, in
contrast to the Downsian model. The current importance of direct democracy inside new
political parties in how they elect their candidates and representatives is an interesting
point to study in a future research related to assembly parties.
In the second scenario, the ambiguous party is represented by a party which consists
of two internal factions: an ideological and an opportunistic. Under a sequential setting,
we show that a party that gives equal weights to its two factions needs considerable
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valence advantage to win the elections, even with a rst mover advantage. Interestingly,
despite the multiplicity of equilibria, the Downsian equilibrium does not hold in this
case and parties have incentives to o¤er divergent platforms. From the votersviewpoint,
parties with heterogeneous factions generate more pluralistic platforms. From the parties
viewpoint, a multi-faction party is worst-o¤when competing with a traditional party. An
extension of this model must study this question simultaneously, considering di¤erent
weights to each of the factions.
In the third scenario, both parties have a preference for ambiguity and for winning
the elections. Under a situation in which o¢ ce-seeking incentives are very rewarding,
parties sacrice their taste for ambiguity and converge to the ideal policy of the median
voter. In the opposite case in which ambiguity is very rewarding, an equilibrium fails
to exist since parties have incentives to deviate to more ambiguous platforms even when
this means losing the elections. We conclude therefore that with risk-neutral voters when
the distribution of voters is known, parties cannot choose ambiguous platforms if they
want to win the elections. A possible direction in which this model can be extended is to
consider that parties have an ideology and deviating from this ideal policy of the parties
comes at a positive cost.
From both the rst and the second scenario, we can reach to the conclusion that
the traditional party moves along the policy space as it needs to di¤erentiate from the
ambiguous party in order to attract voters from the center and from one of the sides of
the median. This result applies regardless of the ambiguous party has enough valence
advantage to win the elections, as it inuences the strategies of the traditional party even
when the ambiguous party is defeated. We also nd that it is not su¢ cient to have a rst
mover advantage for an ambiguous party to win the elections. The only possibility it has
relies on having enough valence advantage to defeat a traditional party. From the three
scenarios analyzed, we also obtain that ambiguity makes insider voters display a kind of
risk aversion, despite voters being risk-neutral. This risk aversion comes from the fact
that a risk-neutral voter, when locating between the two policies of the ambiguous party,
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derives a greater utility from voting the traditional party than from voting the ambiguous
party when the mean policy of the ambiguous party coincides with the unique location of
the traditional party. Therefore, we can also conclude that ambiguity is a disadvantage
for a party when competing with a traditional one even with risk-neutrality. A future
research in which we can study how the valence advantage of one party inuences voters
risk attitudes would be an interesting direction to extend this analysis.
Moving towards the second research area of this thesis, voters, the study focuses on
how the presence of conformity may alter decisions taken by agents under a complete
information setting. When all agents are conformist, no q threshold rule can be imple-
mented in a simultaneous binary voting game. A solution to deal with this problem is
replacing conformist by independent agents, who only consider their opinion when voting.
Under a simultaneous setting, it is possible to make the e¤ect of conformity disappear
with a su¢ cient number of conformist agents replaced by independents. In case the de-
cisions are taken sequentially, conformity does not a¤ect these decisions. This study is
a rst step to analyze an incomplete information version of this model where, instead
of replacing conformist by independent agents, we can add to the vote group a certain
number of independent agents, as boards of directors already do at the companies.
To nish, experimental data supports the fact that inducing conformity in the pref-
erences of the agents by means of an extra payo¤ for coinciding with the vote of some
other agent reduces the likelihood of voting truthfully. Besides, when agents vote know-
ing that there are independent agents, this leads them to vote more truthfully. Results
also show the e¤ect of the voting rule on agentsdecisions, being less sincere the less
pivotal they are. Once we know the e¤ects of inducing conformity in the preferences of
the agents, it would be interesting to know how the voting rule and thus, the pivotality
of the agents makes agents to conform to the decision most preferred by the group of
agents when conformity is not induced in the preferences of the agents. Not only the
performance of the subjects when conducing the experiment but also the beliefs they
have about the behavior of the rest of subjects gives enough evidence to reach to some
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conclusions regarding agentsreasoning in taking decisions.
After analyzing conformity both theoretically and experimentally, we can reach to
some conclusions regarding the pivotality of agents, the voting rules and the truthful
behavior of the agents. First, we nd that conformity inuences the nal decision only
when agents cannot be pivotal, which occurs under a simultaneous setting without in-
dependent agents. Second, after analyzing the number of independent agents needed to
implement the truth for any voting rule, it turns out that unanimous rules are the ones
needing less independents. After unanimity, simple majority appears to be better than
any other supermajority rule. Third, experimental results suggest there is an interplay
between the voting rule and truthful voting, since agents vote more truthfully the more
favorable a voting rule is to obtain a particular outcome. That is, there is an e¤ect of the
voting rule on agents voting truthfully only when they can be pivotal. Future research
may study why agents do not vote truthfully in binary voting games with complete in-
formation in which preferences for conformity are not induced. May a voter sacrice her
favorite option when she realizes that the society prefers the other option or is there a
fear of voting alone or with the minority?
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Chapter 8
Resumen en español
Esta sección se destina a resumir los principales aspectos de la tesis en español. En
el primer apartado, se introduce el tema de investigación y en la siguiente sección, se
presentan los objetivos que se persiguen dentro de la misma. A continuación, se resume
cada una de las principales contribuciones que conforman la tesis. El apartado nal se
destina a presentar las conclusiones.
8.1 Introducción
La presente tesis estudia de manera teórica el comportamiento estratégico de dos partes
fundamentales de la democracia: los partidos políticos y los votantes.
8.1.1 Partidos Políticos
Dentro del amplio abanico de temas de estudio referente a las estrategias de los partidos
políticos, esta tesis se centra en la competencia política para el caso en el que dos partidos
políticos compiten para ganar las elecciones. En particular, analiza casos de competencia
política caracterizados por tener a uno de los partidos ejerciendo de partido tradicional
y a otro partido que es percibido por los votantes como ambiguo. El partido tradicional
viene representado por una única plataforma política y su objetivo se limita a ganar
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las elecciones. En cambio, el partido ambiguo representa varias plataformas políticas y
los votantes son incapaces de relacionar una única plataforma política con ese partido.
La literatura ya ha encontrado respuesta a cuáles serían las estrategias de equilibrio de
dos partidos políticos tradicionales que compiten por ganar las elecciones, el equilibrio
Downsiano, que muestra que ambos partidos se sitúan en la posición del votante mediano
(Downs, 1957), es decir, aquella plataforma posicionada en el punto medio del espacio de
políticas. Con esta tesis, se pretende conocer cuáles serían las consecuencias, en términos
de la estrategia política utilizada por cada uno de los partidos en equilibrio, cuando uno
de ellos es un partido tradicional y el otro partido se caracteriza por su ambigüedad.
La razón para estudiar las competencia entre estos tipos de partidos políticos viene
motivada por la creciente aparición de nuevos partidos políticos que intentan atraer a
votantes descontentos con los partidos tradicionales, que intentan no ser relacionados con
una única ideología política y que pueden ser denidos como partidos ambiguos, al no
ofertar una única política concreta.
El hecho de que un partido político sea ambiguo hace que los votantes asocien varias
estrategias políticas a ese partido. Esto implica que el partido político ambiguo va a
ser evaluado por los votantes como una lotería en la que los votantes dan una probabil-
idad positiva determinada a cada una de las políticas que anuncia este partido político.
Esta tesis presenta el estudio de las estrategias de competencia política entre un partido
tradicional y un partido ambiguo en dos escenarios: cuando el partido ambiguo es un
partido asambleario y cuando el partido ambiguo está compuesto de varias facciones in-
ternas. Por último, se estudia un caso más general en el que dos partidos políticos sin
una ideología concreta tienen un doble objetivo: ser ambiguos y ganar las elecciones.
8.1.2 Votantes
En la vida real, se detectan situaciones en la que los individuos, a la hora de votar
por una alternativa, ceden ante las presiones sociales y votan por alternativas menos
preferidas para poder encajar mejor en el grupo, ser aceptado o para crear un vínculo
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con las personas con las que se coincide en el voto. A este comportamiento se le conoce
en psicología social como conformity, que se dene como "tipo de inuencia social que
conlleva un cambio en el comportamiento de un individuo para sentirse mejor dentro de
un grupo".
Este comportamiento se ha estudiado en psicología social desde mediados del siglo XX.
En 1950, el cientíco Solomon Asch fue pionero en conrmar esta actitud social mediante
un experimento en un laboratorio. Más tarde, Deutsch y Gerard (1955) identican dos
tipos de inuencia social: informacional y normativa. La inuencia informacional ocurre
cuando los individuos actualizan sus preferencias teniendo en cuenta la opinión del resto
de individuos. En cambio, la inuencia normativa describe el comportamiento que se
considera en este estudio, en el que los individuos maniestan una opinión condicionada
por la opinión general que ya hay en el grupo.
En casos de votación, esta conducta puede determinar que la decisión elegida no
sea la que represente las preferencias reales de los individuos y éstos, al imponerse a
sí mismos la necesidad de coincidir con ciertos miembros del grupo, voten una opción
distinta a la preferida. Esto puede representar un grave problema en escenarios tales como
juicios, consejos de administración, comités de calidad, tribunales, entre otros comités de
decisión.
Para estudiar este tipo de comportamiento y sus consecuencias, se presenta un modelo
en el que los votantes tienen bien denidas sus preferencias de acuerdo a dos alternativas
posibles: mantener la opción actual o cambiarla. A partir de ahí, se introduce un tipo de
preferencias lexicográcas que hace que los agentes voten por su opción favorita si ven
que ésta tiene opciones a ser elegida, o voten de acuerdo a lo que va a votar un grupo de
referencia cuando su voto ya no afecta a la decisión nal. El primer escenario a estudiar
es meramente teórico. En él se aplica este tipo de preferencias para n agentes, cualquier
regla de la mayoría (mayoría simple, supermayoría, unanimidad, etc.) y se considera
que los votantes quieren coincidir con cualquier número de integrantes del grupo. En el
segundo escenario, se analiza de manera experimental un perl de preferencias concreto
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para 5 individuos.
8.2 Objetivos
El objetivo general de esta tesis es analizar, bajo un punto de vista teórico y utilizando
las distintas herramientas proporcionadas por la teoría de juegos, el comportamiento
estratégico de dos partes fundamentales de la democracia: los partidos políticos y los
votantes.
Los objetivos especícos vienen condicionados por la nalidad de cada uno de los
artículos cientícos que conforman la tesis y que se desarrollan entre los capítulos 2 y 6.
 Objetivo 1: Modelo de competencia política donde un partido asambleario y un
partido tradicional compiten para ganar las elecciones. Se demuestra cuáles son las
estrategias políticas que llevarían a cabo dichos partidos políticos en equilibrio y
se comprueba de qué manera la existencia de un partido asambleario determina la
estrategia política que toma un partido tradicional.
 Objetivo 2. Modelo de competencia política donde un partido con dos facciones
internas y un partido tradicional compiten para ganar las elecciones. Se estudian las
estrategias políticas de ambos partidos ante la existencia de incertidumbre acerca
de la ventaja que un partido tiene sobre otro cuando deciden sus estrategias de
manera secuencial.
 Objetivo 3. Modelo de competencia política entre dos partidos políticos no ide-
ológicos caracterizados por proponer estrategias ambiguas. Ante esta situación, se
estudian cuáles serían las estrategias políticas que les permitirían cumplir con sus
dos principales objetivos: representar al electorado y ganar las elecciones.
 Objetivo 4. Modelo de elección binaria donde los votantes tienen en cuenta dos
características a la hora de votar: primero, cuál es su opción preferida y, segundo,
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qué va a votar el resto de votantes. Bajo esta situación, se identican las conse-
cuencias del fenómeno del "conformity" sobre la manera de votar de los individuos.
Asimismo, se propone como solución reemplazar un número concreto de individuos
por agentes independientes y no inuenciables.
 Objetivo 5. Estudio mediante un experimento de un caso particular del modelo
presentado en el Objetivo 4. Se valida de manera experimental la fórmula propuesta
para solucionar el problema del conformity y se analizan los resultados obtenidos.
8.3 Contribución
En esta sección, se desarrolla brevemente el trabajo relacionado con cada uno de los
objetivos especícos de esta tesis. Cada uno de los apartados de esta sección contiene
una introducción al tema de estudio, se explica brevemente la metodología utilizada y
los resultados a los que se llegan a través de la misma.
8.3.1 Equilibrio Downsiano ante un partido asambleario
Escrito junto con Socorro Puy. Publicado en el libro The Political Economy
of Governance: Institutions, Political Performance and Elections. Editores:
Schoeld, N. y G. Caballero. Springer (2015). ISBN: 978-3-319-15550-0.
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7.
A lo largo del Capítulo 2, se estudia un escenario de competencia política entre
un partido tradicional (Partido A) y en el que el partido ambiguo ejerce de partido
asambleario (Partido B).
Se dene como partido asambleario aquél que decide sus propuestas políticas medi-
ante asambleas. En el marco teórico que se propone, el partido asambleario organiza dos
asambleas, una pre-electoral y otra post-electoral. En la asamblea pre-electoral, se deci-
den qué propuestas va a representar el partido cuando se celebren las elecciones. Durante
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la asamblea pre-electoral, los asistentes, sean aliados o no al partido, pueden proponer
su política preferida como propuesta del partido. Las múltiples propuestas que pueden
aorar en la asamblea pre-electoral hacen que el partido asambleario sea evaluado por los
votantes como una lotería, dándole una probabilidad positiva a cada una de las propuestas
surgidas en la asamblea. En el caso de que el partido asambleario ganara las elecciones, se
celebraría una asamblea post-electoral en el que las propuestas denidas en la asamblea
pre-electoral puedan ser votadas por los asistentes a la asamblea para decidir qué política
de todas las propuestas implementará el partido. Para ello, se toma la distancia euclídea
entre la política preferida del votante y las propuestas nales del partido. Por razones de
simplicación, y siguiendo el modelo del Ciudadano-Candidato de Osborne and Slivinski
(1996), se considera que sólo dos propuestas salen elegidas en la asamblea pre-electoral.
Esas dos propuestas están simétricamente localizadas alrededor del votante mediano xM ,
es decir, una a la izquierda, xM   ", y otra a la derecha del votante mediano, xM + ",
donde " es la distancia máxima que hace impedir que haya una tercera propuesta en la
asamblea (ver Proposición 2 de Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). Tras conocer las propuestas
del partido asambleario, el partido tradicional selecciona aquella política que le permita
ganar las elecciones. Aparte de las propuestas del partido asambleario y la política del
partido tradicional, cada partido tiene asociado un parámetro que mide la percepción
general que tienen los votantes sobre cada partido, a lo que la literatura en competencia
política denomina valence. El valence recoge la percepción general que genera un partido
político respecto al otro. Un valor positivo de valence para un partido concreto podría
indicar si la sociedad considera a ese partido como más preparado para dirigir el país, si
lo considera menos corrupto, más cercano o carismático, etc. Por ejemplo, si la sociedad
tiene una percepción general acerca de que el partido tradicional es menos corrupto (algo
que los votantes valoran de manera positiva), el valence favorecerá al partido tradicional
respecto al partido ambiguo, de manera que los votantes obtendrán una utilidad extra,
representada por el parámetro ; si votan al partido tradicional. En nuestro caso, se
recurre a la diferencia entre los valence de ambos partidos, ; para denir el grado de
161
protesta social en contra de los partidos tradicionales, cuyo valor indica si la sociedad en
general preere más a un partido asambleario que a un partido tradicional (si el valor
del parámetro valence es más alto para el partido asambleario (B) que para el partido
tradicional (A), tenemos que  = B A > 0). Se asume que los partidos desconocen
el valor del grado de protesta social y si uno u otro partido tiene cierta ventaja respecto
al otro.
La función de utilidad de los partidos políticos y de los votantes nos permite conocer
las estrategias de equilibrio de ambos partidos ante unas elecciones de este tipo. Para ello,
se dene como equilibrio político al par compuesto por las propuestas acordadas en la
asamblea pre-electoral y la política del partido tradicional que maximiza su probabilidad
de ganar.
A la hora de resolver el juego electoral, se tienen en cuenta las siguientes etapas:
1. El partido asambleario (Partido B) organiza una asamblea pre-electoral donde
todo el que desee puede hacer una propuesta política.
2. El partido tradicional (Partido A) decide su estrategia política xA.
3. Se celebran las elecciones.
4. Si el partido tradicional gana, la plataforma xA se implementa. Si el partido
asambleario gana, se celebra una asamblea post-electoral en la que todo el que desee
puede votar y en la que se decide cuál de las propuestas elegidas en la asamblea pre-
electoral será implementada.
Se estudian dos escenarios, cuando todo el electorado participa en la asamblea y
cuando la participación es parcial. En el caso de que todo el electorado participe en
la asamblea, se obtiene el grado de presión social  necesario para que el partido
asambleario gane las elecciones (Proposición 1). Para grados de presión social inferiores,
se identican dos políticas de equilibrio que permitirían ganar al partido tradicional: una
situándose en el punto medio entre la propuesta pre-electoral de la asamblea más de
izquierdas (xM   ") y el mediano (xM), es decir, xA = xM   "2 ; y en el punto medio
entre el mediano y la propuesta pre-electoral de la asamblea más de derechas (xM +"), es
162
decir, xA = xM + "2 (Proposición 2). En este segundo resultado, se obtiene que el partido
tradicional tiene que diferenciarse de la política del votante mediano para poder atraer
a una mayoría del electorado. Cuando el partido tradicional se sitúa a la izquierda del
votante mediano, obtiene el apoyo de la mayoría que está a la izquierda del mediano,
incluido éste. En cambio, si el partido tradicional se sitúa a la derecha del votante
mediano, obtendrá el apoyo de la mayoría que está a la derecha del mediano.
En el escenario en el que hay participación parcial en la asamblea, se pueden distinguir
dos situaciones: que la asamblea sea centrista o sea extremista. Se considera que una
asamblea es centrista si el votante mediano del electorado asiste a la asamblea, es decir,
está situado entre las dos propuestas de la asamblea. En ese caso, se obtiene cuál es
el grado de protesta social necesario para que el partido asambleario gane las elecciones
(Proposición 3). Además, se obtiene que, en equilibrio, el partido tradicional se situará en
el punto medio entre el mediano del electorado y la propuesta de derechas de la asamblea
si la asamblea es de centro-izquierda (xaM + "), es decir, xA =
xM+x
a
M+"
2
; y en el punto
medio entre el mediano del electorado y la propuesta de izquierdas de la asamblea si
la asamblea es de centro-derechas (xaM   "), e decir xA = xM+x
a
M "
2
. Se considera que
una asamblea es extremista si el votante mediano no asiste a la asamblea (la posición
del votante mediano está fuera de las propuestas de la asamblea). En este caso, el
partido asambleario gana las elecciones si el grado de presión social es lo sucientemente
grande como para superar la distancia entre las posiciones del votante mediano de la
asamblea y del electorado (Proposición 4). Además, en los casos en los que la asamblea
es extremista, el partido tradicional opta por ofrecer la posición del votante mediano
del electorado (xA = xM). Es decir, la existencia de una asamblea extremista hace que
el partido tradicional proponga políticas más moderadas, mientras que una asambleas
centrista hace que el partido tradicional se diferencie de las propuestas de la asamblea,
para así atraer votantes centristas y extremistas.
Este análisis permite concluir que la existencia de un partido asambleario que propone
dos propuestas, una a cada lado de la posición del votante mediano, induce al partido
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tradicional a proponer políticas distintas a la posición del votante mediano, lo que con-
tradice la convergencia obtenida por el modelo Downsiano. Además, la existencia de un
partido político asambleario no sólo tiene efectos cuando éste gana las elecciones, sino
que también tiene efectos indirectos cuando pierde, ya que afecta la estrategia política
del partido tradicional, haciendo que éste sea más moderado o extremista dependiendo
de lo extremista o moderada que sea la asamblea.
8.3.2 Competencia política entre partidos con facciones inter-
nas heterogéneas
Escrito junto con la Prof. Socorro Puy.
A lo largo del Capítulo 3, se estudia un escenario de competencia política en el que
uno de los partidos es percibido como ambiguo al estar formado por varias facciones
internas.
Se consideran dos partidos: el Partido L y el Partido R. El Partido L tiene dos
facciones: una ideológica y otra oportunista. La facción ideológica es una estrategia
política que está jada y que se ocupa de mantener los principios ideológicos de los
fundadores del partido. Esta facción puede interpretarse como la "marca" del partido
o como la media de las distintas políticas que el partido ha implementado a lo largo
de su existencia y se denirá como xEL . La facción oportunista es la facción estratégica
dentro del partido y se encarga de maximizar las opciones que tiene el partido de ganar
las elecciones. Esta facción propone aquella plataforma que maximice el número de
situaciones en las que el partido ganaría las elecciones y se denirá como xOL . El Partido
R tiene una única facción oportunista, cuyo objetivo es ofrecer aquella estrategia política
dentro del espacio electoral [0; 1] que maximice sus opciones de ganar las elecciones. A
este nivel del análisis, se introduce la siguiente restricción: que la facción oportunista
esté a la derecha de la política representada por la facción ideológica.
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Dado que cada facción dentro del Partido L tiene el mismo peso dentro del partido,
éste es evaluado por los votantes como una lotería, donde cada facción tiene un 50% de
posibilidades de ser la política que implemente el partido en caso de ganar las elecciones.
Como el Partido R sólo consta de una facción y es oportunista, el Partido R está asociado
a una única política, xR y se le denomina como partido tradicional. Cada partido tiene
asociado un valence en el que todos los individuos están de acuerdo. Tal y como se
hizo en el caso de estudio anterior, se recurre a la diferencia entre los valence de ambos
partidos para denir qué partido tiene una ventaja en valence sobre el otro partido,
. Nuevamente, se asume que existe incertidumbre sobre qué partido tiene ventaja en
valence sobre el otro.
En cuanto a los votantes, la utilidad que reciben por votar a cierto partido depende
del valor del valence y de la distancia euclídea entre la política ideal del votante y las
propuestas nales del partido. Votarán a aquel partido que derive una mayor utilidad y
en caso de que sea la misma se abstendrán. En este caso, hay que tener en cuenta que el
Partido L propone dos políticas y la utilidad del votante viene determinada por el valor
del valence y la distancia euclídea entre la política ideal del votante y cada una de las
políticas propuestas por el Partido L, ponderado por las posibilidades de que cada una
de ellas sea implementada por el partido.
A la hora de resolver el juego electoral, se tienen en cuenta las siguientes etapas:
1. Dada la propuesta jada por la facción ideológica del Partido L, xEL , la facción
oportunista del Partido L propone aquella política que maximice el pago esperado bajo
la incertidumbre generada por el valence advantage.
2. El partido R observa la política anunciada por el Partido L y anuncia la política
que maximiza el pago esperado bajo la incertidumbre generada por el valence advantage,
xR.
3. Se celebran las elecciones y los votantes optan por uno de los dos partidos o se
abstienen en caso de indiferencia.
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Se resuelve el juego secuencial aplicando inducción hacia atrás, es decir, resolviendo la
etapa 3 primero, luego la mejor respuesta del Partido R y, por último, la decisión óptima
del Partido L, una vez que conoce la mejor respuesta del Partido R. Tras resolver el juego
se obtienen las estrategias de equilibrio de ambos partidos, de donde se destaca que el
Partido L elegirá cualquier estrategia a la derecha del votante mediano y por debajo de
la distancia del doble del mediano y la política ja de la facción ideológica, es decir,
xO

L 2 [xM ; 2xM   xEL ]. Por su parte, el Partido R tiene una única estrategia política y se
situará en el punto medio entre el votante mediano y la política oportunista del Partido
L, es decir, xR =
xO

L +xM
2
. En el caso de que el Partido L tenga ventaja en valence sobre
el Partido R, éste ganará las elecciones. En caso contrario, la victoria se la llevará el
Partido R.
Del resultado se debe destacar la multiplicidad de equilibrios obtenidos y la ausen-
cia del equilibrio Downsiano en los mismos, dándose equilibrios divergentes donde cada
partido se sitúa a un lado distinto del votante mediano. Asimismo, el hecho de que
un partido tradicional compita con un partido formado por varias facciones sólo crea
desventajas para éste último, al ganar únicamente cuando tiene suciente ventaja en
valence.
8.3.3 Partidos ambiguos sin capacidad de serlo
Escrito junto con la Prof. Socorro Puy. En revisión en revista JCR.
A lo largo del Capítulo 4, se estudia un escenario de competencia política en el que
ambos partidos tienen cierta preferencia por ser ambiguos. En concreto, se estudia el caso
en que los dos partidos tienen preferencias por ganar las elecciones y por ser ambiguos,
es decir, están dispuestos a ofrecer un abanico de propuestas políticas para así recoger
las demandas de la mayor parte del electorado posible. Se supone, además, que estos
partidos no son ideológicos. Dada la importancia por la ambigüedad, la plataforma de
los partidos pueden ser políticas únicas o puede ser una lotería, que consistiría en la
distribución de probabilidades sobre algunas políticas del espacio de políticas [0; 1]. El
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caso de estudio se limita a loterías que puedan ser discretas o continuas y que sigan
una distribución uniforme. Las loterías continuas vienen denidas por dos parámetros,
el punto medio de la lotería, x y el nivel de ambigüedad " que dene el intervalo de
políticas que pueden ser implementadas, es decir, [x  "; x+ "] : Las loterías discretas
están formadas por un número nito de políticas con la peculiaridad de que la distancia
que hay entre cada política tiene que ser la misma. Las loterías discretas vienen denidas
por tres parámetros, el número de políticasm; la política media x y el nivel de ambigüedad
".
A la hora de votar, los votantes sólo tienen en cuenta su función de utilidad, que
viene representada por la distancia entre las políticas propuestas por los partidos y la
política ideal del votante. Cuanto más grande sea esa distancia, menos utilidad tendrá el
votante. De esta manera, los votantes tienen preferencias single-peaked, caracterizadas
por preferir aquellas políticas que más se acerquen a su política ideal.
El concepto de equilibrio que se utiliza para conocer las estrategias de los partidos
y al ganador de las elecciones es el equilibrio de Nash en estrategias débilmente no
dominadas. Es decir, la estrategia que elija el partido es aquella en la que el partido
reciba más utilidad (maximice sus opciones de ganar las elecciones) dada la estrategia
que haga el otro partido.
Lo primero que se examina es si existe alguna lotería que domine débilmente a todas
las demás, para un mismo punto medio y para un mismo nivel de ambigüedad. Por
ejemplo, si se compara una lotería con dos propuestas (cada propuesta corresponde a los
extremos de la lotería), con una lotería de tres propuestas, se obtiene que la lotería de
3 propuestas domina débilmente a la de dos, ya que hay votantes dentro del rango de
la lotería, a los que llamaremos insiders, que preeren la lotería de 3 propuestas. Esta
comparativa se puede realizar para cualquiera dos pares de loterías con distinto número de
propuestas. Por último, se compara una lotería continua con una lotería con m políticas
y comprobamos que la lotería continua domina débilmente a cualquier lotería discreta.
Esto implica que, si un partido político se decantara por una lotería, ésta tendría que ser
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una lotería continua.
Teniendo en cuenta que las loterías discretas no son estrategias de equilibrio, se anal-
izan situaciones de equilibrio donde las estrategias de los partidos se reducen a dos: la
lotería continua y una única política. Se analiza qué características tienen que darse en
una situación de equilibrio. En primer lugar, si existe un equilibrio, en él los partidos
políticos tienen que empatar. Es decir, no se da ninguna situación de equilibrio en donde
haya un partido que gane y otro que pierda. En segundo lugar, los partidos tienen que
proponer un mismo nivel de ambigüedad. Además, los partidos tienen que proponer la
misma política o tienen que proponer una política equidistante al votante mediano. En
ambos casos, el partido que se desvíe a una estrategia más cercana al votante mediano es
el que ganaría. Esto nos lleva a una única situación, en la que los dos partidos proponen
la política del votante mediano.
Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, se analizan distintos escenarios dependiendo del peso
que tenga para los partidos políticos ganar las elecciones. Si los partidos políticos dan
prioridad a ganar las elecciones (caso en el que la utilidad que obtienen por ganar las
elecciones es mayor que la utilidad que obtendrían por proponer plataformas ambiguas),
los partidos convergen al equilibrio Downsiano, es decir, ambos empatan proponiendo
la política ideal del votante mediano. Si la utilidad por ser ambiguo es sucientemente
grande, no existen equilibrios. Para encontrar un equilibrio donde ambos partidos pro-
pongan una política ambigua, es decir, la lotería continua, tenemos que irnos a un esce-
nario donde no se obtiene ninguna utilidad por ganar las elecciones y en la que ambos
partidos propondrán la lotería continua con el máximo grado de ambigüedad posible. Se
puede concluir, por tanto, que el hecho de que se diseñe un escenario donde los partidos
políticos le den cierta importancia a proponer políticas ambiguas no es suciente para
obtener un equilibrio distinto del equilibrio Downsiano.
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8.3.4 Votación bajo "conformity"
Escrito junto con el Prof. Bernardo Moreno. Publicado en Social Choice and
Welfare (2017) 48:519. DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-1023-7.
En el Capítulo 5 se analiza el comportamiento de los votantes bajo la inuencia del
conformity.
Un grupo de n individuos tiene que decidir si acepta o rechaza una propuesta. Cada
uno de los individuos está a favor o en contra de la propuesta. Los individuos votan y
si el número de individuos que vota a favor de la propuesta es igual o superior a cierta
regla de la mayoría, la propuesta se acepta. Supongamos que las preferencias de estos
individuos no sólo se caracterizan por tener en cuenta si su opción favorita es estar a
favor o en contra de la propuesta. Además, cuando los individuos ven que su voto no va
a afectar a la decisión nal, los votantes se jan en lo que votan el resto de miembros
del grupo, dándole importancia a coincidir con el voto de alguno de ellos. Es decir, las
preferencias de estos agentes son tales que, primero preeren que su opción preferida sea
la decisión nal. Cuando ven que esto no va a ocurrir, preeren votar lo mismo que
ciertos individuos del grupo (aparece el fenómeno del conformity).
Teniendo en cuenta las preferencias de los individuos y bajo información completa,
se examina cómo afectan a los resultados obtenidos, es decir, si se obtienen decisiones
nales que no se obtendrían si todos votasen sólo teniendo en cuenta cuál es su opción
preferida. El primer escenario que se presenta es aquel en el que los individuos votan
de manera simultánea y en el que los individuos pueden querer coincidir en el voto con
cualquier número de agentes. En este sentido, se obtienen equilibrios en los que la decisión
nal es distinta a la obtenida si todos votasen sólo de acuerdo a su opinión. Esto ocurre
independientemente del número de individuos que forme el grupo, para cualquier regla de
la mayoría que se considere para tomar la decisión y para cualquier número de individuos
con los que los votantes quieran coincidir.
Cómo propuesta para solventar esta situación, se propone ir reemplazando a estos
individuos cuyas preferencias están afectadas por el conformity por otros individuos in-
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dependientes, cuyas preferencias se caracterizan por votar sólo teniendo en cuenta su
opción preferida, sin importarles lo que vote el resto de agentes, lo que se considera en
este estudio como votación sincera. Esta medida es bastante usada en comités de de-
cisión en los que se recurren a consultores externos que aportan su opinión insesgada
acerca de la decisión a tomar y que son contratados únicamente por su reputación como
individuos independientes y no inuenciados. Como supuesto, se asume que todos los
votantes quieren coincidir en el voto con un mismo número de personas (una persona, la
mayoría del grupo, etc.).
El segundo resultado de este estudio propone un mecanismo que indica el número de
individuos a reemplazar por agentes independientes y que garantizaría la decisión que se
obtiene cuando todos los agentes votan según su opción preferida para cualquier perl de
preferencias de los agentes. Este número de independientes depende del número total de
agentes que forman parte del grupo, de la regla de la mayoría que se escoja para tomar
la decisión y del número de individuos con el que los agentes quieren coincidir en el voto,
que se asume que es el mismo para todos los individuos. Además, se analiza el caso
particular en el que los individuos quieren votar lo mismo que la mayoría del grupo. En
este caso, el mecanismo también funciona y te indica el número de agentes independientes
que permite obtener la decisión que se elegiría si todos los votantes votaran de manera
sincera.
Por último, se estudia el caso en que los agentes, en vez de tomar la decisión de
manera simultánea, votan de manera secuencial. Se asume que todos los agentes tienen
preferencias afectadas por el conformity y que cada uno de los agentes puede coincidir
en el voto con el número de individuos que preera (se relaja el supuesto anterior en el
que se asume que todos los agentes quieren coincidir con el mismo número de personas).
En este caso, se obtiene que el fenómeno del conformity en las preferencias de los agentes
no afecta a la decisión nal, independientemente del número total de agentes que formen
el grupo de votación y de la regla de la mayoría que se escoja. Este último resultado
viene condicionado por el comportamiento pivotal de los agentes, que se dene como la
170
posibilidad que tiene un individuo de ser decisivo en el resultado de una elección a la
hora de obtener uno u otro resultado. En un escenario secuencial, los agentes tienen más
opciones de ser pivotal que en un escenario con votación simultánea, ya que anticipan el
comportamiento pivotal de aquellos agentes que les siguen. Dado que el fenómeno del
conformity es lexicográcamente inferior a la opción preferida por los individuos, éstos
preeren votar por su opción preferida. Esto no implica que no haya conformity, implica
que ésta sólo se da una vez la decisión ya se ha tomado.
8.3.5 Conformity, información y votación sincera
Escrito junto con los Prof. Bernardo Moreno e Ismael Rodríguez-Lara (Mid-
dlesex University). En revisión en revista JCR.
En el Capítulo 6 se analiza el comportamiento de los votantes bajo la inuencia
del conformity a través de un experimento en un laboratorio, donde se inducen estas
preferencias a los individuos.
Siguiendo el estudio anterior descrito en el Capítulo 5, los agentes tienen que tomar
una decisión de manera simultánea habiendo dos posibles opciones, A o B. El grupo
de agentes está compuesto por cinco agentes. Las preferencias de los agentes vienen
determinadas de manera que tres de los agentes preeren la opción B y los dos restantes
preeren la opción A. Primero, se estudia de manera teórica tres escenarios distintos en
los que se considera información completa. En el primer escenario, los agentes sólo tienen
en cuenta su opción preferida a la hora de votar. De acuerdo con el modelo teórico, el
único equilibrio de Nash no dominado es aquel en el que todos los miembros del grupo
votan por su opción preferida.
En el segundo escenario, se considera que todos los individuos tienen preferencias
afectadas por el conformity, en el sentido que, los votantes quieren votar por su opción
preferida salvo que no puedan inuir en el resultado, caso en el que preferirán votar lo
mismo que al menos otro agente. En este caso, aparte del equilibrio del primer escenario,
se encuentran equilibrios de Nash en el que algunos agentes no votan de manera sincera.
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En el tercer escenario, los agentes saben, antes de votar, que hay dos agentes cuya opción
preferida es B, que están votando de manera sincera. En este caso, se mantiene el
equilibrio de Nash no dominado en el que todos los agentes votan de manera sincera y se
reducen los equilibrios en el que había individuos que no votaban por su opción preferida.
Para comprobar si los resultados teóricos presentados anteriormente para este caso
pueden obtenerse empíricamente, se lleva a cabo un experimento en un laboratorio. Para
inducir a los sujetos del experimento a tener las mismas preferencias que en la teoría,
se recurre a darles incentivos monetarios. Se consideran dos tipos de agentes: A y B.
Cada tipo recibe el máximo pago si la decisión nal coincide con su tipo. En el primer
escenario, los individuos reciben una cantidad extra independientemente de lo que voten.
En el segundo escenario, donde se quiere inducir a los individuos preferencias afectadas
por el conformity, los sujetos reciben un pago adicional si su decisión coincide con la
decisión de algún agente dentro del grupo, independientemente de que la decisión nal
sea o no su opción favorita. En el tercer escenario, aparte de inducir a los individuos
preferencias afectadas por el conformity, los votantes saben que dos agentes de tipo B
son forzados a votar de manera sincera, es decir, a votar por B. Los pagos en este último
escenario son similares a los del segundo escenario.
Para llevar a cabo el experimento, se reclutaron 390 sujetos, siendo todos estudiantes
de Economía o Empresa de la Universidad de Valencia. En total se organizaron 13
sesiones con 30 sujetos cada una. Al comienzo de cada sesión, se le asignaba a cada
sujeto un tipo, A o B, de manera aleatoria, que se mantenía a lo largo de toda la sesión.
Todos los sujetos sabían que cada grupo estaba formado por 5 agentes, 3 de tipo B y
2 de tipo A. Tras haber sido informados de sus tipos, los sujetos tenían que votar por
una u otra opción en 3 rondas distintas. En cada ronda, para aceptar la opción B, se
les anunciaba el número de votos que se requiere para que la opción B sea la decisión
nal, habiendo tres posibilidades: mayoría simple (3 votos a favor de B), supermayoría
(4 votos a favor de B) o unanimidad (5 votos a favor de B). Si la opción B no obtiene
el apoyo necesario en la ronda, la decisión nal es la opción A. El orden de las reglas
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de mayoría se seleccionaba de manera aleatoria de manera que todas las secuencias, si
era 3, 4, 5; 4, 5, 3; etc.; tenían el mismo número de observaciones. En ningún momento,
los sujetos recibían información acerca de cómo habían votado el resto de participantes
en las rondas previas. Al nal del experimento, una de las rondas era seleccionada de
manera aleatoria para pagar a los individuos de acuerdo a cómo lo hubieran hecho en esa
ronda. Los pagos a los sujetos dependían de si la decisión nal en cada ronda coincidía
con el tipo del agente y de si había votado lo mismo que otro sujeto dentro del grupo.
Las hipótesis que se quieren contrastar mediante el experimento son las siguientes:
Hipótesis 1: La presencia de conformity no afectará a la probabilidad de votar de
manera sincera, siendo la probabilidad igual en el primer y segundo tratamiento.
Hipótesis 2: Con conformity, la presencia de dos agentes de tipo B forzados a votar
de manera sincera no afectará a la probabilidad de los restantes tipo B a votar de manera
sincera, siendo dicha probabilidad igual en el segundo y tercer tratamiento.
Hipótesis 3: La regla de la mayoría utilizada no afectará a la probabilidad de los
agentes de votar de manera sincera en ninguno de los tratamientos.
Siguiendo los resultados teóricos, se encuentra que los agentes tienden a votar de
manera sincera en el primer escenario en comparación con el escenario en el que se
induce conformity (en términos medios, los tipos A pasan de 0.75 a 0.6 mientras que
los tipo B pasan de 0.87 a 0.75). Asimismo, se encuentra una relación positiva entre
la probabilidad de votar de manera sincera y la pivotalidad de los individuos. Para el
segundo tratamiento se obtiene que los votantes de tipo A son más sinceros cuando se
requiere unanimidad para obtener la opción B (si un votante de tipo A vota A, no se
obtiene B) mientras que los votantes de tipo B son más sinceros con la regla de la mayoría
(si un tipo B deja de votar por B, lo más seguro es que salga A). En el primer tratamiento
sin inducir conformity, se obtiene que la regla de la mayoría no tiene ningún tipo de efecto
en la probabilidad de votar de manera sincera de los individuos.
Los votantes también tienden a votar de manera más sincera cuando saben que hay
dos agentes votando su opción preferida (en términos medios, los tipo A pasan a ser menos
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sinceros, de 0.60 a 0.52, excepto cuando se requiere unanimidad, mientras que los tipo B
pasan a ser más sinceros, del 0.75 al 0.86 con respecto al segundo tratamiento). Además,
se mantiene la relación que existe entre la probabilidad de ser sincero y ser pivotal, al
encontrar que los tipo A son más sinceros conforme la regla de la mayoría requiere más
votos a la opción B (pasar de mayoría simple a unanimidad), mientras que los tipo B son
menos sinceros cuando se requiere unanimidad, probablemente como respuesta a que los
tipo A van a ser pivotales y van a impedir que la opción B salga.
Para nalizar, se estudia si el hecho de inducir conformity afecta a obtener un re-
sultado más o menos eciente, analizando, para ello, el excedente total (la suma de los
pagos obtenidos por todos los agentes en cada uno de los tratamientos y para cada regla
de la mayoría). Se obtiene que sin conformity la probabilidad de maximizar los pagos
totales es mayor y que esta probabilidad aumenta ante la presencia de los dos agentes
tipo B forzados a votar por B. También se obtiene que, conforme la regla de la mayoría
requiere más apoyo para la opción B, más se aleja de el resultado socialmente eciente,
que se maximiza cuando se obtiene la opción B.
8.4 Conclusiones generales
Esta tesis estudia teóricamente el comportamiento estratégico de dos partes fundamen-
tales de la democracia: los partidos políticos y los votantes.
La parte destinada al estudio de los partidos políticos se centra en la competición
política entre dos partidos políticos cuando uno de ellos representa a un partido tradi-
cional que sólo quiere ganar las elecciones, mientras que el otro tiene ciertas preferencias
por la ambigüedad.
En el primer escenario, el partido ambiguo actúa de partido asambleario. Se muestra
que cuando la asamblea propone políticas más moderadas, se incrementan sus opciones
de ganar las elecciones. Además, se obtiene que la plataforma donde se sitúe la asamblea
hace que el partido tradicional se mueva por el espacio electoral, haciendo que se sitúe
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fuera de la posición del votante mediano cuando la asamblea sea centrista. Por tanto, se
obtiene que el partido asambleario genera divergencia entre las plataformas políticas de
los partidos, en contraste con el modelo Downsiano en el que los dos partidos tradicionales
se sitúan en el votante mediano. La demanda por aplicar democracia directa dentro de
los nuevos partidos políticos en su forma de elegir a los candidatos o las políticas a llevar
a cabo son un tema interesante a desarrollar en un futuro estudio sobre los partidos
asamblearios.
En el segundo escenario, el partido ambiguo viene representado por un partido que
consiste en dos facciones internas: una ideológica y otra oportunista. Bajo un marco se-
cuencial, se muestra que un partido con dos facciones necesita mucha ventaja en valence
para ganar las elecciones, incluso en el caso de elegir la plataforma política ya conociendo
qué va a hacer su oponente. A pesar de la multiplicidad de equilibrios, en este esce-
nario tampoco se obtiene el equilibrio Downsiano ya que los partidos tienen incentivos
a diferenciarse. Desde el punto de vista del votante, un partido con distintas facciones
genera plataformas políticas más plurales. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista de los
partidos, un partido con varias facciones perjudica al partido en comparación con un
partido tradicional. Una extensión de este modelo debe estudiar esta cuestión de manera
simultánea, y considerando que las facciones puedan tener distinto grado de importancia
dentro del partido.
En el tercer escenario analizado, ambos partidos tienen preferencia por la ambigüedad
y por ganar las elecciones. En una situación en las que los incentivos por ganar las elec-
ciones son muy altos, los partidos convergen a la política del votante mediano, sacri-
cando su preferencia por la ambigüedad. En caso de que los incentivos por ser ambiguos
sean muy altos, no se obtiene equilibrio alguno, ya que los partidos tienen incentivos a
desviarse a estrategias más ambiguas, aunque impliquen la pérdida de las elecciones. Por
tanto, con votantes neutrales al riesgo y cuando la distribución de votantes es conocida,
los partidos no pueden ganar las elecciones con una política ambigua. Una extensión de
este modelo interesante de realizar es comprobar si se obtiene el mismo resultado cuando
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los partidos sí son ideológicos y desviarse de su ideología hacia una política más ambigua
conllevase un coste.
Tras analizar el primer y el segundo escenario, se llega a la conclusión de que un
partido tradicional se mueve por el espacio político cuando necesita diferenciarse de un
partido ambiguo con el objetivo de atraer a votantes tanto del centro como de alguno
de los lados del mediano. Este resultado se obtiene independientemente de si el partido
asambleario tiene suciente valence para ganar las elecciones, ya que inuye sobre las
estrategias del partido tradicional incluso cuando pierde las elecciones. De los tres esce-
narios analizados, se obtiene que la ambigüedad de un partido hace que ciertos votantes
desarrollen un tipo de aversión al riesgo, aunque su utilidad sea denida como neutral.
Esta aversión al riesgo viene del hecho de que un votante neutral al riesgo, cuando se
sitúa en medio de las dos políticas del partido ambiguo, obtiene una mayor utilidad
del partido tradicional que del asambleario cuando ambos ofrecen la misma política (en
términos medios, para el partido asambleario). Por tanto, se puede concluir que la am-
bigüedad es un inconveniente para un partido que compite contra un partido tradicional
incluso cuando los votantes son neutrales al riesgo. Una posible extensión de este estudio
sería analizar cómo el valence que tiene un partido puede inuir en las actitudes frente al
riesgo de los votantes. ¿El hecho de que un partido sea generalmente considerado como
populista hará más averso al riesgo a un votante, o hará más tolerantes al riesgo a los
votantes cuando los partidos son más corruptos?
El segundo tema de estudio se centra en estudiar cómo la presencia de conformity
puede alterar las decisiones de los votantes ante una situación de información completa.
Cuando todos tienen preferencias afectadas por el conformity, se obtiene decisiones que
no coincide con lo que se obtendría cuando todos los votantes votan de manera sincera.
Para solventar este problema, se recurre a reemplazar a este tipo de agentes por votantes
independientes, que sólo consideran su opinión cuando votan y siempre votan de manera
sincera. Si la votación se desarrolla de manera simultánea, es posible hacer que el efecto
del conformity desaparezca si se reemplaza a un número suciente de agentes por inde-
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pendientes. En caso de que la votación se realice de manera secuencial, el conformity no
afecta a la decisión obtenida. Este estudio es un primer paso para analizar una versión
del modelo con información incompleta en el que, en vez de reemplazar agentes afectados
por el conformity por agentes independientes, se añada al grupo de votación a agentes
independientes, tal y como se hacen en los consejos de administración de las compañías
hoy en día.
Para nalizar, los datos obtenidos en el experimento respaldan el hecho de que inducir
conformity en las preferencias de los agentes por medio de un pago extra por coincidir con
el voto de algún otro agente reduce la probabilidad de votar de manera sincera. Además,
cuando los agentes saben que hay agentes independientes, esto les conlleva a votar de
manera más sincera. Los resultados también muestran el efecto de la regla de votación
sobre la manera de votar de los agentes, siendo menos sincero cuando menos pivotales
son. Una vez se conoce los efectos del conformity en las preferencias de los agentes,
sería interesante saber cómo la regla de votación y la pivotalidad de los agentes haga
que los agentes voten por la decisión más preferida por el grupo cuando no se induce
conformity en las preferencias de los agentes. No sólo la actuación de los sujetos en
el experimento es importante, también sería muy útil entender cuáles son sus creencias
sobre el comportamiento del resto de los sujetos durante la toma de decisiones de los
agentes en este tipo de situaciones.
Tras analizar conformity tanto teórica como experimentalmente, se pueden llegar a
varias conclusiones con respecto a la pivotalidad de los agentes, las reglas de votación y el
comportamiento sincero de los agentes. Primero, se obtiene que el conformity inuye el
voto de los agentes cuando éstos no pueden ser pivotales, lo que ocurre cuando la votación
es simultánea sin agentes independientes. Segundo, se puede llegar a la conclusión de
que las reglas de votación unánimes son más efectivas para obtener la decisión que se
obtendría cuando los agentes votan de manera sincera, ya que necesitan menos agentes
independientes. Tras unanimidad, la mayoría simple necesitaría menos independientes
que cualquier otra regla de votación. Tercero, el resultado experimental sugiere una
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interacción entre la regla de votación y la probabilidad de votar de manera sincera, ya
que los agentes votan más sinceramente cuanto más favorable sea la regla de votación
para la decisión que más les interese. Es decir, hay un efecto de la regla de votación en
la votación sincera de los agentes sólo cuando éstos pueden ser pivotales. Una extensión
de este estudio puede estar centrado en estudiar por qué los agentes no votan de manera
sincera cuando hay información completa y las preferencias por conformity no están
inducidas. ¿Puede un votante sacricar su opción favorita cuando se da cuenta que la
sociedad preere la otra opción, o deja de votar su opción favorita sólo por miedo a votar
sólo o con una minoría?
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